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Being a China-bom Hong Kongese, I have a special feeling for China. To leam more 
about the country, its majority peasant population must first be understood. Peasantry or 
peasant studies may seem irrelevant to the local academic field. Local research papers on 
peasantry are rare. Nevertheless, peasants are not very different from us, and learning more 
about their beliefs, thoughts and behaviours helps us gain a deeper understanding ofourselves. 
I owe a great debt to Dr Chan Hoi-man for his guidance as I explored this subject, 
especially for his help in developing a sensible theme and framework for this thesis. In addition, 
I must thank him for his encouragement and tolerance during this period. I am also very grateful 
to Professor Ambrose King and Dr Lau Chong-chor for their kind agreement to be members of 
the examination committee. 
By knowing more about peasants, a deeper understanding of our society can be 
reached. The study of industrial societies cannot be separated from the study of peasant 
societies. With the continued existence of rural sectors in every society, the study ofpeasants is 
essential for understanding society as a whole. 
Abstract 
This thesis is a configuration of the transformation process of the peasant view oflife 
through the study of two rural-sector reform movements — the Rural Reconstruction 
Movement and the Chinese Communist Party-led Land Reform Movement. By transforming 
the peasant's view of life, peasants' receptiveness to collective action can be changed, too. 
Theories and analysis from previous peasant studies have been consulted. Reference has also 
been made to social anthropological researches on peasant communities. 
Analysis has been made on the Rural Reconstruction Movement's and the Chinese 
Communist Party-led Land Reform Movement's reform experiments in Shandong and Fujian. 
Both of these peasant cultures contained conservative and revolutionary elements. Because 
they lived under subsistence pressure, the conservative element dominated their everyday lives. 
They were afraid that their few meagre possessions would be lost if they acted rashly. On the 
other hand, under some specific conditions, if peasants foresaw a prosperous future, the 
revolutionary element could develop. They would try to seize the opportunity to change their 
living environments at all costs. However, the conditions necessary to stimulate the 
development of the revolutionary element were not present in the peasant community. This 
condition is usually injected from outside. In this study, those external factors were provided by 
the Rural Reconstmctionists and the Chinese Communist Party's Land Reform activists. 
Although they used different approaches, both movements mobilised peasants and changed 
their views of life in the process. This negates the general conservative image of the peasants 
















CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and Objectives of Study 
For China, the early 20th century was an age of peasant uprisings. In the study of 
contemporary Chinese history, no one would deny the significant role played by peasants in the 
great Chinese Communist Revolution of this century. Their role was significant not simply 
because peasants made up the majority of China's population, but because it was their active 
participation in the Chinese Communist Revolution that finally turned a new page in Chinese 
history. Although this was not the first time that a peasant rebellion had successfully overthrown 
the existing regime in Chinese history, no event other event like the peasant's revolution ofthis 
century had managed to terminate the thousand-year-old feudal system. The cycle from peacetime 
to wartime and back to peace (yizhiyiluanf came to an end. Peasants were no longer society's 
underdogs — they were masters of the new country. Li Mao Zedong's words, the three 
mountains — exploitation by emperors, the gentry and family heads — on top ofthe peasants had 
been removed. Although peasants played significant roles, until recently they have been omitted 
from Westem scholars' study of the Chinese Communist Revolution. Peasant culture and peasant 
political actions remain unexplored fields in the study of the Chinese Revolution. This thesis aims 
to explore this topic through the study of two concrete peasant mobilization cases, the Rural 
Reconstruction Movement (RRM) in Shandong and the Chinese Communist Party's Land Reform 
Movement (LRM) in Westem Fujian. 
By the end of 1920s, China had been through years of suffering. Warlords were fighting 
one another and these continuous wars affected millions of people. The Republican government 
1. Jin Guantao and Liu Qinfeng, Xingsheng yu weiji (Prosperity and Crisis), Changsha : Hunan renmin 
chubanshe, 1984. 
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was powerless and heavily corrupt. The growth of the local economy was retarded as foreign 
imports gained a competitive edge over local products and the balance of trade became 
unfavorable to China. Public debt snowballed. To pay the debt, the Kuomintang (KMT) 
government continued issuing bank notes and silver was flown out to meet import needs. As a 
result, the currency devalued considerably. The inflated price of goods diminished people's 
purchasing power, hence lowering their standards of living. Peasants at the lowest layers of 
society shouldered heavy pressure imposed from higher social layers. They became the most 
deprived group in the society. 
At the same time, there existed those who wanted to save the country, especially the 
intellectuals, who sought the means for the country's development. There was consensus among 
the intellectuals, who harbored a strong sense that the government had to make some changes. 
Those usually termed as reformists clamored strongly for administrative reforms in the central and 
local governments, whilst the more radical revolutionaries argued for a total overthrow of the 
KMT government. 
Among the reformists, the Rural Reconstmctionists (xiangcun jianshe pai), consisting of 
scholars who worked mainly in rural areas, hoped to transform society by promoting education 
and development projects in the villages. They thought that China's main problem was that the 
majority of the population was naive and illiterate. They believed that if all the people, especially 
the disadvantaged peasants, were educated, that China's problems could be solved. They began to 
organize mass educational programs in the villages, but they soon found that under the extremely 
poor living conditions, education still was not affordable for the peasants because they had to 
make a living on their farms and had no time to rest or study. The Rural Reconstmctionists 
realized that unless the peasants were relieved from the pressures of subsistence, no educational 
program would succeed. The educational programs turned into development projects. The 
2 
organizers tried to mobilize peasants organize to fight for their own good. The Rural 
Reconstruction Movement (RRM) soon swept the country. The activists formed an informal 
organization called the National Organization of Rural Reconstmctionists {Quanguo xiangcun 
jianshe taolunhui). The RRM became a countrywide movement to reform the villages. Later, the 
organization became the third major political force (after the KMT and the Chinese Communist 
Party or CCP) called the Alliance of Chinese Democratic Political Organizations {Zhongguo 
minzu zhengtuan tongmeng) or the Democratic Alliance {minmeng). Although the Democratic 
Alliance had no military power, it represented most of the reformist intellectuals, enjoyed a 
comparatively high status in society and had great influence on KMT government policies. 
Apart from the reformist RRM, there was other more radical Communist movement 
aimed at the overthrow of the KMT government. Since the establishment of the CCP in 1921, 
peasants were one of the targets of mobilization. A Peasants' Division, Workers' Division, Youth 
Division and Women's Division were set up under the party central committee. At the beginning 
of the CCP movement, all divisions focused on the mobilization of urban workers and students 
through the trade unions and student unions. The urban masses had been mobilized to join in 
various demonstrations and strikes to fight against capitalists and the KMT government. 
However, the CCP's urban mobilization did not last long. Li 1927, when the CCP's alliance with 
the KMT government broke up, the KMT government suppressed the CCP's movements in the 
urban area. The CCP then shifted its main focus of mobilization from the workers and students in 
the cities to the peasants in the villages. The Land Reform Movement (LRM) soon started in the 
villages. The aims of the LRM included the overthrow of the local KMT government, 
redistribution of land from landlords to the land-less peasants, and rent reduction campaigns to 
abolish the landlords' exploitation of the peasants. The number of peasant organizations 
{nonghui) increased to more than 20,000, with a total membership of more than 1 million in 1927. 
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In some places, the peasant organizations gained substantial strength and superseded the KMT 
government's rule. 
Both the RRM and the LRM movements aimed to transform society through the 
mobilization ofpeasants at the grassroots level. Movement activists with urban backgrounds went 
to the villages and presented themselves as friends of the peasants. They tried to cultivate the trust 
and loyalty between of the peasants. They helped the peasants form cooperatives for production 
and consumption and organized the peasants to participate in various political events. 
The RRM's projects were aimed mainly at improving the peasants' living standards. Their 
projects were conducted in cooperation with the KMT government. They had no intention of 
overthrowing the KMT regime. Peaceful means were emphasized. The LRM, on the other hand, 
adopted every possible means, including violent rebellions, to fight against landlords and the 
KMT government. They forced the redistribution of land from the landed to the landless. The 
RRM's vision of a transformed society was based on traditional Chinese ideals and Confucianism, 
which served as a strong supporting ideology. The LRM, on the other hand, had Communist and 
Marxist ideals and aimed to destroy the traditional feudal relations of production. 
Considering all the similarities and differences, these two movements were the most 
comparable large-scale mobilizations of peasants in China during the 1920s and 1930s. Although 
there were no explicit links between the two movements, the two leaders, Mao Zedong and Liang 
Shuming, met several times and did influence each other's views on the development of China. 
The results of the two movements were also quite similar. The RRM came to an end in 1937 as the 
Japanese invasion stopped their work in the villages, whilst the LRM came to an end when the Red 
Army was defeated by KMT troops in 1936. The two movements were both unfinished 
experimental projects in rural development through the mobilization of mass peasants. After the 
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RRM closed in 1937, many RRM activistsjoined the CCP and carried on their duties to organize 
the peasants. 
Despite these connections between the two movements, there have been no research 
studies compare them. There have been some papers comparing Mao Zedong and Liang 
Shuming, but no studies have been done on the concrete processes of the two movements. This 
study aims to deal with a comparison of the processes of the two movements. As an introduction, 
we examine some past studies of the RRM and the LRM. 
1.2 Past Studies of the RRM and LRM 
1.2.1 Rural Reconstruction Movements 
There have been a few academic studies on the RRM. The works were mainly biographies 
ofthe RRM leaders. Most of them made implicit comparisons of the RRM with the CCP peasant 
movements. 
Guy S. Alitto prepared the most comprehensive biography ofLiang Shuming — the Rural 
Reconstmctor and popular thinker of Republican China�. According to Alitto, Liang's rural 
reconstruction work was a Confucian attempt to modernize China^. Liang hoped to transform the 
country through the use of moral and intellectual power^. He envisioned a non-state led mass 
movement aimed at changing society without using violence. According to Alitto, Liang applied a 
"revolutionary conservative" approach^ with the contradictory possibilities of "political cultural 
revolution" and "conservative control". Liang hoped to promote "reason" {lixing) as the principle 
2 Alitto, Guy. S, The Last Confucian, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979. 
3. Alitto, ibid, p.l92. 
4. Alitto, ibid, p.273. 
5. Alitto, ibid, p.274. 
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mobilizing the peasants. However, it failed. The successful mobilization of peasants in Zhouping 
county of Shandong Province largely depended on peasants' awareness of their self-interests, not 
"reason". Liang believed that state intervention in the mobilization of society should be avoided. 
He emphasized a non-state led mass movement, but the influence of the state has never been 
successfully excluded. The RRM project in Zhouping was supported by the warlord Han Fuqu of 
Shandong Province. In fact, it was Han's initial support that allowed the RRM's project to begin in 
Zhouping; it was Han's betrayal of the movement in 1937 that shattered the dream of the RRM 
workers. 
It seems that there was an inherent paradox between Liang's theoretical construct and the 
project implemented by the Rural Reconstmctionist. The RRM was criticized for minimizing the 
corrupted traditional Chinese culture on one hand and, on the other, tried to use the same culture to 
solve China's problems^. 
According to Alitto, the leader of CCP peasant movement, Mao Zedong, and the "last 
Confucianist", Liang Shuming, represented two methods of modernization in China. They 
differed in their emphasis on conflict (Mao) versus consensus (Liang) as the development force of 
history. They had different views on the use of political force in the path of Chinese 
modernization — Liang believed in peaceful mass movement of the autonomous society and Mao 
believed in armed revolution with a strong leading party state. However, they shared many 
similarities. They both focused on the mobilization of peasants as integral to China's 
development. They believed that China's industrialization should be made through the 
development of small rural industries and without foreign intervention. For approaches to 
mobilize peasants, they both believed that people's internal virtue was the ultimate motivator to 
save China. Liang called it "reason", and Mao called it "proletarian consciousness". Both 
6. Alitto, ibid, p.278. 
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emphasized the spirit of sacrificing oneself for the nation and the country as the motivational force 
ofthe masses. However, this spirit had to be cultivated through group dynamics. Alitto thought 
the similarity in beliefs believes and approaches of Liang and Mao were probably due to "the 
objective historico-geograhic legacy of a large, poor and disjointed agricultural society”?. In a 
country like China, with a huge population but a retarded economy, resources were inadequate, 
with the exception of spiritual ones. Liang and Mao shared a vision of Chinese modernization 
through the improvement of people's spiritual life. 
Other than Alitto, Ma Yong, editor of the ''Collected works of Liang Shwning”, tried to 
depict a complete picture of Liang^. He confirmed the contributions of the RRM to the 
development of China. He also found similarities between the CCP peasant movement and the 
RRM represented by Liang. He criticized Liang's misunderstanding of class struggles in the 
villages and the RRM's dependence on intellectual power to save peasants from their exploited 
situations. Ma pointed out that Liang's reliance on scholars to lead the mass movement was a kind 
of individual heroism. While Alitto thought that Liang's failure was due to the difficult social 
conditions, Ma thought it was Liang's misunderstandings of the social structure of China and his 
innocent belief in the use of intellectual power to save the country through cultural transformation 
that led RRM to fail. There have also been studies on other Rural Reconstmctionists. Charles 
Hayford studied another RRM leader, Yan Yangchu (James Yenf. As Christian Chinese, Yan 
believed also in Confucianism. He started his career promote education in the villages in 1926. 
For Hayford, although Yan was trained in a Westem missionary school and was a liberal 
7 Alitto, ibid, p.273. 
8. Ma Yong, Liang Shumingpingzhuan (The Biography ofLiang Shuming), Anhui: Anhui renmin chubanshe, 
1992. 
9. Hayford, Charles, To the People: James Yen and Village China, New York: Columbia University Press, 
1990. 
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Christian, Yan's Christianity and liberalism were more patriotic and creative than the "colonized 
identities" ofthe "Westem Imperialist" implied^^. Yan made use ofWestem funding and Western 
knowledge to develop the distinct Chinese science and democracy. Yan conducted the first 
comprehensive mass-education program in China. His teaching techniques, i.e. mobilization 
techniques, resembled Liang Shuming's and Mao Zedong's. Like Liang, Yan found it difficult to 
maintain a relationship with the KMT state from afar. "Reform could not exist, much less 
progress, without a stable and firm national government to protect the country, enforce reforms, 
and maintain local order,…but if it allied with any of the visible military powers, it was subject to 
cooperation, veto, and cormption."^^ Hayford clearly stated the paradox ofYan and the RRM — 
he thought it was the CCP,s successful combining of military force with a rural reform program 
that led to its final victory. 
The above works on RRMs were basically narratives. They told of the rise and fall of 
RRMs but did not identify the mechanisms underneath the movements. 
1.2.2 CCP Land Reform Movements 
In contrasted with the relatively few studies on RRM, there have been many studies on CCP-led 
peasant movements. One group emphasized the elite — their character, conflicts and decisions 
and the effect they had on CCP policies, 
(i) Micro-Level Studies of the Revolutionary Elite 
The study of the CCP revolution had once concentrated on the study of the party d i t e " 
This kind of "Pekingology" — the study of top level power struggles and line disputes in 
10. Hayford, ibid, p.xii. 
11. Hayford, ibid, p.l79. 
12 See Bemett A Gordon. "Elite and Society in China: A Summary ofResearch and kiterpretation' in Robert A. 
Scalapino ed. Elites in the People's Republic of China. Seattle: University Washington Press 1972. 
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Peking — assumed that the contemporary Chinese politics was determined by top level power 
conflict. The struggles between different "cliques" based on personal ties, "interest groups" and 
ideological "factions", had determined the CCP's policies and the result of the revolution. Philip 
Huang criticized this kind of approach, saying that it "reduced the history of the Chinese 
revolution to the power machinations of a few men" and "reduces the Chinese revolution to the 
armchair theoretical exercise of a few menI'^ ^ For Huang, to understand the Chinese Revolution, 
one had to place top-level struggles into a larger social context. 
Other studies focused on the structural factors that constrained and enhanced the 
development ofthe CCP movement in China. In these studies, the results of the CCP movements 
were determined by structural factors. 
(ii) Macro-Level Studies of Structural Factors 
In contrasted with micro-level studies, the macro-structural studies can be classified into 
two types — "contextual theories", which emphasize the constraints and influences ofthe social 
environment, and "motivational theories" which emphasize the collective attitudes affecting the 
result of the peasant movements". 
For contextual theories, see the works of Barrington Moore, Eric Wolf and Theda 
Skocpol. ki his Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Barrington Moore described 
China's traditional social structure as weakly integrated, with very few links between the upper, 
13 Huang, Philip C. C. "Intellectuals, Lumpen- Proletarians, Workers and Peasants in the Communist 
Movement', in Philip CC. Huang, Lynda Schaffer Bell and Kathy Lemons WaUcer, Chinese Communists and 
Rural Society 1927-1934. China Research Monographs, Center of Chinese Studies. University of 
California, Berkeley. 1978. p.89-90. 
14 Hofheinz, Ray Jr. 1969. "The Ecology ofChinese Communist Success: Rural Influence Pattern, 1923-45' in 
A. Doak Bamett, ed. Chinese Communist Politics in Action. Seattle: University ofWashington. p.34. 
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ruling class and peasants. "[T]he link between rulers and ruled was weak and largely artificial, 
liable to snap under any severe strain."^^ For Moore, in the late 19th century the basic integration 
systems 一 the granary system (welfare function), pao-Chia system ^)olice surveillance function) 
and hsiang-yueh system (popular indoctrination function) 一 all failed. Peasants' were generally 
discontented and the KMT state failed to address their needs. Seeing this, the CCP seized the 
chance to build a strong revolutionary base among the peasants. The Japanese invasion in 1937 
completed the elimination of the local elite and forged solidarity among the suppressed peasants. 
Moore explained that the social conditions helped the CCP to its final victory. 
Eric Wolfformulated similar arguments in his Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century^^. 
He claimed that the CCP, as a "peasant party" successfully turned the millenarian dreams of 
peasants into reality. 
On the basis ofMoore's and Wolfs work, as well as that of Charles Tilly and knmanuel 
Wallestein, Theda Skocpol formulated a more comprehensive model to explain the break-up of 
social revolutions^^. According to Skocpol, the traditional state had failed to react to the 
international and historical crisis facing China in the 19th century. Neither the warlords nor the 
KMT government could save China from the crisis. Not until the strong CCP party-state seized 
power in 1949 was the crisis resolved. She emphasized the impact of the international 
environment on the rise of the social revolution, and the relative autonomy ofstate organization in 
determining the success of a social revolution. 
15. Moore. Social Origins, p.205. 
16. Wolf, Eric. Peasant Wars. 
17. Skocpol, Theda. 1979. State and Social Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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Apart from the contextual analysis, there have also been studies emphasizing mass 
motivations. The most prominent of these is Chalmers Johnson's Peasant Nationalism and 
Communist Power^^. In it, Johnson claimed that "[T]he Communist rise to power in China should 
be understood as a species of nationalist movement."^^ For him, it was the invasion of Japanese 
troops that "destroyed the traditional rural social order and sensitized the Chinese peasantry to a 
new spectrum of possible associations, identities, and purposes.”��As the KMT's armies retreated 
after Japanese invasion, a large portion of rural China had a power vacuum. The CCP seized the 
opportunity and presented themselves as a patriotic, anti-Japanese force seeking national 
salvation. The presence of Communists as the most competent organizers of resistance in the 
countryside soon aroused peasants' support. For Johnson, the CCP correctly addressed the 
peasants' nationalism, rather than exploiting class conflict, to succeed. 
In contrast with Johnson's theory, R. H. Tawney argued that peasants' support of 
Communism was an expressive action towards the intolerable injustice they then endured. 
KMT president Chiang Kai-shek credited the Communist victory to its terrifying "force of 
arms"2i. He thought it was the CCP's extreme violence that fnghtened the people into obeying 
Communist rule. 
Elite character and structural factors were all factors in the rise and fall of CCP peasant 
movements. However, these explanations are static. The dynamic interactive process between 
CCP and RRM organizers in the villages and the peasants has been ignored. Moreover, whether a 
micro or a macro explanation, they all tried to explain the success of CCP Revolution at a national 
18. Johnson, Chahners A. 1962. Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press. 
19. Johnson, ibid, p.ix. 
20. Johnson, ibid. p.5. 
21. Chiang Kai-shek. 1957. Soviet Russia in China. New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Cudahy. 
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level. However, the CCP peasant movement varied in different areas and in different periods 一 
there was no single pattern to peasant movements. Hofheinz, in his study ofthe ecology" ofthat 
• 22 
success, suggested that no particular structural relationship should be generally applicable . 
Unequal land distribution, high tenancy rates and high rents had no direct relationship to the 
outbreak of peasant collective action. Neither was the Communist influence was necessarily 
linked to cultural backwardness and strong Westem impact. The presence of banditry, was an 
indicator for the tightness of the KMT's political control that had scant connection with 
Communist influence. Hofheinz suggested that a closer look on the practices of the CCP in the 
local context of their interactions with peasants and peasant communities was the key to 
understanding CCP peasant movements in further exploratory studies. 
(iii) M e s o - l e v e P Studies on Local Process 
Along with micro-level studies on revolutionary elite and macro-level studies on structural 
factors, the third category, meso-level studies, focus on the concrete process of peasant movement 
at a specific period of time in a particular area. These studies usually describe the CCP 
revolutionary history in local communities and explain the perceived phenomenon. Some ofthe 
studies emphasize the organizational process of CCP ^)arty-centered)and others focus on the 
community roots of peasant collective action ^>easant-centered). 
i) Party Centered Studies 
Lotveit, Kim, Averill, Huang, Bell and Walker all examined the CCP revolution during 
the LRM or Jiangxi Period, which Huang acknowledged as "[T]he gigantic social movement that 
first took definite shape."^^ 
22. Hofheinz. Ecology of Chinese Communist Success. 
23. Chan, Hoiman, Lecture Notes from the course ~ Chinese Society, conducted in Department of Sociology in 
Chinese University Hong Kong, 1994. 
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The most comprehensive work on the LRM was prepared by Trygve Lotveit^^ and Ilpyang 
J. Kim26. While Lotveit described the general structure of CCP's governance in the Jiangxi Soviet 
Base, Kim portrayed the formulation of the "mass line" policy, which emphasized popular 
participation and how it achieved considerable success in mobilizing the peasants. 
Stephen C. Averill provided an overall picture of the CCP's LRM Period^^. He paid 
special attention to CCP's interaction with traditional localism, various lineage organizations and 
bandit societies. He argued that the CCP made use of existing peasant beliefs and peasant 
institutions to mobilize the peasants. However, it was these local factors that spurred the Red 
Army to attain higher revolutionary goals. 
Conducting research on the same period, Philip Huang analyzed the changing process of 
the CCP's party constituency^^. In the initial stage, the party depended heavily on the local 
organization and bandit groups to develop its party organization and Red Army. A large portion of 
lumpen-proletarians within the party caused problems such as localism and opportunism. Huang 
argued that "it was only through land reform and systematic involvement of the farming 
population in the exercise of revolutionary power that the party was able to forge a genuine link 
9Q 
with the countryside." 
24. Huang, Philip C. C. et al, Chinese Communists andRural Society 1927-1934. p.96. 
25. Lotveit, Trygve. 1973. Chinese Communism 1931-1934. Scandinavian kistitute of Asian Studies 
Monograph Series No.l6. Copenhagen: Studentlitteratur. 
26. Ilpyang J. Kim. 1973. The Politics of Chinese Communism, Kiangsi under the Soviets. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
27 Averill, Stephen C. 1978. "The Communist and Society in Kiangsi 1926-31'. A paper prepared for the 
Workshop on Chinese Communist Rural Base Areas of 1922-1949, held at Fairbank Center for East Asian 
Research, Harvard University, on 14-21, August 1978. 
28. Huang, Philip C. C. et al, Chinese Communists and Rural Society 1927-1934. 
29. Huang, et al, ibid, p.27. 
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Along with an analysis ofthe LRM in general, Bell and Walker analyzed the main focus of 
the CCP's policy on the mobilization of agricultural laborers and women.^^ Bell described the 
change oforthodox beliefs from the emphasis on agricultural laborers as the proletarian leaders in 
Chinese Revolution to the emphasis on the mobilization of owner peasants, as well as tenant 
/ 
peasants. On the other hand, Walker described the liberation of women as an important facet in 
CCP's revolutionary effort. 
Besides the studies on JiangXi period, there were many studies on the Yanan (Yenan) period. The 
popular work ofMark Selden illustrated the contribution of the "mass line" to the success ofthe 
CCP RevolutW^ Selden praised the CCP's practices during the Yanan period for discovering 
the method "linking popular participation in the guerrilla struggle with a wide ranging community 
attack on rural problems.”�� It was the first time that peasants, through "mass line" policies, could 
participate in the political process to determine their fate. During the Yanan period, peasant 
• 33 
community life was egalitarian, participatory and decentralized. 
Victor Nee shed light on the CCP's organizational work during the Yanan period from a 
social exchange theory^^ For him, the CCP offered the peasants guidance in the organizing and 
training of local resistance against foreign invader. Li return, the peasants gave the CCP leaders 
approval and support, including selling food and clothing to the party andjoining the CCP army. 
Peasants were self-interested in supporting the CCP revolution. 
30. Bell, Lynda Schaefer. “ Agricultural Laborers and Rural Revolution' and Kathy LeMons WaUcer "The Party 
and Peasant Women', both in Huang, Bell and WaUcer, op cit. 1978. 
31 Selden, Mark. The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1971. 
32. Selden, ibid, p.276. 
33. For a contrasting picture, see Chen, Yung-fa, Yanan deyinying (Shadow ofYanan). 
34. Nee, Victor. Social Exchange and Political Process in Maoist China. New York: Garland Publishing. 1991. 
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The above studies emphasized the organizational efforts of the CCP. Peasants were seen 
as passive recipients reacting to CCP mobilization with self-interested orientations. This 
approach reduces what was in reality the peasant's active role. The reasons for this were partly the 
negligence of peasantry as a specific social group and partly the lack of firsthand historical 
materials on peasant life in China. Studies conducted by examining published party documents 
unavoidably emphasize the party's power. 
ii) Peasant-Centered Studies 
Another category of studies focuses on peasant rebels as a general phenomenon in China. 
The CCP revolution is presented as a successM case. This category can be further divided along 
three theoretical orientations 一 Marxist, political economist and culturalist. 
Marxist 
Marxist theory generally assumes that conflicts in society originate in the exploitative 
social relations of production. Li rural areas, the basic social relations of production are at the root 
of the conflict between the landed and landless classes. Surplus is extracted from peasants to 
landlords through rent. Merchants, moneylenders and the state also exploit wealth from the 
peasants. Marxist theory predicts that one day, peasants realize the class conflict andjoin together 
to overthrow all forms of exploitation. Li this context, analysis focuses on objective class interest, 
social and political arrangements shaping the peasants' consciousness and the resources available 
for collective action.^^ 
The CCP formulated a Marxist interpretation on peasant rebels (nongmin qiyi) and peasant 
wars {nongmin zhanzheng). Traditional China was considered a feudal society. The main social 
35. Little, Daniel. Understanding Peasant China. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1989. 
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conflict was between peasants and landlords. Peasant revolutionary wars were all fought against 
economic exploitation and political domination. However, before a new productive force and 
relations of production could emerge, the lack of pioneer leadership (such as the CCP),resulted in 
only at a change of regime, without the destruction of feudal society. Until the 19th century, there 
sprouts of capitalism represented the emergence of a new productive force and social relations of 
production. It acted as a disintegrative force on the feudal society. Moreover, foreign imperialist's 
political and economic invasions increased the exploitation of peasants and hastened the 
breakdown of the empire. With conditions ripe, the CCP-led peasant movement was able to 
overthrow the semi-feudal, semi-colonial society” As class conflict was the basis of the 
revolution, a class line could be drawn to distinguish enemies from allies. Li the bipolar 
continuum, those under heaviest exploitation would be the most revolutionary. They would be the 
loyal followers of the revolutionary CCP and hence the main targets for mobilization. 
Jean Chesneaux also applied the class conflict framework to explain peasant rebellions in 
China.37 For him, conflict was inherent in the agricultural setting. Landlords, gentry and officials 
were all "natural enemies" to peasants. Because conflict existed, revolution was unavoidable. 
However, peasants alone were incapable of achieving a successful revolution. It was only the 
leadership of the CCP that tumed the peasant's revolutionary potential into reality. 
Robert Marks analyzed the Haifeng peasant uprising in 19th and 20th centuries.^^ He paid 
special attention to changes in social structure and their relationships to peasant revolutions. For 
Marks, peasants' collective actions had to be studied within the context of rural social and 
economic structures. He referred particularly to property management relations, tenancy relations, 
36. Mao, Zedong, 1991. Zhong Guo Ge Min He Zhong Guo Gong Zhan Dang (Chinese Revolution and Chinese 
Communist Party) in Selected Works Vol. 2. Beijing: Renmin Chu Ban She. 
37. Chesneaux, Jean. 1973. Peasant Revolts in China 1840-1949. London:Thames&Hudson. 
38. Marks, Robert. 1984. Rural Revolution in South China. Madison: University ofWisconsin Press. 
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forms oftaxation and peasants' access to land 一 to illustrate the structure of peasant life. Marks 
also highlighted the influence of imperialism and pressures from global capitalist markets 
imposed on local social structures. 
The major criticism of the Marxist class analysis of peasant movements was the sense of 
determinism. The emphasis on class conflict as the ultimate motivator of peasant movements has 
been proved wrong. There were other motivating factors, such as local sense ofbelonging, lineage 
loyalty and religious beliefs, which cut across class lines and which were more likely motivational 
and organizational sources. 
Political EconQmist 
The guiding threads of the political economist theory were that peasants were rational 
individuals. Collective rebellions were interpreted as unintended consequences ofthe behavior of 
rational individuals. Political resources available facilitated individual participation. 
Elizabeth Perry's Rebels and Revolution Arise in North China 1845-1945^^ is a 
representative work in this category. Perry studied the peasant rebels, Nian, Red Spears and CCP 
led peasant movements. For her, peasant rebellion was a rational action toward the need of 
survival. Peasants reacted to the local environment, expressing objectives for the benefit ofthe 
local community rather than national or regional benefits. Participants and leaders were motivated 
by self-interest. The resulting peasant movement was an unintended collective action. Under the 
leadership of CCP, "policies pointed the way to a more efficient method of group survival; it was 
possible to transform peasant behaviof , Peasants turned rationally to CCP. 
39. Perry, Elizabeth. 1980. Rebels and Revolution Aries in North China 1845-1945. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
40. Perry, ibid, p.247. 
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The political economist analysis applied by Perry was based on the assumption that all 
actors were rational and self-interested. This explanation shares the weaknesses of the Marxist 
explanation, reducing peasants' wants to merely material interests. Both ignore the culturally 
nurtured rural context of peasant life. 
Cu1turalist 
The culturalist pays attention to specific cultural factors in determining peasants' 
individual and collective actions. Cultural explanations do not consider other factors that trigger a 
collective rebellion. Rather, cultural factors predispose peasants to rebellion. They alone indicate 
the basis and the boundary of possible peasant collective actions. 
Susan Naquin emphasized the role of shared millenarian ideology in the Eight Trigrams 
Rebellion (the 1813 revolt led by members of loosely connected religious sects) . For Naquin, 
religious sects were important organizations among the competing powers in village 
communities. Their membership was diverse — rich and poor, landed and landless, 
administrators and ordinary peasants. A shared ideology and organizational effort cemented all of 
them together. It was the belief that the movement would succeed and a belief that life or death 
depended on each person's contribution s that bound people together in such a rebellion. 
Kamal Sheel analyzed the CCP-led peasant uprisings in JiangXi ofthe late 1920's.^ ^ He 
found that revolution was possible only when rebellion leader Fang Zhimin became part of the 
peasant community. "[I]ntellectuals cannot make revolutions as they please, but must work 
41. Naquin, Susan. 1976. Millenarian Rebellion in China. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
42. Sheel, Kamal. 1989. Peasant Society and Marxist Intellectuals in China. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
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together with the peasants who have their own notions ofjustice and order."^^ The peasants' view 
seemed to be the determinant rather than the determined. 
In his study on the highlanders in central China, Jerome Chen emphasized peasants' 
underlying values in revolutionary mobilization.^^ Chen differentiated the highlanders from 
plainsmen, and claimed that the former "lived outside cities, towns and even villages or fortresses. 
Unprotected by militia or police, ignored for by lineage or government, and uneducated, they had 
to fend for themselves and rely to a considerable degree on the wisdom of their oral tradition, 
which was both martial and romantic."^^ Moreover, Chen suggested two kinds of enthusiasm that 
revolutionaries could rely on: "The first from the poor peasants to give aid to the Communist Party 
in the process of conquest, and the second from the middle and rich peasants in the process ofland 
redistribution and policy making."^^ It seemed that peasants of different backgrounds reacted 
differently to the CCP's mobilization. Chen took a more diversified and more specified view of 
peasants' cultural values. 
Ralph Thaxton may have prepared the most comprehensive work in culturalist analysis.^^ 
Thaxton proved that it was not simply the destruction of old regime, exploitation, nor the 
availability of political resources that led to peasant rebellions. It was all these factors that aroused 
peasants' moral anger. The feeling of injustice was the predisposor to revolution. "Ln modem 
China, a peasantry with its strategies of survival nearly exhausted regained the material basis for 
its "old designs for living" and realized its own conception of social justice through participation 
43. Shed, ibid, p.238. 
44 Chen, Jerome. 1992. Highlanders of Central China. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 
45. Chen, ibid, p.247. 
46. Chen, ibid, p.248. 
47. Thaxton, Ralph. 1983. China TurnedRightside Up. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
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in revolutionary politics."^^ Thaxton called the CCP Revolution a "folk revolution", and defined it 
as "a revolution in the service of the humble folk."^^ 
There were surely other explanations for peasant collective actions. However, it is not the 
aim of this study to exhaust all paradigms. The above three paradigms — Marxist, political 
economist and culturalist 一 were the basis of this study. 
These three paradigms seem to hold conflicting theoretical orientations and explanations. 
However, as suggested by Little^^ and Huang^^ they could be complementary. Each of them 
illustrates part of the reality and some of the problems insufficiently examined by the others. It 
was necessary to combine the three approaches and to clarify their relationships. The aim ofthis 
paper is to look for the context that each approach explains clearly. It does not to claim that 
generalization is possible in the study of Chinese peasants' collective action. Such a pattem would 
sacrifice specificity. Nevertheless, a generalized framework could be the first step for further 
studies of more concrete explanations of peasant collective action. This study takes a culturalist 
approach, taking into consideration Marxist and political economist's emphases on structural and 
material factors. To study peasant culture, no individual peasant or peasant community should be 
the trajectory point. The social entity that best nourished peasant culture was the local peasant 
communities. Hence, this is a meso-level study. At the meso-level, researches focuses on local 
peasant communities. 
48. Thaxton, ibid, p.220. 
49. Thaxton, ibid. 
50. Little, David. 1989. Understanding Peasant China. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
51. Huang, Philip CC. "Paradigmatic Crisis in Chinese Studies: Paradoxes in Social and Economic History’ in 
Modern China. July 1991. p.299-341. 
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In addition, the results ofRRMs and LRMs will not be compared. It would be unfair to 
judge peasant movements merely by their results. This study will show how peasants reacted to 
different mobilization; how peasant culture constrained or enhanced their actions. 
1.3 Peasant Studies and the Peasant View of Life 
To respect peasant's participation in RRM and LRM, the present study would consult 
peasant studies as the theoretical reference. Hence, a brief introduction of the field is necessary. 
Peasants probably existed for thousands of years. The history of peasants was much longer than 
its counterparts 一 the workers of the industrial society. Peasant studies as an academic field of 
study has revived in the 1970s because of the continuous revolutionary tides in Asia, Afiica and 
Latin America. Debates have been aroused on whether there was a specific social group — the 
peasant group, and there was a specific field of study — peasant studies. Let us review the major 
arguments in the following section. 
52 • 
Lenin in his early writings on The Development of Capitalism in Russia published in 
1899, argued that the increasing commercialization of the rural area would lead to further 
differentiation among agricultural producers. He expected that a class of capitalist agricultural 
producer would emerge and peasants would tum into proletariats. So peasants, as a group, would 
ro 
disappear in the history . 
52. Lenin, 1960. Collected Works Vol 3. The Development of Capitalism in Russia. Moscow: Foreign 
Languages Publishing House. 
53. The old peasantry is not only differentiating; it is being completely dissolved, it is ceasing to exist, it is being 
ousted by absolutely new types of rural inhabitants ~ these types are the rural bourgeoisie (mainly petty 
bourgeoisie) and the rural proletariat ~ a class of commodity producers and a class of agricultural wage 
workers.' (Lenin. 1977. Development of Capitalism in Russia. Moscow, p.l77. Cited in H. Alavi, 1987, in 
Shanin, ed., Peasant and Peasant Societies, p.l91) 
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However, empirical evidence has shown the "non-inexistence" of peasants all over the 
world. Even Lenin himselfhad changed his unrealistic prediction^^. 
Despite the acknowledgement of the existence of peasants, Theodore Schultz^^ and 
Samuel Popkin^^ believed that general economic theories, concepts and framework could be used 
to explain peasantry. They assumed that individual peasant was no different to a standard rational 
man searching for optimization of benefits. Rational choice model could be applied to explain 
peasants' economic activities and their political actions. 
On the other hand, A. V. Chayanov, a Russian rural economist has recognized the social 
and theoretical distinctiveness of peasants^^. Li Chayanov's view, peasants depended solely on 
their family members for production. Production was for self-consumption. They aimed at 
securing the subsistence needs of the family rather than making a profit. It was not capitalist profit 
to determine the intensity of cultivation and the volume of output but the balance between 
subsistence needs and their unwillingness towards work. For the fulfillment ofsubsistence needs, 
peasants were willing to exploit themselves to increase the volume of production. Chayanov's 
analysis was based his the research on individual family farm, but the resulting findings had 
greater implications. It implied that peasant economy should be treated as an economic system in 
its own right. Hence, it legitimized the application of a unique logic in the analysis ofpeasants. 
Chayanov's study became the foundation of peasant studies. Together with Marx's Grundrisse 
r 0 
and other studies on peasantry, especially those anthropologists' work , the studies all became the 
54. Alavi, Hamza. 1987. Peasantry and Capitalism: a Marxist Discourse in Teodor Shanin, ed., ibid, p. 185-196. 
55. Schultz, T.W., 1964. Transforming Traditional Agriculture, New Haven: Yale University Press, p.5. 
56. Popkin, S. 1979. The Rational Peasant. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
57. Thomer, Daniel, Basile Kerblay and R. E. F. Smith (eds). 1986. A. V. Chayanov on the Theory ofPeasant 
Economy. Madison: University ofWisconsin Press. 
58. That includes Wolf, Eric. 1966. Peasants. New Jersey: Englewood; Firth, Raymond. 1946. Malay 
Fishmen: Their Peasant Economy. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and C.0.; Redfield, Robert. 
22 
classical model studies on peasantry. They all came to the conclusion that peasants as a unique 
social group should be studied through its own logic. 
In peasant studies, peasant society and peasant life had been studied on the one hand as 
encompassing specific characteristics which were differentiated from the "larger" society; on the 
other hand, their linkage and usually subordination to the external structure of power were 
emphasized. Peasants then became a special social group sustaining their own culture and life and 
at the same time interacting continuously with the outside world^^. 
Furthermore, as peasants had been the major actors in history before the industrial 
revolution, the interaction between peasants and the non-peasant sector of the society could be 
studied as a historical process. Under the impact of the ever-growing non-peasant sector, peasant 
society has undergone structural changes. Particularly, under great pressure of the processes, 
"state-making" and "capitalization"^^, peasant society has suffered from new kinds ofexploitation 
by state and capitalists, acculturation^^ by more "civilized" sectors and internal disintegration of 
the peasant society. Peasants resisted through collective actions^^ and more popularly, used the 
"weapons of the weak"^^. 
1941. The Folk Culture ofYacatan. Chicago: Chicago University Press. For a summary of different works 
see Geertz, Clifford. 1962. "Studies in Peasant Life: Community and Society' in Bernard Siegel (ed.), 
Biennial Review of Anthropology 1961. Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 1 -41. 
59. It is this later kind of conceptualization that differentiates peasant society to tribal society. Tribal society are 
known to be completely isolated from the larger society and self-sustained. See Clifford Geertz, 1962，ibid. 
60. Tilly, Charles. 1984. Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons. New York: Russell Sage. 
61. Formerly used to depict the cultural impact of disintegration of traditional and specific peasant cultures under 
the impact of mass communication. Shanin, Defining Peasants, p.47. 
62. Wolf, E. 1969, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century, New York: Harper and Row; and Moore, Barrinton, 
1966, Social Origin of Dictatorship and Democracy, Boston: Boston University Press; and E. Hobsbown, 
1961, Primitive Rebels, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
63. Scott, James. 1986. Weapons of the Weak. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
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A cultural pattern, which is different from other social groups, can be found in the peasant 
society. In this study, the specific cultural pattem is delineated as the peasant view of life. It is 
conceptualized as the beliefs and values that direct peasants' behavior. Instead ofaffecting every 
peasant's act, the view of life sets a boundary for choices from which each peasant can choose. 
This is not a static concept. When peasants interact with the outside world, their view of life 
changes accordingly. This study focuses on peasantry as a bearer of specific cultural values that 
interact constantly with the outside world and is constantly changing throughout history. 
1.4 Methodology 
This thesis aims to arrive at a historical comparison between the RRM's and LRM's 
mobilization experiences in Shandong and Fujian provinces during the periods from 1920-1937. 
The unit of comparison is the interactive process between movement organizers and the peasants. 
As the thesis's aim is not to compare the results of mobilization, structural factors are regarded as 
background, rather than determining factors of the mobilization process. 
This research is based on the study of documents. Two sets of magazines published in 
1930s were used as the source material. For RRM, the magazine used was Xiangcun jianshe 
(Rural Reconstruction) published by the Shandong Rural Reconstruction Research Listitute 
{Shandong xiangcun jianshe yanjiuyuan). The series was published from June 1930 to August 
1937. Although it was published in Shandong, it was distributed all over China and was an 
authoritative magazine that covered news ofRRM activities all over the country. Articles in the 
magazine included theoretical issues on Rural Reconstruction, research papers, experience-
sharing essays, announcements, regulations issued by the government and minutes of important 
RRM meetings. 
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For CCP, the magazine used was Hongse zhonghua (Red China), the official newspaper of 
the Chinese Soviet Republic Temporary Central Government (Zhonghua soweiai gongheguo 
linshi zhongyangzhengfu). The series ran from December 1931 to October 1936. It served mainly 
the CCP Soviet Base areas in Jiangxi and Fujian. As an official newspaper in Jiangxi and Fujian, 
most articles were government announcements, orders, laws and regulations. There were also 
articles on political campaigns, CCP organized activities, cases of the disobedience and other 
news of the areas. 
For the purposes of this study, these series provide concurrent descriptions of events in 
Shandong and Fujian. Hence they can be used as source documents on the course ofRRM and 
LRM in these areas, hi addition, books published during the 1930s were source documents for 
more in-depth description ofRRM and LRM. Biographies ofRRM and LRM activists were also 
used as supplements. 
1.4 Outline of Chapters 
Chapter 2 reviews literature on peasant culture. Nourished with distinct cultural values, 
peasants behaved differently from members of other social groups. Peasant culture will be further 
defined as the peasant view of life. The content of this changing view will be discussed. This 
view changes according to external constraints and influences. It acts as the guiding principle of 
peasant life, and changes in this view will affects peasants' individual and collective actions. The 
relationship between peasants' views and their actions will be explained. Finally, a theoretical 
framework will be formed. 
Chapter 3 delineates the social background of Republican China. The RRM and LRM 
peasant movements were attempts to modernize China. The RRM promoted the ideals of 
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traditional Chinese society, while the LRM promoted a Communist ideal. Although they differed 
in their visions of China's future, they both started their work in the villages. 
Chapter 4 is a historical profile of the RRM's and CCP's development processes. A 
comparison of the social structure of Zhouping in Shandong Province and the westem part of 
Fujian Province, where RRM and LRM were conducted, will be carried out. The comparison 
helps readers to better understand the basic social structure of the two areas. 
Chapter 5 describes the peasant view before the transformation process in Zhouping and 
Westem Fujian and how RRM and LRM workers broke into the closed village communities will 
be analyzed. In their early stages, both parties tried to utilize the existing rural power structures. 
However, they failed. They then tried to mobilize the powerless peasants directly. This practice 
successfully mobilized the peasants, and the organizers began to set up their own networks in the 
village communities. 
Chapter 6 delineates the RRM's and CCP's further efforts to transform the peasant view of 
life. They tried to secure loyalty from the peasants by providing incentives. As a result ofchanges 
in the power structure, constant improvement ofliving conditions and emotional propaganda, the 
peasant view of life was transformed. Peasants became eager to share the responsibilities ofthe 
village community. 
The last chapter discusses the revolutionary effect of the LRM and the more limited 
success of the RRM in changing the peasant view. There is no single way to effect this change. 
The method of transformation is subject to interactions among the transformation agency, the 
peasants and the objective social conditions. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
If we want to differentiate the characteristics of peasantry from other social groups in 
society, what concept can we use to give a holistic delineation of its specifics? Sydel Silverman 
would agree that peasantry should be defined in terms of its specific culture. Indeed, he argued 
that the term "peasantry" was a cultural concept. Instead of defining a community as a peasant 
society or a group of people as peasants, he defines peasantry as a way oflife and cultural pattem^ 
2.1 Peasant Culture 
Broadly speaking, culture defines humans from animals and differentiates the human 
social world from the natural world. Culture is the "man-made part of the environment"^ and an 
integral part of human existence. "Without men, no culture, certainly; but equally, and more 
significantly, without culture, no men."^ Clifford Geertz gave an even simpler definition of 
culture — "the thing that enables man to become a man". 
Culture is a holistic concept structured to include all aspects of human world. It sets 
boundaries for the development patterns of social institutions, the working of human life, belief 
system and ways of communication^. In addition, culture is divided into various aspects and 
sub-units and different human societies have different cultures. A particular cultural aspect 
maintains a dialectic relationship with the whole structure, i.e., the cultural system determines its 
complementary aspects — changes in any particular aspect transform the cultural system as a 
whole. Culture is dynamic in nature, reacting to environmental influences and psychological and 
\ Silverman, Sydel,�The Concept of Peasant and Concept of Culture', in Joan P. Mercher (ed.), Social 
Anthropology of Peasantry, Bombay: Somaiya Publications, 1983. 
2. Herskovits, Melville J, Man and His Work, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970，p.625. 
3. Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures, Basic Books, p.49. 
4. Herskovits, ibid., p.634. 
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historical factors^. Individuals in a cultural system simultaneously leam from the system (the 
\ 
process of enculturation) and expound its meanings ^>rocess of interpretation). There are no two 
individuals who hold identical cultural values. Similarly, no two groups of people will follow the 
same cultural patterns. Hence, humans are not identical entities but different species^. He may be 
Chinese, Mian, European or an Australian aborigine (varying by race), and peasant, worker, 
soldier or teacher (by occupations). Cultural patterns vary across social groups and within the 
same group. Generally, the smaller the social group, the less variation there would be^. However, 
variations are not random. Different cultural patterns can be found for different social groups and 
cultural character in fact distinguishes one group from another. 
There are two ways to characterize culture. The first "assumes that culture shapes an 
o 
action by providing ultimate ends or values towards which action is directed." Li contrasted to 
this materialistic explanation, human actions can be defined by values. Value is described as a 
historical and universal and defined as the destination of an act guiding series of acts to achieve the 
ultimate goals oflife. 
However, the above method of characterization does not seem to be the usual guide for our 
behaviors. It is unusual that human acts will be judged in accordance with ultimate values; on the 
other hand, most human actions are guided by common sense. To delineate the latter case, a 
second way to characterize culture would be to describe it as a "tool kit", or repertoire, from which 
an actor can select for reference to perform various kinds of actions^. Furthermore, human act is 
5. Herskovits, ibid., p.630. 
6. Geertz, ibid., p.53. 
\ Herskovits, ibid., p.637-638. 
8. Swidler, Ann. 'Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies； American Sociological Review, Vol.51，1986， 
p.273. 
9. Swidler, ibid., p.277. 
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not piecemeal in nature. Actions are usually integrated into larger assemblages, which can be 
called "strategies ofaction"^^ Culture affects these "strategies of action" but not unit acts. From 
this characterization, culture is downplayed from the solely determining factor to a contributing 
factor in the explanation of human action. This is a loosely defined concept but it pays more 
respect to human subjectivity and the dialectic relationship between culture and man. For 
peasants, culture is just the common sense ideas they leam from experience, from legend and 
through conversation with older generations. These common sense ideas need not be included in 
any organized body of symbols. On the contrary, they are loosely related and unrecorded. 
"Thinness" and "immethodicalness”" are the characteristics. Nevertheless, they are based on 
some ultimate underlying peasants' views towards their lives and their fates. This study intends to 
dig out what is beyond the seemingly common sense ideas to locate the ultimate peasant "view of 
life". This concept is the trajectory point of this study. To cope with this common sense concept, 
peasant culture will be characterized as the peasant view oflife. 
The peasant view oflife is the integrated pattem of peasants' attitudes. These attitudes are 
peasants' standard of judgement of what is a good life and what is a bad life; what is just and 
unjust; what is legitimate and what is intolerable. Applied to everyday life, the peasant view oflife 
directs peasants' actions within a broad framework. It embraces models of actions from which 
peasants could leam about tradition and experience, and consists of sets of guidelines that help 
them form their strategies of actions. The view of life is loosely integrated, even encompassing 
self-contradictory sets, but consistent within the sets themselves. Following this kind of 
definition, the section below is a review of works in this field. 
iG. Swidler, ibid., p.276. 
11. Geertz in configuring common sense as a cultural system has described two of its qualities as "thinness" and 
"immethodicabiess". The former stands for the simplicity and obviousness and the later advocates common 
sense as unsystematic, ad hoc, inconsistent and plain. See Clifford Geertz. 1983. Local Knowledge. New 
York: Basic Books, p.90. 
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In light of the above discussion, peasants can be defined as a social group possessing 
specific cultural characteristics. Peasant culture differentiates peasants from workers, soldiers and 
teachers; and distinguishes peasant community from others. It is leamed, interpreted and 
internalized, and the peasants behave according to these broad cultural patterns. 
The study of peasant culture starts with its contrast to urban culture. Robert Redfield^^, in 
his pioneer work on peasant community, Tepoztlan - A Mexican Village^^, described a peasant 
community as a "folk" society and peasant culture as folk culture. Redfield explained the term in 
his more detailed work, The Folk Society. In it, he formulated the image of a folk society as an 
isolated community with a high degree of cultural homogeneity and stability. Peasant culture 
changes very slowly and peasant behavior is traditional^^. Redfield used the concepts — peasant 
society and peasant culture 一 interchangeably to depict a culture-nurturing peasant community. 
According to Redfield, one cannot tell the full story of peasant society without reference to its 
cultural aspects. The close relationship between these two concepts as constructed by Redfield 
implies that peasant culture works within the boundary of the defined peasant society and the 
peasant society is fumished with the influence of local peasant cultural values. Peasant culture is 
localistic when compared with outer civilization. Nevertheless, peasant society is not a closed 
community and peasant culture is not a static embodiment of peasant values. Peasant society is in 
contact with the outer world and peasant culture confronts greater civilization and is under 
continuous transformation. 
12. Robert Redfield was one of the most profound scholar in peasant studies. He had conducted many 
community analysis in village communities. His work became the exemplar work for many students in 
community analysis. 
13. Redfield, Robert. 192. Tepoztlan - A Mexican Village. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
14. Redfield, Robert. 1947. The FoUc Society', American Journal ofSociology, Vol. 52, No.4, p.293-308. See 
also Sidney Mintz, 1953, The FoUc-Urban Continuum and the Rural Proletarian community,' American 
Journal ofSociology, Vol. 59, No.2, p.136-143. 
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For Redfield, a folk society (peasant society) is in constant interaction with the non-
peasant (urban) sector of the "great" society. Peasant "small tradition" (peasant culture) was 
always part of the "great tradition" (great civilization)^^. In analyzing the characteristics o fa folk 
society, one should not ignore the influence of the urban sector. From Durkheim's, Tonnies's and 
Parson's dichotomous types of conceptualization^ ^ , Redfield formed the folk-urban concept. His 
concept of folk-urban is of poles at opposite ends of a continuum^^. Redfield went on to describe 
the three principle processes of change from folk to urban: secularization, individualization and 
disorganization. However, he did not clearly describe the intra-relationships and the inter-
relationships among the three processes. 
Herskovits, who critically distinguishes the form and process of cultural change, has 
criticized Redfield's folk-urban construct. Redfield has placed the forms of culture at opposite 
ends of the spectrum (folk and urban) but not the process of cultural change (from folk to urban). 
For Herskovits, pattem (form) or classification of culture is only the first steps in studying culture. 
Pattem should be a starting point for understanding the process of cultural change, not an objective 
15. Redfield, Robert. 1956. Peasant Society and Culture. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p.70. 
16. In light of this view, peasants became the abnormal others. It was used as a yardstick of "othemess" to 
measure the familiar ethnocentric view of the modem Westem society against the "traditional society". 
Traditional and modem were the two opposite ends on the same dimension of analysis. A same logic can be 
applied. Some well-known dichotomies have been formulated: the "mechanic solidarity" versus "organic 
solidarity" of Durkheim; "community" versus "society" of Toennies and the pairs of "pattem variables" of 
Parsons. Even Marx, albeit given particular attention to historiography, has put peasants in pre-capitalist 
society. For Marx, peasants have played major roles during the process of the formation of capitalism, but 
they arejust like "a sack of small potatoes" which cannot represent themselves. They have to be represented, 
protected and at the same time dominated by superiors outside their own group. For details, refer to Shanin, 
Teodore. 1990. Defining Peasants. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. p.4. 
17. Redfield himself admits that the concept is only an ideal-typed construction and such a theoretical 
construction was� to seek through this method of comparison of differently affected communities with some 
general knowledge as to the nature of society and its changes... these conclusions [the formulation of foUc-
urban dichotomy] are generalizations on many particular facts. The assertions are "on the whole" true. To 
reach these conclusions it is not necessary to report the history of any one of the communities: they may be 
compared as ifall existed at the same moment of time...The single comparison of contemporary communities 
is not a method to be recommended to those wishing to do historical research... however,... [it is] a 
satisfactory way somewhat to clarify certain problems as to the nature of isolated homogeneous society as 
compared with mobile-heterogeneous society.' Redfield, Robert, ibid., p.339. 
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ofstudy in itself. According to Herskovits, Redfield is "based on criteria of form, and arranges the 
data on a scale between the polar concepts of differing types of societies."^^ In doing so, Redfield 
presents the analysis of the process of cultural change in different peasant communities. He 
constructs ideal types and replaces them with a concrete historical process. 
Historical development of every culture has its own logic. The logic of 
history, however, does not admit the neat arrangement of data between the 
opposites that classifications of this kind presuppose. Historical logic differs 
from culture to culture, from historic stream to historic stream. This is an 
internal logic for observers who internationalize logic of process because of 
variability, and at the same time, it is manifest in many forms.^^ 
Hence, we know that the study of culture should not be universal and ahistorical. 
However, that does not mean that the unique character of every particular culture can only be 
studied within the discipline of history, or that only a narrative can be reached for each culture, 
with no comparison possible. Instead, the "logic of process" should be applied: 
...through the analysis of how unique historical sequences have developed, 
and on understanding of the forms of culture in which they have eventuated, 
ample and adequate generalizations can be put forward for testing after the 
manner of science ... The culture forms which represented their end-results 
must be regarded not as fixed, but as variables whose limits are set by the 
18. Herskovits, Melville J. 1970. Man andHis Work. New York: Alfred. A. Knopf, p.604. 
19. Herskovits, ibid., p.604. 
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probabilities that a given type will emerge from a given concatenation of 
• ,90 
circumstances. 
As far as culture has been considered as a dynamic variable and studied with respect to its 
particular social and historical context, a generalization of cultural patterns can be maintained�� 
This study starts with a discussion of cultural patterns within a specific peasant 
community. The pattern is enclosed by a specified dimension, i.e., the effective boundary of the 
culture's influence. The study's next focus is the transformation of the boundary of the cultural 
dimension and changes in the patterns of the peasants' cultural values. The dimension of the 
peasants' view sets the effective limit for the peasant view oflife. It is in restrained by the physical 
location of the peasant community, whether isolated or incorporated with other communities 
affects the social connection of the peasant community. For patterns of peasant's culture, the 
content is the peasants' view oflife, which vary little from one individual peasant to another at the 
beginning and which gradually change. The dimension and content change during the process and 
reach a point when they merge with the great tradition. The dynamic, changing process of the 
peasant view oflife has gone on since the beginning ofhistory. Sometimes, change is gradual and 
sometimes drastic. To identify different forms of changes is the main theme of this study. To 
coagulate the analysis on the peasant view of life and its transformation process, the following 
sections will deal with past studies on its dimensions and content. 
2G. Herskovits, ibid., p.639-640. 
2\ Back to Redfield's foUc-urban dichotomy, in confronting with all the criticisms, Redfleld defended by stating 
that the dichotomy was an ideal construct helped to understand the peasant community. Since it was an 
idealistic model, there were no pure foUc or pure urban societies, all societies had some foUc and some urban 
attributes. It was not his intention to define a community as more foUc or more urban. It was for him to point 
out the different combination of urban and foUc qualities and acknowledge it as the starting point of analysis. 
See Redfield, Robert. 1989. The Little Community. Midway Reprint Edition. Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, p.132-148. 
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2.2 The Dimensions of Peasant Culture 
To characterize the dimensions of peasant culture, a natural village or a natural settlement 
area that physically separate it from each others is identified as the basic unit. Anthropologists 
pioneered village level community studies^^ and they believe that villages are not simply physical 
or geographical units but self-sustained basic social units whose members share common views of 
life and who are linked by blood or other social ties. Village communities are characterized by 
their isolation. The inhabitants stand ready to fight against outsiders in order to protect the 
interests of the village. The village as a collective unit also serves functions of production and 
welfare. Hence, a village is a social, cultural, political and economic unit that binds individual 
peasants together. 
In contrast, William Skinner argues that villages are open, rather than closed, 
communities. He used China as an example. China had a marketing system that consisted of a 
market town at the center and villages surrounding it which the peasants' social and economic life 
sustained. In each marketing system, villages were arranged in hexagonal shapes circling a 
standard market town; standard market towns in tum circled an intermediate market town; 
intermediate market towns circled a central market town. The process went on to arrive at regional 
cities as the center of the centers. Skinner concludes that China is divided into nine great 
marketing regions^^. In his view, each peasant is a member of two communities: his village and 
the marketing system to which his village belongs^^. Skinner argued that it was the larger 
marketing community that determined a peasant's life situation, not just his view of life. The 
22. Among them were Robert Redfield, Oscar Lewis and Edward Banfield, which would be studied in more 
detail in later sections. 
23. Skinner, G. William. 'Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China, Part 1-3, Journal of Asian Studies, 
Vol.24, nos.1-3, 1964-65, G. William Skinner, ed. The City in Late Imperial China, and William Skinner, 
'Chinese Peasants and the Closed Community: An Open and Shut Case,' Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, Vol. 13, 1971,p.270-281. 
24. Skinner, Chinese Peasants and the Closed Community, p.272. 
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openness and closeness of the peasant community are not determined by the dimensions of the 
particular community, but vary with the changes of the great society's structural factors. When the 
greater society is in disorder, the peasant society will probably close up to protect the peasants' 
interests against outsider attack; when the greater society is at peace, the peasant community 
would be relatively open to allow peasants to move in and out of the community and interact with 
the outside world^^. Considering the transformation of peasant culture, Skinner puts emphasizes 
the effects of the changing structural factors that force the peasant community to open, forcing 
lower-level marketing systems to merge with those at higher levels and local peasant communities 
to merge with greater society. 
26 . 
Skinner's analysis was criticized on both theoretical and empirical grounds . However, if 
we put aside the mechanical hexagonal constructions of the marketing system, his contribution is 
to remind us of the openness of village community. The village "little tradition" should always be 
studied with the "great tradition" in mind. However, in Skinner's analysis, culture depends on 
structural factors. The transformation of peasant's culture is subject to the changing social 
environment. Culture itself is defenseless against external influences and the peasants are unable 
to determine structural factors. Under this perspective, culture is not holistic and enjoys no 
autonomy from other structural factors. 
Instead of using a marketing system to define the dimension of peasant society, Prasenjit 
Duara retains the openness of village community and replaces Skinner's marketing system with 
the concept of "cultural nexus"^^. Unlike Skinner's cellular marketing system, "cultural nexus" is 
not a special concept but a cultural construct. Duara emphasizes the interrelationship of village 
25. Skinner, William, Village Community: An Open and Shut Case, in 
26. Chiu, Fred Y.L, Periodic Market and the Chinese Indigenous Economic System, Unpublished M.Phil. 
Dissertation. 
27. Duara, Prasenjit. Culture, Power and the State, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988. 
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institutions, i.e. the nexus, and the shared norms and symbols of villagers, gentry, bureaucrats and 
even the emperor, i.e. the culture. Cultural nexus is the cultural basis of rural China, and links the 
rural and urban communities. Duara's construction is both illuminating and elusive. It is powerful 
to include various levels of social structure, from rural to urban, in the same framework. The 
holistic aspect ofcultural nexus has been expanded to apply to the entire society. The dimensions 
ofthe peasant view of life could be connected to the greater society. Nevertheless, the power of 
this concept is also its weakness. It is too vague for in-depth research into the relationship among 
different levels of peasant culture and their transformation process. The concept is self-
contradictory and has been criticized as "a not very useful construction"^^. 
In contrasted to Duara's mega-scale "cultural nexus", Richard Madsen puts forward the 
10 
concept of "moral discourse" to study Chinese peasants . For Madsen, "moral discourse" is the 
ability to understand, interpret and evaluate an individual peasant to judge him as good or evil. 
Each peasant's discourse was more than subjective and varied among individuals. The categories 
of peasants' discourse are limited. Hence, it is possible to distinguish patterns ofbehavior. Duara 
reduces the study of peasant culture to a study of peasants' subjectivities. As compared to the 
above theories, peasants' actions relied not on their positions in the village, in the marketing 
system (as defined by Skinner) or their specific level in the cultural nexus (as defined by Madsen), 
but on a subjective interpretation of different meaning systems. To acknowledge this conviction is 
to acknowledge that peasant culture is the summation of individual peasants' interpretations, not 
the dominant values of the peasant society. The holistic attribute of peasant culture has been 
eliminated and the dimensions of the peasant view oflife are scaled down to the individual level. 
28. Duara, ibid., p.l6; and Lloyd E. Eastman, 'State Building and the Revolutionary Transformation ofRural 
Society in North China； Modern China, Vol.l6, no.2, 1990, p.226-234. 
29. Madsen, Richard. Morality and Power in a Chinese Village, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. 
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Skinner, Madsen and Duara all defined the dimensions of the peasant view oflife, whether 
structurally or culturally determined. In doing so, they introduced static views defining peasant 
culture as closed. In contrast to the above views, F. G. Bailey argues that a peasant's sense of 
moral community is quite flexible. Bailey has used the closeness of interpersonal relationships 
among the peasants to indicate the effectiveness of the moral community. Moral values are 
personalized and change according to the relative position of an individual peasant in the 
community. In addition, peasants' interpersonal relationships are determined by a consideration of 
whether the particular peasant was a member of the moral community. "Standards of honesty, 
respect, and consideration in so far as they are moral imperatives are diminished as the status ofthe 
person at the other hand of the relationship becomes more marginal"��Membership of the moral 
community is loosely defined, and varies according to the circumstances. It can be enlarged to 
include outsiders when it benefits the peasants. Li Bailey's example, as peasants sought obtain tax 
relief from government officers, they called the officers "mother" or "father" in order to tum the 
relationships with the bureaucrats into moral relationships^\ Conversely, the boundary can be 
constricted to exclude members who have broken the agreed rules and damaged the collective 
interests of the community. Bailey draws an instrumental but flexible picture of the peasant 
concept of moral community. He explains that this is due to the great uncertainty and insecurity of 
peasant life. Since nothing is controllable or predictable, the only way to survive is to maximize 
every gain and utilize every relationship that can be reached. Contrasted with the rigid dimensions 
of peasant community set by the other scholars, Bailey introduces a modicum of flexibility to 
define the dimension of peasant culture and, thus, their view oflife. To him, the moral community 
is open, not closed. Peasants can accept outsiders as members and allow interactions with them. 
30. Bailey, F. G., 1966，The Peasant View ofBad Life,, Advancement in Science, Vol. 23, No. 114, p.400. 
31. Bailey, 1966,ibid., p.401. 
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In this study, the dimensions of the peasant view of life are defined in this flexible way. 
This study is concerned with the transformation process of the dimensions ofthe peasant view of 
life from a closed boundary to an extended one. As discussed above, although patterns of the 
dimensions of the peasant view oflife should not be static. Rather, a specific dimension should be 
our starting point. As a starting point, the "broad" definitions of Skinner and Duara and the 
"narrow" definition ofMadsen are inappropriate. This study focuses on changes in peasant culture 
at the local community level. The local community best characterizes the closed dimension of 
peasant culture in the villages of rural China. Villagers are expected to share some cultural factors 
of the peasant society in general and to have similar, though not identical views oflife. During the 
transformation process, the boundary of peasant community can stretch and the peasants can 
become more willing to accept their roles in the greater society. From this point, the study ofthe 
transformation of peasant's view will also be a study of the changes in the peasants' lives. 
2.3 Content of the Peasant View of Life 
The last section discussed the transformation of the dimensions of the peasant view oflife. 
This section includes a discussion of the other part of the transformation, i.e. the transformation of 
the content of peasant culture. Before we tum to the transformation process, we examine 
contradictory ideas on the peasant view of life. One scholar focuses on the "good" side of the 
peasants, delineating them as trustworthy, altruistic and united. Another focuses on their 
skepticism, selfishness and competitiveness. In Redfield's Tepoztlan - A Mexican Village, he 
describes the small village as harboring a 'Rousseauan quality which glosses loyalty over evidence 
of violence, disruption, cruelty, disease, suffering and maladjustment... with little poverty, [and 
D 
few] economic problems, and political schisms.’ Urban culture, in Redfield's view, is just the 
32. Lewis, Oscar. 1963. Life in a Mexican Village. Urbana: University ofIllinois Press, p.428-429. 38 
opposite. Redfield fteher defines folk culture as a unified single web of interrelated meanings 
consisting of few alternative lines of thought and action. Elements of the culture are 
interdependent and consistent. 
Another scholar, Oscar Lewis, criticizes Redfield's folk-urban continuum as obscuring 
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"the wide range in the ways of life and in the value systems among so-called primitive people". 
Like Redfield, he conducted a study in Tepoztlan, Mexico. Contrary to Redfield's Rousseauean 
picture, Lewis emphasized the underlying individualism in Tepoztlan institutions and the selfish 
peasant character. In his description, the peasant community lacked co-operation. There were 
tensions among villagers. Schism was common within the village, and there was a pervading 
quality of fear, envy and distmst^^. Lewis believed that their different theoretical orientations, 
methodologies and different personal judgements could explain his differences with Redfield. 
Lewis believed that Redfield was interested only in a one-way changing process: "the evolution 
from folk to urban rather than a well-rounded ethnographic account"^^. For Lewis, the paths of 
cultural change are more diverse and the process far more complicated than for Redfield. Lewis 
believes that folk and urban are not interdependent variables on the same continuum, but that they 
are independent. Lewis also criticizes what he perceives as Redfield's personal valuejudgements, 
"Underlying the folk-urban dichotomy used by Redfield is a system of value judgements ... folk 
societies are good and urban societies bad. It is assumed that all folk societies were integrated 
while urban societies are the great disorganizing force"^^. Lewis' and Redfield's views overlap 
only at the psychological level. To both of them, peasants place great value on work, tie 
33 Lewis,Oscar. 1963. LifeinaMexicanVillage. p.433-435. 
34. Lewis, ibid., p.429. 
35. Lewis, ibid., p.432. 
36. Lewis, ibid., p.435. 
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themselves firmly to the land, view farming as the ideal occupation, believe in their communities 
37 • 
and maintain a stable and strong family system and hold traditional religious beliefs . Lewis' 
view of village people is "a psychology of living with problems rather than with solutions, of 
Q^ 
constantly adjusting to difficulties ” 
Defending his ideas on Tepoztlan, Redfield maintains that the differences lie in their 
differing research interests. Redfield asks "What do these people enjoy?", whereas Lewis wants to 
know "What do these people suffer from?"^^ Different research interests result in different 
interpretations of the data and different conclusions. For Redfield, Lewis' work s complementary 
rather than contradictory to his. Redfield further claims that every analysis has its underlying 
questions, as well as its presumed models. It is crucial for researchers to uphold "a controlled 
conversation, a dialectic of opposites, carried on within oneself^^. 
Redfield's explanation for their differences is unsatisfactory. Contrasting behavior and 
views of peasant have been found among the peasants that must be explained are not due to 
differing research interests. It is not the purpose of this study to pursue the contrasting images of 
the peasant view oflife, but to organize those seemingly contrasting views within the context of a 
specific community. Li this way, understanding of a peasant community can be improved. It is the 
aim of a cultural study, with reference to concrete historical experience, to record the changes of 
cultural patterns in a dynamic transformation process. Contrasting factors affecting the process 
and the relationships among them should be analyzed as a totality, not as detached parts. 
37 See Lewis, ibid., p.445. 
38. Lewis, ibid., p.447. 
39. Redfield, ibid., p.l36. 
40. Redfield, ibid., p.l48. 
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Along with Redfield and Lewis, other studies on the cultural patterns of peasant society 
provide a variety of pictures. Some are similar to Redfield's, others are more like Lewis'. They all 
fall into a category that Herskovits has criticized as emphasizing the "form" rather than the 
"process" of studying culture^^ 
2.4 Peasants' Views ofLife and Their Actions 
The study of culture ultimately seeks to understand human actions. This study has as its 
goal an understanding ofhow peasants' actions are formulated and how they change. Action is the 
visible manifestation of culture. It is possible for peasants' views to be read from their actions and, 
through our interpretation, the peasants view can be seen directly. Many theorists who have tried 
to distill the essence of specific peasant cultural patterns and their influence on peasant behavior. 
Among them are Edward C. Banfield, George Foster and James Scott. 
Banfield characterizes the cultural pattem of Lucania, in Southern Italy, as "amoral 
familism" in which the peasants tended to maximize material, short-run advantages of their 
immediate families. In the society of amoral familists described by Banfield, mutual distrust was 
common and organizations difficult to form and maintain. People were selfish and concerned 
only with private interests. Public affairs were lefl to be conducted only by officials who were paid 
to do so42. For Banfield, the cause of this ethos arises from the poor living conditions due to the 
high death rate, poor land-tenure conditions and absence of institutions to facilitate development 
projects. With no hope of improving their lives on the edge of subsistence, the peasants made 
every effort to secure their individual interests. These ethos became the decisive determining 
41. The works has been summarized in Foster, George. 1960-61. 'Merpersonal Relations in Peasant Society', 
Human Organization, Vol. 19, p.174-178. 
42. Banfield, Edward C. 1958. The Moral Basis ofa BackwardSociety. New York: The Free Press, p.83-101. 
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principle for peasant's action beyond the limit of their immediate family. For Banfield, it was 
these ethos that differentiated peasant society from other societies^^. 
Based on similar observations of peasant's life, Foster, in his fieldwork in Tzintzuntzan, 
Michoacan, Mexico, formulates the peasants' "image of limited good"^^. "Image" for him, was 
the cognitive orientation imposed by social, natural and supernatural universe, which define the 
implicit rules of the games directing the peasants' behavio/^. He defined the content of the 
"image oflimited good" in this way: 
Broad areas of peasant behavior are patterned in such fashion as to suggest 
that peasants view their social, economic, and natural universes — their total 
environment — as one in which all of the desired things in life such as land, 
wealth, health, friendship and love, manliness and honor, respect and status, 
power and influence, security and safety, exist in finite quantities, but in 
addition there is no way directly within peasant power to increase the 
available quantities^^. 
As "good" is limited and cannot be increased, an individual or an individual family can 
only be better off at the expense of others — a zero-sum game. One person's increased goodness 
is immediately a threat to the others. This image of limited good implies two possible peasant 
reactions: (i) maximum cooperation through communal arrangement, which buries individual 
differences and punishes individualism (the communist arrangement); or (ii) extreme 
individualism for no individual cares about others' business (similar to the amoral familist 
43. Banfield,ibid., p . l l . 
^ . Foster, George M. 1965. 'Peasant Society and the Image ofLimited Good', American Anthropologist, Vol. 
67, No.2. p.293-315. 
45. Foster, ibid., p.293. 
46. Foster, ibid., p.296. 
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described by Banfield). Foster finds the latter case was dominant in most peasant societies^^. In 
these extremely individualistic communities, there is no communal solidarity and the community 
will quickly break down. To avoid this, Foster found in these communities commonly 
acknowledged rules and institutional settings (communal arrangements) to keep the extreme 
self-oriented individual behaviors from violating the community's structure. Hence, communal 
arrangements and individualistic views oflife can co-exist with each other. 
A model peasant of this community is one "who works to feed and clothe his family, who 
fulfills his community and ceremonial obligations, who minds his own business, who does not 
seek to be outstanding, but who knows how to protect this right."^^ The peasant tries to maintain 
his status quo and wealth. There is no incentive for cooperative projects. Under this perception, 
peasants are not conservative and backward looking to outsiders, but rational individuals under the 
context of "limited good". This view implies that any effort to change the peasant society must 
involve the transformation of their cognitive orientations, as well as community structure. 
James C. Scott, who claims no explicit influence from the former scholars' ideas on the 
peasant view of life, has developed what he calls "the moral economy of peasants"^^. His moral 
economy however, closely resembles the concepts formulated by Banfield and Foster. For Scott, 
moral economy is '[peasants'] notion of economic justice and their working definition of 
exploitation — their view of which claims on their product is tolerable and which intolerable."^^ 
The basis for that "definition" is the "subsistence ethics", or the ethics aimed at maintaining a 
minimum level of income for the survival of the individual peasant, his family and the community 
47 Foster, ibid., p.301. 
48. Foster, ibid., p.304. 
49. Scott, James C. 1976. The Moral Economy of Peasants. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
50 Scott, 1976,ibid., p.3. 
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as a whole. For Scott, the emphasis on "subsistence ethics" was "the consequence of living so 
close to margin"5i. The moral standard (in a social sense) is connected to subsistence (or material) 
needs. That which is moral is something that can improve one's life to above the subsistence level. 
This sense of morality is further integrated into a wide array of social arrangements laid down to 
assure a minimum subsistence income for each member of the moral community. 
Like RedfIeld, Scott consciously avoids romanticizing the social arrangement: 
” They are not radically egalitarian. Rather, they imply only that all are entitled 
to a living out of the resources within the village, and that living is attained 
often as the cost of a loss of status and autonomy. They work moreover, in 
large measure through the abrasive force of gossip and envy and the 
knowledge that the abandoned poor are likely to be a real and present danger 
S9 
to better-off villagers." 
Scott does not deny the individualistic views of Lewis, Banfield and Foster, and he 
specifies the combination of communal moralistic setting and the peasant's individual view (as 
Foster does). Scott emphasizes that moral economy provides only insurance for survival and is a 
defensive strategy rather than an offensive one. It protects of one's rights, but is not for pursuing 
one's further ambitions^^. Since most peasants lived under conditions of persistent subsistence 
threats, "moral economy" became the distinctive character of most peasant societies. 
51. Scott, 1976,ibid., p.2. 
52. Scott, 1976,ibid., p.5. 
53. In the well -acknowledged debate between Scott and Popkin, Popkin while adopting a rational choice model, 
suggested that peasants be no different from a capitalistic profit maximizer. He criticized the "moral 
economist" romanticize peasants. However, it seems that Scott is conscious about the problem. He does not 
deny that the peasants could act "rationally". Rationality, for Scott, has subjected to constraints of the 
environment. It is Popkin who put his argument to an extreme. Actually, they are complimentary rather than 
contradictory (as the same as the case ofRedfleld and Lewis). See Popkin, Samuel L. 1979. The Rational 
Peasant, Berkeley: University of California Press, and Chapter 2 in Little, Daniel. 1989. Understanding 
Peasant China: Case Studies in the Philosophy ofSocial Science. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
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It is important to note that, from Banfield to Scott, all efforts to search for the content ofthe 
peasant view of life have found it strongly linked to their poor material lives and their dim 
prospects. However, it is wrong to define the peasant view oflife under material constraints only, 
and especially to characterize peasants as interest maximizers. Their views of life can change if 
their living conditions and expectations for the future change. Peasants' participation in collective 
movements, and great revolutions demonstrate that their views can change under some 
circumstances. During their revolutionary participation, the peasant view of life is no longer 
individualistic and materialistic; there are collective elements. The next section takes a closer look 
at the relationship between the peasants' view oflife and their collective action. 
2.5 Peasants' View of Life and Peasant Collective Actions 
Life under continuous subsistence threats induces different reactions. Peasants can choose 
from a variety of strategies from the individual level, such as migration, sabotage, individual 
incendiarism and various "everyday forms of peasant resistance"^^ to collective strategies. 
Collective peasant actions can be divided into two categories: restorative and 
revolutionary. Ln his analysis of peasant movements, Landsberger says "[W]hen assaults on the 
peasant and his community begin, his reaction, i.e., the means used by the peasantry, are generally 
not violent, nor 一 and this is even more to the point 一 are the goals at all revolutionary"^^ 
Restorative, backward-looking peasant collective actions are more common. They are 
usually spontaneous, with no clear objective or ideology. They lack structured organization and 
are easily suppressed by the ruling power. James Scott suggests an explanation for restorative 
54. Scott, James C. 1986. Weapons of the Weak. New Haven: Yale University Press; and Colbum, Fomest D. 
(ed.), 1989. Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, New York. M.E. Sharpe Inc. 
55. Landsberger, Henry A. (ed.), 1974. Rural Protest: Peasant Movements and Social Change. London: 
Macmillan. p.37. 
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peasant collective actions: that subsistence ethics are the normative roots of peasant political 
actions. As subsistence needs are a nominal right within a moral community, peasants are likely to 
rebel when their subsistence needs are not fulfilled. Peasants join together in collective actions 
aimed at restoring their moral economy. "The violation of these standards could be expected to 
provoke resentment and resistance — not only because needs are unsatisfied but because rights are 
violated56." 
The moral economy thesis provides an explanation for conditions that give rise to 
restorative peasant collective actions, but it does not explain revolutionary actions. In 
revolutionary events, peasants hold forward-looking views of life that are not the same as their 
views would be under "normal" conditions. Scott fails to differentiate between these two kinds of 
peasant collective actions and does not allow for the possibility of more than one two reasons for 
the peasant view oflife to change. 
Revolutionary peasant collective actions are better organized. They have clear 
orientations and are usually initiated by forces outside of the peasant community. The aim is the 
achievement of goals outside of the peasants' existing expectations and sometimes for the 
construction of a new order within the peasant community. Revolutionary peasant collective 
actions can develop from restorative ones or develop on their own. A discussion ofpast studies on 
peasant collective action follows. 
rn 
The nature of peasant collective action is a major debate in Chinese historiography . 
From a Marxist point of view, debates among historians have centered on whether the peasant 
56 Scott, 1976, ibid., p.6. Although Scott does not intend to suggest that the broken of subsistence security be a 
cause of peasants' political action, he is stating a condition for that. ’A study of moral economy of peasants 
can tell us what makes them angry and what is likely, with other things being equal, to generate an explosive 
situation.' It is a mistake to link up directly the cause of revolution and moral economy thesis. 
57. Liu, Kwang-ching. 'World View and Peasant Rebellion: Reflections on Post-Mao Historiography,' Journal 
ofAsian Studies, Vol. 11, no.2, 1981, p.295-326. 
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wars {nongmin zhanzheng) in Chinese history were anti-feudal (anti-systematic) or were aimed 
only at fighting "bad" landlords. The former could be conceived as revolutionary, aimed at 
structural transformation, and the latter as restorative, aiming only to replace the bad master with a 
good one. Those historians who espouse the revolutionary nature of peasant wars believe that 
peasants lived under severe exploitation of the landlords and were thus bound to be in struggle 
with them. The unequal relationship of production in feudal society destines the peasants to be the 
transformation agents of the feudal system. Peasants against landlords, and the consequent 
revolutionary actions, derive from a conflict over the control of land and are the result of the 
• 58 
inherent conflict between the workforce and owners, or the social relations of production . The 
major view contributing to peasants' revolutionary action are equalizationism (pingjun zhuyi), the 
poor peasant's goal of achieving absolute faimess by sharing all property, including land and other 
productive assets, with the rich. Peasants want to improve their living conditions, and their point 
of reference is their neighboring richer peasants. The average peasant is satisfied when there is no 
better-off peasants living in the village; in other words, when absolute equality is achieved. This is 
an echo of the Foster's previously discussed peasants' "image of limited good". The zero-sum 
game stops when everyone is equally wealthy. Peasants mobilized by equalizationism are seduced 
by the ultimate value of faimess and by the desire for material gain through redistribution of 
wealth from rich to poor. However, equalizationism is considered revolutionary in the 
mobilization process but conservative compared to the goals of revolution. Absolute equalization 
de-motivates production incentives, and no peasant would willingly produce extra if he foresees 
58. Chen, Wu-tong, 'Nongmin zhanzheng yanjiu de zhongzhong zhen luri (The Study of Various Debates on 
Peasant Wars), in Lishiyanjiu Editorial Board, ed., Jianguo yilai shixue lilun wenti taolun juyao (Selected 
Important Discussions on Some Theoretical Problems in Historiography after 1949), Jinan: Qilu shushe. 
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that he will have to share the extra product with other peasants. That knowledge would curtail the 
yield of agricultural production and the development of the economy^^. 
Other historians regard peasant wars as rebellions that challenge individual landlords or 
"bad" emperors only but not the overall feudal system. These historians believe that peasants lack 
class-consciousness and could never realize their own interests. The peasants do not have a vision 
of any social order than the existing one, this view claims, and they could only act as "repairmen" 
{xiu li gong) to the feudal system^^. The case of Zhu Yuan-zhang, the first Emperor of the Ming 
Dynasty, is the best example of rebellion of peasant origin that, in the end, served the landlord's 
interests. After successfully leading a peasant rebellion, Zhu made himself the emperor and the 
largest landlord. The major view contributing to these restorative collective actions was 
monarchism {wangquan zhuyi), which was the peasants' belief in and hope for a warm-hearted 
emperor to protect their interest. The aim of this kind of collective peasant rebellion is to replace a 
cruel emperor with a merciful one who would lessen the exploitation of the peasants. 
Monarchism and equalizationism are two sides of the same utopian peasant dreams. 
Peasants hope for a merciful emperor who imposes a low tax rate on them and provides a stable 
environment for farming. The dream allows for the possibility of every peasant becoming an 
owner-peasant whom works his own small piece ofland, from which his family's living is assured. 
With the predominance of monarchism and equalizationism, peasant collective action can be both 
revolutionary and restorative; both can contribute to the success of peasant revolution but also 
limit their respective scope. 
The third category historians have used to conceptualize peasants' restorative and revolutionary 
views are a transformation process. Peasant collective actions are usually spontaneous, restorative 
59. Chen, ibid., p.226-245. 
60. Chen, ibid., p.215. 
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and devoid of clear goals at the beginning. But as the struggle with their class enemy continues, 
they adopt a revolutionary consciousness. Peasant revolutionary consciousness is inherently 
restorative at the start, emerges during the revolutionary process and becomes the dominant view 
in a peasant revolution. 
This category of peasant's view is illustrated in Lucien Bianco's study on CCP 
mobilization in China. It suggests that peasant actions change from conservative to revolutionary 
as revolution continues. Peasants initially doubt that peasant collective actions can succeed, and 
thus limit their participation. However, once they have joined, peasants' actions can be very 
violent and out of control^^ Bianco saw this apparent contradiction as consistent, hi his view, 
early disinterest is due to a fear of losing status. Peasants then act very consciously 
(conservatively) to avoid being prominent, which would attract enemy's attack. Afterjoining the 
rebellion, they believe they must eliminate their enemies completely in order to protect themselves 
from any potential revenge^^. 
Compared to the former studies that depict a static picture of the peasant view of life, using a 
transformation process reconciles the contradictory (revolutionary and conservative) images and 
introduces a dynamic perspective. It confirms our previous discussion on the transformation 
process of peasant culture. In this study of the peasant view of life is an examination of the 
transformation process, its dimension and content. 
The transformation process of the peasant view from conservative to revolutionary can be 
broken down into several stages of development, which will be discussed in detail in next section. 
Before proceeding, it is helpful to refer to Joel Migdal's four-stage model from peasant 
6 � Bianco, Lucien (Bi Yanggao), 'Zifaxing nongmin saodong yu nongmin dui zhonggong dongyuan de huiying' 
(Spontaneous Peasant Rebels and Peasant's Response to CCFs Mobilization), in Sun Zhongsan xianshengyu 
jingdai zhongguo xueshu taolunhui (Seminar on Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Contemporary Chinese Studies), 
Vol.3, Taipei, 1987, p.210-235. 
62. Bianco,ibid., p.220-221. 
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mobilization to peasant collection action^^. In Stage I ofMigdal's model, peasants are passively 
accommodated "to the demands of outside political institutions". They do not "attempt to 
influence or manipulate the institutions", ki Stage II, "peasants seek individual materials or social 
gains"; their support is exchanged for benefits gained. Li Stage III, peasants "seek gains for their 
particular group or segment within the community or for their entire community", and limited 
co-operation among the smaller unit is achieved. Rewards are shared, perhaps on a selective basis. 
Li Stage IV, "peasants seek gains for their entire class". At this level, peasants are less suspicious 
of the collective organization and have more confidence that the goal (albeit ideological or 
Utopian) will be achieved^^. Migdal's analysis has delineates the concrete process of 
transformation of peasant actions and finds a pattem ofbehaviors. However he does not give the 
reasons for the transformation, especially the individual peasants' reasons for their actions. There 
is a need to study peasant's action through the study of their culture, which is the inner decisive 
force for a peasant's action. A culturalistic approach is a more holistic one for depicting peasant 
life. It can dynamically show the transformation process of the peasant view and life. Li particular 
regard to this study of RRM and LRM in China, we find here the peasants' interactions with 
movement organizers and the process under which their view oflife transformed during the 1930s. 
Within the literature reviewed, peasants, who usually have poor living conditions, have 
held the "image of limited good". As the result of living under persistent subsistence threat, the 
peasants living in different places share the image. That does not mean that the image is 
universally found in every peasant community, but it predominates in many different cultural 
systems. As a general attribute of peasant communities, this study will attribute the "image of 
limited good" to Chinese peasants. However, this is only the starting point of the study. Specific 
63. Migdal, Joel S, Peasants, Politics, and Revolution, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19xx. 
64. Migdal, ibid., p.218-221. 
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factors of the peasant communities under study will be explored in detail. With reference to 
Skinner and Bailey, the "image of limited good" operates not necessarily in a closed 
community 一 its relative openness depends on stimulation from the objective social environment 
and the subjective judgement of individual peasants in the community. Hence, respect to the 
cultural characteristics of the local community is important. 
We will examine the efforts of the RRM and LRM movement organizers, who broke into 
the closed peasant community from the outside world, leading the conservative peasants to 
become revolutionary warriors. It is the peasants' willingness to see movement organizers as 
members of community that enables the RRM and LRM to succeed. Outside stimulants and inner 
interpretation together transformed the peasant view oflife. The image oflimited good is itselfa 
variable. Although the transformation process is at the beginning a consequence of the peasant's 
poor material life, great improvement in material living conditions is not necessarily the only 
prerequisite for transformation. Spiritual or ideological transformation is sometimes more needed 
than improvement in material life. This study finds that spiritual and ideological power come 
from the RRM's educational programs and the LRM's political propaganda, which turned peasants 
away from the image oflimited good. Although both RRM and LRM organizers provided certain 
material incentives to the peasants, they only attracted the peasants to participate in the 
movements in the early stages. After the peasants were recruited, securing their belief in a 
prosperous life in the future was more important than providing immediate material gains. Hence, 
this study documents how movement organizers become involved in the local peasant 
community; how peasants interacted with these outsiders and how the peasants were finally 
mobilized to fight, not only for themselves or their own communities but for the peasant class in 
general and for the national interest of China. 
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With reference to Joel Migdal, the transformation of the peasant view of life and their 
resulting actions can be analyzed in four stages. In Stage I, peasants are very unresponsive to 
outsiders' mobilization. The dominance of the image oflimited good characterizes the first stage. 
Peasants are suspicious of outsiders, especially the movement organizers who make claims on 
peasants' benefits. Peasants define their local communities narrowly, and the outsiders are 
considered competitors for resources or as enemies. Peasant action is individualistic, cooperation 
is minimal (to sustain subsistence needs only) and has little influence on community life. Both 
RRM and LRM movement organizers encountered the peasants' image of limited good. They 
found it difficult to reach the peasants, and further mobilization seemed impossible. 
In Stage II, movement organizers began to be accepted by the peasants as members of the 
"we" community. The dimension of the communities' view of life expanded. The inclusion of 
movement organizers in the peasants' moral community characterizes this stage of the 
transformation process. Inclusion, however, does not imply any successful transformation ofthe 
peasant view of life. Movement organizers must adopt peasant networks as well as the peasant 
view of life, which are more conservative than the organizers hold. It seems that such setback is 
necessary when approaching the peasant community for the first time. Only after becoming 
brothers and sisters of the peasants are the movement organizers able to succeed with further 
mobilization programs, bi both the RRM and LRM, peasants were organized to participate in 
development programs and gained something from such participation. However, at this stage, 
peasant's participation depended heavily on the amount ofbenefit. Peasants participated to get the 
benefits. They were concerned with their immediate families' welfare only, proving that the 
"peasants' "image oflimited good" was still dominant. 
In Stage III, the image oflimited good breaks down for some peasants. They adopt a more 
prosperous vision of the future. The evolution of these groups of "enlightened" peasants signifies 
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that the transformation process has moved into the third stage. Organized cooperatives expand in 
scale and peasants began to join into the movements voluntarily, targeting long-term collective 
goals. However, the sense of collectiveness is still restricted to the local community. The groups 
of peasants might feel responsible for the development of the local community but they feel little 
or no responsibility to their class or the nation in general. Peasant collective action at this stage is 
aimed at the development of the local community. The picture for future development of the 
community lies in having lived a good life or in the folk legends. Peasants are incapable of 
forming images of a good life beyond those in their tradition or religion, e.g. equalizationism and 
monarchism. So their collective action (if any) at this stage is usually characterized as restorative 
or backward looking. The visions ofRRM and LRM at this stage were in line with the peasants' 
traditional view oflife. A stable environment was achieved to allow the small owner-peasants to 
conduct agricultural production. If such a stable production environment was maintained, 
peasants were sometimes satisfied. However, both RRM and LRM failed to do this. Affected by 
the unstable political and economic conditions of the 1930s, peasant life showed little 
improvement. Both movements had to be seek support to move into the fourth stages of 
mobilization. 
Li the last stage, Stage IV, peasants' "local image oflimited good" has completely broken 
down. The sense of local community is considered either broken or expanded to include all 
members in their class. This sense signifies the beginning of this stage. Peasants have a 
completely new image for their future prospects. They organize together to transform their 
structural positions. Collective action at this stage can be considered revolutionary, aiming for 
change in the overall society. In our study, only LRM underwent this stage of peasant 
mobilization and transformation of their view oflife. Peasants were mobilized to protect not only 
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the local community but also the nation by fighting against the Japanese invaders. Stage IV of 
RRM project can only be found in their theoretical construct. 
The above model describes the stages of transformation of the peasant view of life and 
their actions. The actual process is not necessarily in the sequence from Stage I to Stage IV. There 
may be jump-overs and reversals. The model framework is to facilitate the understanding of 
peasants' culture and peasant actions but never represents the real historical facts. There is no 
general path of transformation. In this study, we will consider two possible transformation 
processes. One process is a radical one, while the other is conservative. We consider RRM and 
LRM as two examples to show the two ways of transformation. The model is summarized in the 
following table. 
Table. 2.1 The Four Stages Showing the Transformation Process ofPeasant's Localistic Image of 
Limited Good. Action Consequences and Effects on the Environment 
Stage Peasant's View Peasant's Action Effect on Structure 
I Image ofLimited Good Passively Accommodate No Effect on the 
in Strictly Defmed to Outsider's Structural Environment 
Peasant Community Mobilization 
n Loosened Image of Individualistic Support Little Effect on the 
Limited Good in Exchanged for Structural Environment 
Strictly Defined Material and Social 
Peasant Community Benefits 
ni Broken Lnage of A Part of the Peasant Some Changes 
Limited Good in Community Participating in the Peasant Community 
Strictly Defined in Limited Form of But Few Structural 
Peasant Community Collective Actions Differences 
rV Broken Lnage of Alliance Formed Within Changes in the Entire 
Limited Good in the Whole "Class" Social Structure 
Broadly Defined to Conduct 
Peasant Community Collective Actions 
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CHAPTER 3. FROM MODERNIZATION TO MOBILIZATION 
This chapter is a presentation on the background of the two movements, the RRM and 
LRM, in terms of their cultural transformation. Chinese culture has a long history and is a great 
tradition within a transforming society. It is a coherent body of well-established ethics, values, 
norms and life strategies to guide people's actions. The peasants' small tradition, which is 
observed in the relatively isolated villages, preserved the essence of the great tradition. It 
maintained a dynamic relationship with the great tradition. The small tradition is considered the 
great tradition in its archetype and yet it is influenced by and led by the metamorphosis of the great 
tradition. Constant interaction between the two traditions is the basic assumption of this study. 
]n the development history of modem China, both material and cultural infrastructure of 
the old country are under constant transformation. Some changes are independent, with their own 
pace and logic, but the majority is forced by challenges from the West. Under threat from the 
West, China was forced to step on to its modernization path. In this chapter, the RRM and LRM 
are studied in line with other modernization attempts in China. These modernization attempts can 
be regarded partly as attempts to mobilize people to participate in various development projects 
and partly as efforts to transform Chinese traditional culture that is thousands of years old (the 
great tradition). Cultural transformation is a change in the inner society. It is the essence ofthe 
nation and must be preserved while on the road to modernization. On the other hand, it impedes 
China's modernization. This contradiction persists in all the modernization attempts discussed in 
the following part. 
Since the beginning of the 20th century, China searched for a modernization path for itself. 
The search began during the late Qing Dynasty. The Self-Empowerment Movement {ziqiang 
yundong) and the Reform Movement {weixing yundong) were reform efforts of the traditional 
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ruling elite. The main strategy of these projects was to keep the core Chinese tradition unchanged 
but to equip it with Westem apparatus {zhongxue weiti, xixue weiyong). These strategies were 
reacting to Westem challenges and followed a conservative modernization path aimed at 
obtaining the double advantage of preserving social and cultural attributes and equipping China 
with Westem technology. However, material improvement could not be separated from its 
underlying cultural foundation and vice versa 一 the survival of the culture depended on support 
from its material base. Unfortunately, these movements failed to save the country and the Qing 
Dynasty came to an end in 1911. 
The May Fourth Movement in 1919 signified the arrival of new modernization 
movements. Westernization^ was the main theme during this period and Chinese traditional 
culture was regarded as an obstacle to modernization that needed to be eliminated. Westem ideas 
of democracy and science were to be introduced to the old kingdom. The Westernization dream 
did not last long. It ended as the outbreak of the World War I uncovered the ugly side of capitalism 
and Westem society. Moreover, the Russian October Revolution was a demonstration of a 
completely different modernization path that China could choose for itself. Socialist and Marxist 
thought spread rapidly among the intellectuals in China. Modernization no longer necessarily 
meant Westernization. The socialist way and the Russian model became known as the 
modernization path for China and the common utopia for the entire society^. 
In contrast, there was a revival of the emphasis on preserving Chinese traditional culture as 
the basis of China's unique modernization path. Dr. Sun Zhongshan's (Sun Yat-sen) sanmin zhuyi 
(Three People's Principles or Nationalism, Democracy and People's Livelihood), could be seen as 
a rough combination of the socialist and the Chinese modernization paths. It combined the 
1. The Westernization model is referred in fact to the capitalist society of the Westem Europe since the 19th 
Century. 
2. As a way to go ahead of the West. 
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Russian model of bureaucratic party rule with a general emphasis on nationalism and people's 
livelihood in the modernization process. It became the ideological base of the Republican 
government. However, the Republican dream was destroyed by Jiang Jieshi's (Chiang Kai-shek's) 
betrayal. Aiming at building a strong state in the messy political environment, Jiang established a 
military government, placed the country under his authoritative rule and made himself the biggest 
warlord and military ruler^. 
Apart from their differences in aim and policy, the above-described attempts to modernize 
China were efforts of the elite class. The majority of the population, especially the large number of 
peasants living in backward villages, remained untouched. Traditional culture (the small 
tradition) still dominated their lives. Through the effort of the Rural Reconstruction Movement 
(RRM) and the CCP Land Reform Movement (LRM), the masses became involved in China's 
modernization process. The two movements represented disappointment in Jiang's Republican 
government and the shift of focus from elite-class efforts to the revolutionary potential of the 
masses. The following is a brief comparison of the theoretical and ideological bases ofRRM and 
LRM. 
3.1 The Bankruptcy of the Peasant Society and the Corruption of the Great and Small 
Traditions 
At the end of the 1920's, China stood at the edge ofbankmptcy. Foreign imports rushed 
into the territory. Product dumping had driven local industries out ofbusiness. As export prices 
dropped sharply during the Great Depression, peasants' incomes dropped tremendously^. 
Deteriorating market prices soon drove peasant incomes below subsistence level. 
3. Schwartz, Benjamin I, "Themes in Lntellectual History: May Fourth and After', in John K. Fairbank, ed., The 
Cambridge History of China, vol.l2 part I，Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. 
4. As the planting of cash crops had brought to the peasants more income at the 1920's, many peasants turned to 
cash crop production. Since they became more relied on the market, they lost the ability of self-reliance. 
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The crisis in the villages soon drew the attention of the ruling government, the intellectuals 
and the revolutionaries. Beginning in 1927, the KMT government tried to implement rent 
reduction programs. The Land Law of 1930 stipulated that the rental of farmland should not 
exceed 37.5% of the yield or 8% of the price ofland. The reduction of rent was not an end in itself 
but a stepping stone towards the realization of land ownership for peasants {gengzhe you qitian). 
The aim of the scheme was to secure general land ownership for small peasants. The law 
encouraged peasants to own the land they tilled and protected their ownership by requiring that all 
land transactions be approved by the government. Li addition, land value tax and progressive land 
value increment tax were implemented to fight against speculative buying and selling of land^. 
Not surprisingly, the rent-reduction programs received much resistance from local officials and 
landlords. Some KMT administrators were even assassinated. The program came to a halt. The 
1930 Land Law was withdrawn and never implemented on the mainland^. 
The failure of KMT's efforts to further save the villages encouraged the rise of non-
government organizations to form various development programs. In general, these programs are 
called the Rural Reconstruction Movement. Participants were mainly intellectuals, some 
educated abroad, some trained at universities (which were owned by local units) and some were 
scholars teaching in village schools. Members of the movement also included workers of famine 
relief organizations, local government officials and financial investors. Whether their initial aims 
were education, social relief, smooth administration or investment opportunities, they all came to 
the conclusion that agricultural production had to be increased and peasants' incomes improved, or 
any other objectives would be impossible. Concrete projects were conducted in the villages and 
theoretical discussions formed to back up the movement. Liang Shuming, a prominent Neo-
5. Hsiao, Tseng. �Land Reform in the Republic of China" in Symposium on the History of the Republic of 
China. Vol. 5. Taipei: 1984. 
6. Actually, it had been implemented in Taiwan when the KMT government fled to the island. See Hsiao, ibid. 
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Confucian, formulated the most comprehensive theoretical base for the Rural Reconstruction 
Movement and soon became a leading figure in the movement. 
For Liang Shuming, Chinese society was based on Chinese ethics {lunli benwei), which 
basically developed from Chinese kinship relationships. People in the system were like members 
of a family linked together to form a bigger family. Every member owed his or her rights and 
j 
responsibilities to other members. People were not individuals, but part of the same body . 
In this family-like society, there was no inherent conflict between different groups of 
people. There was no clear class differentiation. Resources were distributed evenly among 
members of society. No one particular group (capitalists or landlords) could monopolize 
ownership of means of production, including land and capital. Society was also relatively open, as 
the imperial examination system allowed ordinary people to obtain official positions and to 
increase their status and wealth. As a result, there were different occupations (zhiye fenli), but no 
g 
class differentiation {jieji duili). 
Although there was no notable social conflict, the society was disorganized. Between the 
"big families" and the small peasant households, there was no intermediate social organization to 
link them. Individual peasant families could found themselves in a sea of other families^. What 
held the families together was the unique cultural system 一 a civilization enclosing both great and 
small tradition — underlying the social structure of China that was essentially an organization 
without organization. The cultural system was based on family ethics (lunli). People treasured the 
family values, which were developed through their most intimate life experiences. Relationships 
among the people who lived in this system corresponded to family relationships. People regarded 
7. Liang Shuming, 'Xiangcunjianshe lilun" (Rural Reconstruction Theory) in Liang Shuming quan ji (Works 
ofLiang Shuming). Vol. 2. Jinan: Shandongrenmin chupan she. 1990. p.l68. 
8. Liang,ibid., p.170-172. 
9. Liang, ibid., p.l92 - 195. 
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each other by their positions within the family (whether high or low). People had clear ideas of 
how a family ran but no idea ofhow an organization could be formed. This unique cultural system 
maintained social order in the Chinese society but kept it disorganized. 
hi Liang's view, Chinese society worked smoothly until the end of the 19th century, when 
the challenge from Westem civilization entered the old nation. Chinese culture failed to compete 
and lost its efficacy. The breakdown of the cultural system resulted in damage to the social order, 
which led to the collapse of the social infrastructure^^ and the lunli benwei system broke down. 
People turned away from the warm family-like relationships and values to become selfish and 
individualistic. The search for maximization of individual rights eclipsed mutual-help 
relationships. The zhiye fenli nature of the society also broke down. The capitalist modem 
industries generated huge amounts of wealth. As the wealth was reinvested into all sectors, 
including industrial and agricultural, it expanded even more. The concentration of wealth in a few 
capitalists' hands resulted in the concentration of economic resources and hence a dominant 
classi i . 
The old social order broke down and no new social order was built up at the same time. 
The society became dysfunctional. That was the resultant crisis of the peasant society and the 
immediate crisis of early twentieth-century China. It was the aim ofRRM to reconstruct order and 
revive the essence of Chinese culture. 
The CCP's view of Chinese development could be considered a Marxist historical 
1 o 
development thesis . From the orthodox formula of historical development, any society must 
pass through five stages: ancient, slavery, feudal, capitalist and socialist. China stepped into the 
10. Liang,ibid., p.164-165. 
11. Liang, ibid., p.204-211. 
12. Different people had contributed to the thesis. They might disagree with each other or more inconsistent in 
different periods of time. It was here to portrait a general picture of that. 
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feudal period during the Zhou Dynasty (1644-771 B.C). It lasted for more than 3,000 years until 
the Ching Dynasty (1644-1911). During this period, the structure of the society changed very 
little. It was characterized by a self-sustaining economy in which peasants produced for their own 
use and there was little trade. In opposition to the majority peasant population was the minority 
elite group, which consisted oflandlords, nobles and the emperor. The ruling group owned most 
of the land and monopolized the use of violence to control others. Peasants had to pay rent and tax 
to the ruling group, which meant that a large portion of their production was paid to support the 
luxurious lives of the elite. Class conflict was inherent in the conflictual exploitative relationship 
between the ruling landowners and the land-less peasants. The great exploitation obstructed the 
• 13 
historical development from feudal society to capitalist . 
The old feudal empire was forced to change during the 1840 Opium War because the 
invasion of foreign imperialists had changed the structure of Chinese society. As foreign imports 
rushed into the hinterland, the self-sustained economy was mined and the economic infrastructure 
of feudal society deteriorated. The development of trade and commodity production in agriculture 
ignited the growth of capitalism (ziben zhuyi mengya, or the growth of the sprouts of capitalism). 
As the dumping of imported goods killed the family-run, peasant handicraft industries, as well as 
their domestic agricultural production, the bankrupt peasants were forced to leave the countryside 
and become workers in factories owned by foreigners or local units. They were the first generation 
of proletarians in China. Although commercialization and proletarianization had taken place, the 
potential number oflocal entrepreneurs was limited. Foreign imperialists suppressed local capital. 
As a result, China was unable to step onto its own capitalist road, and turned into a semi-feudal 
and semi-colonial society (ban zhimindi, ban fengjian shehui). Most peasants were then under the 
13. Mao, Zedong, 'Zhongguo geming he zhongguo gongchandang" (Chinese Revolution and Chinese 
Communist Party), in Mao Zedongxuanji (Selected Works ofMao Zedong), vol.2, p.621-656. 
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double exploitation of the feudal landlords and imperialist colonizers. China's problems at the end 
of the 19th century were the invasion of foreign imperialism and the corrupt century-old feudal 
system. The way out of the crisis should be a capitalist revolution aiming at national liberation 
{Xin minzhu zhuyi geming or New Democratic Revolution)^^. The New Democratic Revolution 
differed from the old Democratic Revolution (capitalist revolution) in that it aimed for the ultimate 
achievement of socialism. Capitalism was a transitional stage and the success of the New 
Democratic Revolution would pave the road for socialism and communism. Hence, the New 
Democratic Revolution was a necessary preparation for the later socialist revolution. In this stage 
of revolution, proletarians were the leaders of revolution but not the major constituency. The 
peasants, the most deprived group under double exploration of imperialist and feudalism should 
be most revolutionary. For the success of the New Democratic Revolution, peasants had to be 
mobilized. To mobilize the peasants and to transform the rural social structure, reforms on lord 
ownership should be conducted. It would on one hand break up the feudal relations of production; 
on the other hand provide immediate gain to the peasants. Hence, Lord Reform Movement would 
be a necessary path towards the New Democratic Movement. 
Acknowledging the country's crisis, the Rural Reconstmctionists and the CCP have agreed 
to destroy the imperialist economic invasion. Becoming completely Westernized, the imperialist 
way, was rejected by both sides. They diverged, however, in their understanding of the "internal" 
problem of China. Liang Shuming believed it was the breakdown of the cultural system that led to 
the dislocation of the society, but the CCP identified the problem of feudal exploitation as the 
obstacle to development. Liang rejected the unequal distribution of wealth as a predominant 
phenomenon in China, but the CCP regarded it as the central conflict in society. Liang asked why 
the social order had disrupted and CCP, in contrast, asked why the existing "unjust" remained. 
14. Mao, ibid., p.647. 
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Liang claimed that cultural attributes were the determining factor and CCP targeted the 
transformation of the social structure. Both ignored the cohesion of the processes ofcultural and 
structural transformation, the fact that the evolution of one process will always affects the other. 
Beginning with different views on the problem of China, Liang went back to Chinese tradition to 
uncover its valuable essence. The CCP went forward to organize the exploited classes to overturn 
the existing order. However, as it happened, transformation of cultural and structural factors did 
occur. 
3.2 Chinese Culture and Chinese Development 
To save the country and to save the Chinese social order, the Rural Reconstmctionists, 
represented by Liang Shuming, believed that cultural transformation was the key factor. He found 
"reason" to be the essence of Chinese culture, i.e. the great tradition. Reasonable Chinese people 
respected normative rules and had clear minds to differentiate right from wrong, true or false. Li 
making the judgements, they were not influenced by outside dominating forces. Decisions were 
made not out of fear or favor, but based on reason or normative values. They were individualistic 
and inner looking. Chinese "reason" was different from Westem rationality. For Liang, in the 
reign of reason, human relationships were considered important factors in decision making, while 
Westem-style rationality was mechanical and calculative. For the Confucian, reason was 
institutionalized through the establishment of li (rite) andyue (music) and became a non-religious 
common belief of the Chinese people^^. Those who believed in reason tended to be peaceful, 
gentle, passive and undisciplined^^. It became the "Chinese personality". The Westem 
15. Liang Shuming, 'Xiangcunjianshe lilun" (Rural Reconstruction Theory) in Liang Shuming quan ji (Works 
ofLiang Shuming). Vol. 2. Jinan: Shandong renmin chupan she. 1990. p.181-184. 
16. Liang, ibid, p.l91. 
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personality, on the other hand, was aggressive, strong, conflictual and disciplined . Framed in 
Westem personality was the development of science, democracy and material culture. When the 
two different cultures met, the Chinese culture lost. This failure soon led to the breakdown ofthe 
society. There were many voices demanding the safeguard of the future of China, some believing 
that learning and copying from the West was the best solution. Some hoped to mix Westem and 
Chinese culture. Some believed that China should drive away all Westem elements and go back to 
being a closed society. However, Liang rejected all these ideas. He believed that China and the 
West were on different development trajectories. Westem society should not be China's future. 
As Chinese and Westerners were different people living under different cultural systems, they 
were located in different traditions and were not on the same historical development path. 
1 Q • • 
Learning and copying from the West would only be self-destructive . In addition, Liang disliked 
individualistic, materialistic Westem culture. He found only anxiety and envy in Westem society. 
It should not be the model for Chinese society. Simply mixing the two cultures was also a bad 
solution. As Westem and Chinese culture had developed from different sources, they could not be 
combined in an arbitrary way^ .^ Going back to a closed society was also both impossible and 
inappropriate, too. For Liang, Chinese culture had already become rigid and lacking in vitality. 
What was left was merely a skeleton of the rules of li and yue', the core — reason 一 had 
disappeared^^. 
Then what should be done to rescue the broken country? Liang found the answer in 
Chinese tradition. He said that the way should be to get rid of the weed and keep the flower of the 
17. Liang,ibid. p.l91. 
18. Liang, ibid., p.197-200. 
19. Liang Shuming, "Dongxi wenhua jiqi zexue" (Eastem and Westem Culture and Philosophy), in Liang 
Shuming quanji (Works ofLiang Shuming) vol.l, p.338-343. 
20. Liang, 'xiangcunjianshe li lun', p.201-203, p.272-273. 
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leek. Dross in Chinese culture should be discarded and the essence reserved. The core ofChinese 
culture 一 reason, should be re-established; the degenerated li 2ccidyue should be replaced with a 
new system. The established new culture not only would accommodate the development of 
Chinese society, but also the future of all the societies in the world. A reasonable society was the 
ideal of the entire human race, both in the West and East. Re-establishing reason in China would 
contribute not only to China's well being but also to the development of the human species as a 
whole2i. 
And how to re-establish reason? For Liang, reason could not be realized suddenly; it had to 
be cultivated gradually and through institutions, not individuals^^. In these institutions, people 
communicated with one another and searched for the right way collectively. He hoped that reason 
could be exerted imperceptibly and become the habit of the people, hi these institutions, members 
would be active decision-makers and public issues decided by the public. Public opinion was 
decisive, but individual right had to be protected. However, this was not a democratic society 
where the majority was always right. Reason contributed to the standard ofjudgement on right or 
wrong, true or false. Since reason could be acquired through experience and learning, experienced 
• • 23 
and scholarly individuals should be leaders in the public arena and their opinions respected . To 
cultivate reason at the societal level, the institutions should be set up by the state, which alone 
possessed adequate power and resources. However, the Republican government was seriously 
corrupt and Liang had no faith in it. He believed it would be impossible for other single group to 
dominate in the chaotic political situation. Social transformation hence had to rely on society 
21. Liang, ibid., p.276. 
22. Liang, ibid., p.279. 
23. Liang, ibid., p.282-283. 
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itselJ?4 In addition, cultivating reason depended on the development of subjectivity, which 
required the people themselves to believe in reason. They had to be conscious, self-motivated and 
deliberate, and to engage in the institutions voluntarily. If the state or other social forces played 
any role, it should at most be supplementary. No coercive force should be applied in the process, 
or else it would only be destructive to the whole project^^ Hence, to re-establish reason, work 
should be done through education, persuasion and affection. This was an educator's project. The 
resulting social order should be the consensus of the whole society. It was up to society to save 
itself. 
When interaction among the people became institutionalized, a collectivity would be 
formulated and individuals become part of it. Individuals would make decisions based on the 
interest of the collectivity. Liang believed this public orientation to be the ideal social orientation. 
But it was only possible, in Liang's view, through educational means. Using material attraction 
would engage people's calculative mentality; using coercive force would exercise their fear of 
punishment. The application of material attraction or coercive force would only induce 
individualistic thought. People should instead place individual interest before collective good. 
Self- interest instead of reason should be the guiding principle of social relationships. Then there 
would be no community but only individuals competing with one another. For Liang Shuming, 
Westem societies based on individualized values. The market system was organized to pursue 
individual interests and the state only disciplined individuals to preserve a baseline for them to live 
together at minimum cooperation. Social order was enforced by the underlying coercive force of 
the state. Liang thought that social order based on such institutional settings would easily break 
down. He believed that social order should be constructed in a different way. For Liang, although 
24. Liang, ibid., p.276-277. 
23. Liang, ibid., p.282-283. 
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a centralized state had developed early in the history of China, coercive force was usually 
restrained and seldom used to discipline the individuals. In contrast, education was often used as a 
means to cultivate collective an orientation among the people. As everyone believed in reason and 
adopted the collective orientation in prior to individual interest, social order would automatically 
achieved. The state would then play a dummy role. In Liang's view, the state could have a 
transitional role, which would diminish when the autonomous social institutions had set up to 
manage the society. During the transition period, the state should allow and assist in the setting up 
of autonomous social institutions. Liang hoped that the RRM could be the agency to promote the 
establishment of the social institution. Before that aim was achieved, cooperation between the 
RRM and the KMT state was necessary. However, the state's role should be minimized. Liang 
hoped that the RRM's educational power could be combined with the KMT state's political power 
{zhengjiao heyi) and yet maintain a degree of autonomy. The RRM would conduct an educator's 
project in consensus with the whole society^6 
For the CCP, culture is a different thing. Starting from a Marxist framework, they believed 
that culture was the reflection of the political and economic base of the society. Different political 
and economic systems would determine the emergence of different kinds of culture^^. The fact 
that Chinese culture was different or similar to Westem culture actually depended on the nature of 
the society. 
For a Marxist, different societies were set along the universal formula of historical 
development. Chinese and Westem societies stood at different stages of development. Westem 
society had already moved into the capitalist stage in the 19th century, and Chinese society 
remained in the feudal stage at the beginning of 20th century. When these two societies met, it 
26. Liang Shuming, "Zhengjiao heyi" (The Combination of Political Power and Educational Power) in Liang 
Shuming Quanji, Vol. 5, p.670-678. 
27. Mao, Zedong,�Xm inzhu zhuyi lun" (On New Democracy), in Selected Works ofMao, vol.2, p.694. 
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was a more advanced, more progressive culture meeting an older, backward one. The traditional 
Chinese culture was vulnerable. Facing the challenge, the choices were either the doctrine of 
"back to the ancient times" (restorism) or to ally with the imperialist, i.e. Westemize completely. 
The former was impossible and the latter was against the will of most people. In the CCP's view, 
the mysterious and conservative traditional culture was reluctant to change and impeded the 
awakening of the anti-imperialist rebellious consciousness of the people. It had to be 
9R 
transformed. 
In the CCP's judgement, Liang Shuming's work to rebuild the Chinese culture took a 
conservative approach. Although the Rural Reconstructionists had good intentions to save 
society, their work reconstructing the traditional order in fact consolidated the existing feudal 
regime andjustified the domination of the exploiting class. The traditional culture was indeed the 
29 
ruling-class culture . 
So what should the new Chinese culture be? Luo Pu (Zhang Wentian), the ideological 
leader of the CCP in the 1930s, believed that firstly it should be nationalistic to build up national 
dignity to fight the imperialist. Secondly, it should be democratic in order to be against the 
authoritarian rule and exploitation. Thirdly, it should be scientific, i.e., believe in science and 
knowledge. Li short a "nationalistic Communism" was the base of this new culture^^. 
This new Chinese culture has absorbed "good" elements (Communism) from the West and 
combined them with the nationalistic spirit of China. The new culture was not restorative and not 
28. Luo, Pu (Zhang, Wentian), 'Kangzhang yilai zhonghua minzu de xin wenhua yundong yu jinghou renwu" 
(The Chinese New Cultural Movement and its Work Since the Anti-Japanese War), in Rongqu Luo (ed.), 
cong xihau dao xiandaihua (From Westernization to Modernization), Beijing: Beijing University Press, 
1990, p.613-614. 
29. Sun Zhufang, 'Weisheme yao pipin xiangcun gailiang zhuyi gongzuo'(Why It Has to Criticize the Work of 
the Reformists), in Xue Muqiu and Feng Hefa (eds.), "Zhongguo Nongcun" lunwen xuan (Selected Articles 
in "Chinese Village"), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1986, p.244-251. 
30. Luo. ibid.,p.612-613. 
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aimed at Westernization^^ It was a third route. The New Culture was class-based to serve the 
interest of the lower class only. It would contribute to the success of the revolutionary movement 
to fight the upper, ruling class. Above all, the new culture had to be practical and capable of 
serving a revolutionary purpose. 
Culture was conceptualized differently by Liang Shuming and the CCP. For Liang, 
culture was holistic and autonomous from the economic and political sector of the society. It 
provided the basis for the smooth running of society. Reason, being the core of Chinese culture 
had to be reconstructed in order to save society. For the CCP, culture was a dependent factor. 
Feudal society had feudal culture; capitalist society had capitalist culture; socialist society had a 
socialist culture. When China was on its way of changing from a feudal society to a capitalist and 
then a socialist society, feudal culture had to be destroyed. A new socialist culture should be built. 
The new culture would become subordinate to the revolutionary movement. It had to be practical 
and able to facilitate the success of the revolution. The CCP developed culture to serve only 
instrumental functions for the success of revolution. Its autonomous status was also downgraded 
to a dependent position. However, that did not mean that cultural transformation was ignored in 
the actual CCP movement process. On the contrary, CCP emphasized the importance of the 
ideological battlefield. The various political campaigns organized by CCP had won people's favor 
and gained enormous support. It seemed that in affecting the people's beliefs and their cultural 
values, the success of revolution was enhanced, and it seemed that the reign of culture was not 
only autonomous but also brought about changes to the other sectors. In the actual movement 
process, the Rural Reconstmctionists and the CCP both emphasized the importance of cultural 
transformation. Their different theoretical emphases dissolved in the actual movement process. 
31. Luo, ibid., p.615-617. 
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3.3 Village as a Starting Point 
Where should the transformation of culture be started? Liang believed that the smallest 
collective unit in Chinese society was the village. Any reform project should first be a village-
<^^  
level one . He thought that the village was also the most suitable environment to cultivate reason. 
As peasants were the most innocent and unadorned group, working with the nature and caring 
about living organisms, they tended to be passionate. That passion was essential for the 
development of reason. In addition, villages consisted of the ideal Chinese family prototypes, 
which were the basic unit of social organization, bound by intimate relationship and mutual trust. 
The village provided an excellent base for the cultivation of reasonable personal relationships. 
Moreover, village community was the lowest level social network linking peasants together. 
Peasants identified with the village community rather than to the country. In this community, 
public awareness was more likely to succeed and was the essential base for higher-level social 
participation. Furthermore, village community was least damaged by Westem culture. Villages 
still observed traditional moralities which were already lost in the cities. Regarded as a 
fundamental prerequisite of Chinese society, the village society supported the operation of the 
whole society. It would be most effective to transform the whole society from its fundamentals^^. 
The first step to transforming a community was to set up an institution in the village. 
Liang took ideas from Lu Heshu (a Confucian in the Song Dynasty), who believed that all people 
were interdependent and improving their relationships would encourage them to help each other. 
Lu created the xiangyue (village covenant) which was a kind of voluntary contractual relationship 
among the villagers. Under the covenant, all villagers agreed upon some prescribed rules in 
examining each others' behavior and judgements right and wrong were made according to these 
32. Liang, ibid., p.313. 
33. Liang,ibid., p.314-320. 
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rules Signers of the covenant would help each other through times of difficulties. Liang found 
xiangyue to be an ideal vehicle for reason and passion. Liang also learned from Lu Futing (a figure 
in Ching Dynasty) who thought xiangyue was a normative, spiritual arrangement and that there 
should be more concrete materials to support it. He found shexue (community education), baojia 
(security unit), and shecang (community warehouse) to be the three establishments supporting 
xiangyue. Shexue carried out educational functions and assured the preservation and transmission 
of moral values; the baojia system conveyed security and political functions; and Shecang 
performed economic functions such as storage, marketing, lending and borrowing. These three 
establishments fulfilled the village's basic needs and united peasant families. Mutual 
understanding could be built up and morality and reason promoted. It was the aim of the RRM to 
establish similar institutional settings in other villages^^. 
By spreading the transformation projects from village to village, the Rural Reconstruction 
Movement would be able to cover the whole country. It was Liang's aim to formulate a concrete 
rural transformation program through the establishment of model villages in Zhouping County. It 
was hoped that the programs and the experience of Zhouping could be shared by other Rural 
Reconstmctionists and replicated in other parts of China. Liang's final vision of China was a 
village society where people were interlocked and, bound by the same set of moral values and 
respected reason as the principle of life. Based on common beliefs for the good of the society, 
collective efforts would contribute to national-level development projects. The village society 
was also an autonomous community. Village institutions would manage themselves and the role 
of state could be kept minimal. With these things accomplished, China would be free from its 
problems and crisis and set an example for the development of the future human world. It would 
be a model for human life. 
23. Liang, ibid., p.282-283. 
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For the CCP, cultural transformation belonged under the category of destroying the feudal 
relationships of production. It should be a class war between the exploited and the exploiting. The 
CCP's role would be to organize the exploited class to form a strong alliance to fight the exploiters. 
The exploiter's culture should also be abolished. Class analysis was applied to identify whom and 
which groups of people were friends of revolution and which groups were the enemy^^. 
The first stage of the CCP revolution focused was on the working class. From a Marxist 
point of view, the workers were the pure proletarians. They were the most revolutionary force in 
China. They should be the leaders and the main actors in the revolution. CCP organized various 
workers' movements in big cities such as Shanghai, Hankou and Guangzhou. During 1922 alone 
there were more than 100 large-scale workers' movements incidents^^. Violent struggles 
characterized this phase of worker's movements in China. At the same time, the CCP propaganda 
machine attacked the alliance between the KMT state and the big capitalists. They were accused 
of being traitors of the country because they cooperated with foreign business people, and were 
blamed as the exploiters who "stood on the heads of the Chinese people". The accusation was 
calculated to arouse people's consciousness of who the enemies of the nation were. The CCP, on 
the other hand, was promoted as the friend of the people. It could be the only leader to save the 
country. The propaganda effort and the related workers' movements were quite successful in the 
first stage. However, the continuation of worker's movements ultimately led to strong suppression 
by the state. Trade unions and CCP organizations suffered from attacks from the KMT 
government and the imperialist army. In circa 1927, the CCP's activities in the big cities were 
forced underground. Most workers' movement activists were arrested and killed. The CCP's 
35. Hu, Huazu, Zhongguo geming shi jiangyi (The Teaching Materials on Chinese Revolutionary Histoty), 
Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daixue chuban she (People's University of China Press), 1963. 
36 Hu, Huazu, Zhongguo geming she jiangyi (The Teaching Materials of Chinese Revolutionary History), 
Beijing: Zhingguo renmin daixue chuban she (People's University of China Press), 1963. 
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activities in the cities had almost been ruptured completely . Alongside with the worker's 
movements, peasants' movement developed. However, the CCP's acknowledgement ofpeasants 
as a revolutionary force changed, and kept on shifting throughout the revolution. For Chen Duxiu, 
the first CCP leader, peasants, especially the owner peasants, were regarded as selfish, 
conservative petit-bourgeoisie. They possessed no revolutionary consciousness. They might take 
38 
chances to fight the big landlords but they were only motivated by their self-interest to own land . 
However, Chen also found that peasants might become revolutionary under severe exploitation in 
the semi-feudal, semi-colonial society. In addition, as peasants were the largest population group 
in China, without their participation, no national level revolution could be successfuP^. Although 
the peasants' strategic position had been realized, they still were secondary to the workers. In 
Chen's view, to ensure the success of the revolution, peasants had to be put under proletarian 
(worker) leadership^^. 
Contrasted to Chen Duxiu's view, Pang Bai, the pioneer peasant movement leader thought 
that the peasants could be revolutionary^^ He regarded peasants as more loyal to their "class" and 
their neighborhoods than other social classes. Communal spirit was spread among the peasants. 
Once they were organized {nonghui), they would rely on their organizations. Members of the 
peasant organizations in Haifeng, Guangdong Province, once declared that "we are bom to be the 
37. Hu, ibid. 
38. Chen, Duxiu, 'Zhongguo guomin geming yu shehui ge jieji" (Chinese National Revolution and Social 
Classes), in Jianshu Ren, et al (eds.), Chen, Duxiu zhuzuo xuan (Selected Works of Chen, Duxiu), vol.2, 
Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1993, p.563. 
39. Chen, ibid. 
40. Chen, Duxiu,�Da Li Zifen" (Answer to Li Zifen), in ibid., p.532. 
41. Pang Bai, Tang Bai gei Li Cuntao" (A Letter from Pang Bai to Li Cuntao), in Pang Bai Wenji (Works of 
Pang Bai), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe (People's Press), p . l l . 
73 
peasant organization's men and we die to be the peasant organization's ghosts"^^. Pang believed 
that peasant organizations should be built up in every village, every county and every province. 
When the entire country's peasants had been organized, they would be involved in various 
communal settings and became a strong revolutionary force. 
Central to the class conflict in the villages was the right to control the means of 
production 一 land. The amount of rent charged and the ownership ofland were the main focus of 
class struggle. Reduction of rent and redistribution of land were the top objectives of peasant 
movements. Since land was not movable and could not be kept away from the reach of peasants, 
peasants could control land. It was not the peasants who lived in fear but the landlords who feared 
that they could not collect rent. Peasants tended to have more bargaining power over their class 
enemy than workers, who had no control over the flow of capital. In addition, state control was 
weak in the villages. It would be easier to organize peasants in a loosely controlled area. Pang 
thought the general rise in rent and tax during the 1920s would jeopardize the peasant-landlord 
relationship. Peasants under severe exploitation were ready to rebel. Pang believed that any 
stimulation could ignite peasants" revolutionary action^^. 
To organize peasant movement in a village, one had to recognize which group ofpeasants 
was most revolutionary. In Mao Zedong's authoritative analysis, rural inhabitants could be 
divided into landlords {dizhu), rich peasants (funong), middle peasants (zhongnong), poor 
peasants {pinnong) and peasant laborers {gunongf^. Landlords needed not produce for 
themselves. They relied on the collection of rent for living. They were the exploiting class in the 
village and were inherently anti-revolutionary. They were the enemies of peasant movements. 
42. Pang Bai, 'Haifeng nongmin yundong" (The Peasant Movement in Haifeng), in ibid., p.l41. 
43. Pang Bai, Tang Bai gei Li Cuntao', ibid., p. 11 and p.39. 
44. Mao Zedong, 'Zengyang fenxi nongcunjieji" (How to Analyze Rural Classes), in Mao Zedongxuanji, vol. 1, 
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The rich peasants were those who both worked on their own plot of land and collected rent from 
tenants. The rent collected was usually exploitative in nature. The middle peasants were mainly 
owner peasants {zigengnong) who owned small piece ofland and depended for their living on its 
yield. They might be eager to expand their ownership of land. However, during the economic 
depression, their lives deteriorated. Both rich and middle peasants were skeptical that the peasant 
revolution could succeed, reluctant to join. However, they seldom became anti-revolutionary. 
The poor peasants were the largest peasant population group in the village. They were mainly the 
tenant peasants (diannong), who might possess some materials of production but owned no land. 
They were under the exploitation of landlords and rich peasants. They were ready to join the 
revolution to fight for their interest. The peasant laborers were the poorest group in the villages. 
They were part of the proletariat in China. As they possessed nothing at all and had to sell their 
labor to eam a living, they were the most revolutionary and were the leading force in revolutions^^ 
hi Mao's logic, the poorer the peasants, the higher their revolutionary consciousness. 
From actual movement experience, Pang and Mao both found unarmed peasant 
movements to be weak. Although organized peasants could be a great threat to landlords, when 
landlords allied with warlords, they could easily destroy the movement. Getting militarized was 
one of the objectives of peasant movements. Li contrast with Liang Shuming's emphasis on 
peaceful transformation, Mao Zedong praised the use of violence in peasant movements. He 
believed that a violent revolution was both necessary and essential. If armed force were used, 
peasant organizations could build up their authority and destroy the old feudal power of the 
landlords46. 
45. See also Mao Zedong,�Zhongguo shehui gejieji de fenxi" (The Analysis on Chinese Social Classes), in Mao 
ZedongXuanji(Selected Works ofMao Zedong), vol.l, p.3-ll. 
46. Mao Zedong, Hunan nongmin yundong kaocha baogao (Report of a Study on Peasant Movements in 
Hunan), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe (People's Press), 1951, 
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During the well known CCP August 7th Meeting^^, the strategy {lwcian) of the Land 
Reform Movement to link armed rebellion with land revolution in the rural areas was formed. In 
Mao Zedong's famous words, "state power was gained from armed force" {zhengquan shi yau 
qiangganzi zhong qude def^. After that, the use of armed force became a characteristic ofmany 
CCP-led peasant movements. The LRM and Red Army helped to set up "red powers" {hongse 
zhengquan) in villages. Mao believed that the "red powers" could survive, as there were splits 
between the "white powers" {haise zhengquan or the KMT state power). As the KMT warlords 
continued fighting each other, the "red powers" became viable. The gradual spread of the "red 
powers" would lead ultimately to a success of the national-level revolution^^. Contrary to the 
Rural Reconstmctionists' goal of eliminate the state's participation in the long run, the CCP aimed 
to strengthen the role of a revolutionary state during the LRM. 
Both the Rural Reconstmctionists and the CCP acknowledged the village as the basic unit 
of Chinese society and started their reform projects there. Both discovered the developmental and 
revolutionary potential of the peasants. For Liang, the peasant community was the best place to 
cultivate reason. For the CCP, peasants were under severe exploitation and therefore ready to 
participate in revolutionary movements. Both went to the villages and tried to organize the 
peasants and both believed it crucial to promote revolutionary transformation in the villages. 
Liang tried to build up a village community based on an ideal Confucian village covenant to 
47. It is the CCP Central Committee emergency meeting held at Hankou on 7th August 1927.. It was 
acknowledged as a tuming point in CCP revolutionary history. See Jiang huaxuan et al Zhongguo 
gongchandang huiyi gaiyao (Summary of Chinese communist Party Meetings, Shenyang: Shenyang 
chubanshe, 1991，p.67-71; and Pi minxiu, 'Guanyu baqi huiyi dejige wenti" (Some Questions Concerning 
the August 7th Meeting), in Chu chengjia (ed.), Zhonggong dangshiyanjiu lunwemuan (Selected Articles on 
the Study of Chinese Communist Party History), vol.2, Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1987，p.21-45. 
48. See Feng jianhui, 'Wodang kaichuang noncun baowei chengshi daolu de lishi kaocha" (The Study on the 
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include all members of the village community. The CCP set up peasant organizations mainly to 
recruit peasants to fight the rich. 
Both the RRM and LRM admitted that state power in Republican China was weak. Liang 
distrusted the KMT government and thought that any social reform should be carried out by 
society itself. In addition, he believed that subjectivity had to be respected in the reconstruction 
process of reason, hence a voluntaristic approach should be used. The use of state power should 
be limited to avoid any imposed duties. Self-initiation was the central theme of the RRM. In 
contrast with the RRM, the CCP's LRM considered the seizure of political (state) power and the 
use of violence a must, not only to defend the "red powers" against the attack of landlords and 
KMP troops, but as a means to expand the scope of the movement. The Communist Red Army 
acted as the connection between the party and the masses. It was both an army and a propaganda 
team. An armed struggle was the only way to a Communist revolution. 
Finally, it was Liang's aim to construct a self-sustained society. The state's importance 
would be reduced and its functions demoted to the villages. The CCP sought to replace the KMT. 
It set up a socialist state, which was the leader of the exploited classes and led the society into a 
new historical stage. 
Both Rural Reconstmctionists and the CCP were led by intellectuals and scholars who 
were sensitive to China's deep crisis during the early years of the 20th century. They had lost 
confidence in the corrupt and incompetent KMT government. They also doubted that the 
capitalist and industrialists could bring China onto a developmental path. They had no faith in the 
KMT government's urban reforms. Going to the hinterland villages to search for the potential 
peasant forces became the only choice. They thought that if the large peasant population could be 
mobilized that China could be on to its modernization path. They shared the ultimate picture of an 
ideal society. Liang's ideal was a socialist society — he even quoted Marx and Engels to describe 
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the ideal society^®. The Rural Reconstructionists and the CCP differed only in the approaches to 
achieve that ideal society. 
The Rural Reconstructionists did not believe that the chaotic political situation of the 
1920s would improve and they disapproved of the choice of seizing the state's power by violent 
military action. Hence they had to accept the chaos and the KMT regime. They hoped to keep the 
political reign untouched and to improve lives of peasants through societal forces. The RRM's 
intention was criticized by the CCP, which argued that in retaining the existing social order, any 
improvement in village life would benefit the ruling upper class only. In addition, without 
securing the material life (land ownership), the poor peasants could never attend educational 
programs organized by RRM to promote reason. The Confucian ideal would become a game of 
the rich5i. Liang Shuming defended himself and denied that he had overlooked conflicts within 
the villages. He agreed that it would be a "good" thing if the wealthy landlords and "bad 
gentlemen" {tuhao lueshen) could be eliminated completely. However, as they were backed up by 
the state and warlords, Liang did not think they could be destroyed. Li which case initiating 
conflicts among the villagers would only ruin the village order and result in chaos, which 
o 
eliminated the possibility of cooperative development . Moreover, Liang believed that the 
problems outside of the villages (imperialist economic invasion) were more harsh and urgent than 
the internal conflicts (class conflicts). Class struggle should be suspended for the safety of the 
whole society53. j^ other words, it was not the development principles that differentiated RRM 
50. Liang Shuming, 'Xiangcunjianshe lilun" (Rural Reconstruction Theory), in Liang Shuming quanji (Works 
ofLiang Shuming), p.412. 
51 Xichao, 'Quanguo xiangcun gongzuo taolunhui de yinxiang" (Reflections of the National Symposium on 
Rural Works), in Xue muqiu and Feng hefa (eds.), "Zhongguo nongcun" lunwen xuan (Selected Articles in 
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52. Liang Shuming, 'Xiangcun jianshe lilun" (Rural Reconstruction Theory), in Liang Shuming quanji (Works 
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53. Liang, ibid., p.408. 
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and he CCP's efforts, it was the differing assessments of the situation and the judgement of the 
feasibility of different approaches to modernize China that distinguished them. 
No matter what the difference between the RRM and LRM's ideals for the development in 
China were, when it came to the actual implementation of their projects, they shared similar 
tactics. Both agreed that peasants had to be organized. "Go to the villages" {dao xiangcun qu) was 
their unanimous song. Their efforts made direct contact with the peasants and tried to mobilize 
them to join the organizations. 
Both the RRM and LRM involved the participation of the peasants who held an "image of 
the limited good." Whether it was to transform the "image oflimited good" to the mutual-support 
orientation of the RRM or to establish the revolutionary consciousness ofLRM, the first task for 
the movement activists was to break into the village community and interact with the peasants. 
Both had to consider the relationship between the two movements and the existing village power 
structure. Hence, although they differed in their theory, in the actual process of the movements, 
similarities can be found. Those processes are examined in the next few chapters. 
\ 
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CHAPTER 4 A HISTORICAL PROFILE OF THE RRM AND LRM 
Before turning to the transformation of peasant culture in Zhouping and Westem Fujian, 
this chapter gives historical profiles of the RRM and LRM to give an overall picture ofthe courses 
of the two movements. In addition, it compares the ecologies of Zhouping and westem Fujian as 
background for the two movements' structural differences. 
4.1 The Rural Reconstruction Movement 
In the first stage of the RRM, most actions were spontaneous responses to the deteriorating 
rural environment. The programs were not well planned but with piecemeal objectives. RRM 
first started at Chai Cheng Cun (Chai Cheng village) in Ding Xian (Ding County), He Bei 
Province. The work began in 1904 and was carried out by Mi Jiasan and Mi Digang, father and 
son. They set up elementary schools and organized peasant organizations in the villages there. An 
educator's rural reform project, improvement in the peasants' level of education and amount of 
agricultural production were two core elements from the very beginning. 
Sun Faxu, the former magistrate ofDing County, became the chairman of Shanxi Province 
in 1930. With the support of the warlord, Yan Xishan, Sun started the Village Self-management 
Program {cun chi) in the province. Village-level management councils were established and 
empowered to rule on village affairs. Sun hoped that the villages would become autonomous, 
organized social units able to seek their own development. The rural reform projects were for the 
first time combined with state administrative reform^ Many intellectuals who still believed in the 
power of administrative reformjoined up with Sun and formed the Village Government Group 
{cunchipai). It was the first organized body of intellectuals concentrating on rural reform. 
1. Chen Xujin, ibid, p.6-8. 
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Reform projects soon spread and groups of intellectuals went to the villages to start their 
own projects. They were initially independent from each other. Some were supported by the local 
government, some were funded by foreigners and urban merchants and some had no resources and 
had to depend on the local community for money and labor. In about 1930, the movement 
developed towards its climax and spread all over northern and central China�. 
The first stage of RRM was carried out in a piecemeal manner targeting one or a few 
specific problems of the village. The more comprehensive projects were organized by the 
National Association of Mass Education Movements {Zhonghua pingmin jiaoyu cujinhui, or 
MEM) led by Yan Yangchu (James Yan), which started its work in Chai Cheng Village in Ding 
County3. With its specific history in relation to RRM and the comprehensive project carried out 
by MEM, Ding County became a center of RRM. As a leading figure in RRM, Yan named 
ignorance, poverty, weakness and selfishness as the four main problems of Chinese people and 
developed the four disciplines to address them: literature studies (wenyijiaoyu); livelihood studies 
{shengjijiaoyu) to improve the peasants' knowledge of production; hygiene education (weisheng 
jiaoyu) to improve peasants' health; and civic education {gongmin jiaoyu) to improve their 
awareness of public issues^. With its comprehensive programs covering various aspects of 
peasant life, the RRM hoped to change the rural environment and the peasant view oflife. 
Li Zhengping County of Henan Province, Pang Yuting organized the people's militia to 
defend villages against the rampant banditry in the area. Pang soon realized that the bandits were 
actually poor peasants, and that bandits could not be eliminated until the peasants could feed 
themselves. The defense problem was linked to the developmental problem. He then started a 
2. Chen, Xujin, Xiang cun jian she yun dong (Rural Reconstruction Movement). Shanghai, Taidong shuju, 
1964, p.5-6. 
3. The same village which Mi father and son worked on. 
4. Chen, ibid, p.8-9. 
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comprehensive program of rural reconstruction. Other members of the Village Government 
Group (cunchipai) including Liang Zhonghua, Wang Yihe and Wang Hongyi, alsojoined Pang's 
work. They laterjoined with Liang Shuming to set up the Henan Village Government Academy 
{Henan cunchi xueyuan), which became a center to train professional rural reconstmctionists^. 
The academy was sponsored by the Henan Provincial Government and led by the warlord 
Feng Yuqiang. Feng appointed General Han Fuqu to set up the academy, which was divided into 
a village organizing department and a village teacher's training school. Unfortunately, the 
academy did not last long, hi 1930, Feng was defeated by Jiang Jieshi and Chang Xueliang (a 
warlord in Shanxi Province). Jiang's army closed it down. 
Jiang Jieshi's order to close down the academy did not kill the dream, however. Supported 
by Han Fuqu^, the academy reopened in Zhouping County of Shandong Province and was 
renamed the Shandong Rural Reconstruction Research Institute {Shandong xiangcun jianshe 
yanjiuyuan). Liang Shuming was invited to be head ofthe institute?. 
4.1.1 Shandong Rural Reconstruction Institute 
Li June 1931, the Shandong Rural Reconstruction Research Institute was set up and 
Zhouping County was turned into an experimental district under the control of the institute. 
Zhouping was an average county in Shandong Province with a total population ofl65,735 people 
in 19358. Most of the inhabitants were owner peasants with an average land occupation of3.3 mu 
5. Alitto, Guy S. The Last Confucian. Berkeley: University of California Press, p.l73. 
6. The former General under Feng who had turned to Jiang's side and defeated Feng in the Feng-Jiang battle and 
gained control over Shandong Province. 
7. Shandong xiangcun jianshe yanjui yuan, ji zhouping shiyanqu gaikuang (A general Account of the 
Shandong Rural Reconstruction Research Institute and Zhouping Experimental District). Zhouping. 1936. 
p.l-2. 
8. Data was collected in 1935. See Wu Guyu, 'Zhouping renkou wenti zhifenxt (The Analysis ofPopulation 
Problems in Zhouping), 'mXCJS, Vol.5, no.6 and no.7, Oct 3rd and Dec 15th 1935. 
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per head, which was below the national average of 4 mu per head^. As agricultural production was 
not sufficient to support life of the whole family, the local peasants supplemented their income by 
making domestic handicrafts. However, the total income of each peasant family was still very 
limited. Any unexpected expense would put peasant income below subsistence level. As the 
general trend of commercialization reached Zhouping, the peasants turned from traditional 
production of food products to cash crops, the major crop being cotton plantation. Except for the 
small portion of the cotton products kept to weave clothes for peasants' own families, the crop was 
exported. The value of cotton exports amounted to about 6,100 catties and was valued at $632, 
which was about 75% of Zhouping's total exports^^. This income brought extra cash for 
consumption and investment in production. With increased participation in the market, peasants' 
links with the outside world increased. Consumer products such as kerosene, silk fabrics, 
cigarettes and bicycles were imported to the county. Peasants' lives had changed. However, the 
changes were limited to only part of the local community. Despite its connections with the outside 
market, the local community, especially the local cultural values, changed little. When the RRM 
workers started their work in Zhouping, they found the peasants very conservative. Every family 
could only marginally support itself and there was little cooperation among the inhabitants. It was 
up to the RRM workers to transform the local community and the peasants' view oflife. 
At the end of 1932, the KMT government passed the County Reform Bill {Xianzheng 
gaige an) and Local Government Self-Management Bill (Difang zizhi gaige an) to promote the 
set-up of experimental counties in every province. Under the bills, the Shandong Rural 
Reconstruction Research Institute formalized its control over Zhouping County. Later, two more 
counties in Shandong Province, Heze and Jining, also became experimental counties. The 
9. 'Zhouping nongcun jinjigaikuang' (The Rural Economy ofZhouping), 'mXCJS, Vol.6, no.5, Oct 16th，1936. 
10. The total export value was amounted at 854 dollars in 1935. See 'Zhouping nongcun jinji gaikuang\ ibid. 
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institute was divided into three divisions: research, training and experiments.Research Division 
was established to conduct in-depth research studies on various rural development programs and 
train students from all over the country. Research students were recruited, with students from 
Shandong Province given first priority. Students with strong village backgrounds and higher 
educational levels were also preferred. They had to take a comprehensive course that included 
rural reconstruction theories, Dr. Sun's Three People's Principles, village defense knowledge, 
village political and economic issues, and agricultural technologies. Upon the completion ofthe 
courses, students were required to conduct field research around Zhouping and prepare research 
paper addressing a particular problem relevant to the village upon their graduation. Some 
graduates stayed in Zhouping, and others were sent to new experimental areas all over the country 
to conduct rural reconstruction projects there� . Besides the research done by the students, the 
social research department of the Research Division investigated village population, village 
economy, family life and village social problems. An experimental farm was also established to 
improve agricultural and animal husbandry technologies. Successful experiences were related to 
the peasants in the county. 
The Training Division was responsible for the training of local rural reconstruction 
workers. Young people who were still living in the villages and possessed some basic knowledge 
(at least read and write) were recruited. Both theoretical knowledge and practical skills were 
taught. In addition, spiritual training {jingshen taolian) was emphasized to improve trainees' 
morality. It was hoped that a trained worker would become a technical expert and a model ofhigh 
moral standards. After training, the workers were sent to villages all over Shandong Province and 
supervised by the Rural Reconstruction Workers Listruction Division {Xiangcun fuwu renyuan 
11. ibid, p.18-21. 
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zhidaochu). Graduates became the front-line workers of the Rural Reconstruction Movement and 
• 12 
acted as mediators between the outsider intellectuals and the villagers . 
The Experiment Division was responsible for daily administration and specific reform 
projects in the experimental counties Zhouping, Heze and Jining. Until the KMT central 
government had passed the County Reform Bill, the institute had only limited control over the 
county government. Although the county magistrate was appointed by the institute, other officials 
directly reported to the provincial government. After the bill was passed in 1933，the institute 
gained formal control over the county government. It carried out reforms including organizational 
restructuring, dismissal of the local police and militia, replacement of district {qu) and xiang 
government offices with xiang schools and village {cun) schools, gaining offinancial control over 
some tax revenues. These reforms increased the administrative efficiency of the state and 
facilitated other developmental projects. 
i) School Centers 
The establishment of xiang schools {xiangxue) and village schools (curvcue) was the core 
reform of the Rural Reconstruction Listitute. It replaced local-level government offices with 
autonomous self-managed organizations that linked with villagers being to perform collective 
work for village development. Through xiang schools and village schools, the ideal village 
covenant {xiangyue) was built. Educational techniques were used in xiang schools and village 
schools. The former officials were replaced hyxiang school directors {xiangxuedong) and village 
school directors {cun xuedong). The directors were not appointed by the government but 
recommended at a village general meeting. The directors formulated a board of directors 
(xuedong hui) and chose one respectable and knowledgeable person to be the school chairman 
12. ibid, p.21-40. 
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(xue chang). The chairman worked together with the board of directors, who was responsible for 
promoting educational programs in the schools. They also performed some state functions, such 
as making judgements on village disputes and carrying out upper-level government policies. In 
addition, they would conduct social reform programs (such as stopping the binding of women's 
feet and opposing early marriage, opium smoking and gambling) and development projects (such 
as setting up cooperatives and constructing public facilities, e.g. drainage systems and recreational 
grounds). All the programs were promoted in a voluntaristic way. It was hoped that through a 
• 12 
gradual process, villagers would willinglyjoin the xiang schools and village schools . 
ii) Cooperatives 
While schools were education and administrative organizations, peasant cooperatives 
were economic organizations. The cooperatives helped peasants to increase their agricultural 
output and improve their farming technologies through cooperation, and to increase their income 
through collective purchases and sales. Cooperatives were set up at the village {cun) level. 
Several village cooperatives often grouped together to form axiang cooperative, and at the county 
level, there was a federation of cooperatives. The objective of setting up the cooperatives was to 
improve villagers' lives through collective efforts. With gradually increased cooperative profit 
and capital, the RRM workers hope that a significant part of villagers' wealth could be 
collectivized and a socialized economic life would be achieved. Cooperatives were set up for 
weaving (jizhi), forestry {linye), sericulture (canye), cotton marketing (mianye yurvciao), credit 
(xintai) and warehousing (zhuangcang). Except for the weaving cooperative, which suffered from 
strong dumping pressure from Japanese imported textiles, other cooperatives enjoyed 
considerable success. The cotton marketing cooperative was the most successful. From 1932 to 
13. ibid, p.54-90. 86 
1935, membership of the cooperative grew from 219 to 2,749. Annual average profit to members 
increased from $832.46 to $2,606.68^4 
iii) Self-defense Force 
The defense force in Zhouping before 1930's was the local police and militia. The police 
force was loosely organized and local bullies controlled the militia. Listead ofbeing a protective 
army, together they suppressed the peasants. In 1933, local police and militia were dismissed and 
a new people's militia was formed. A comprehensive training program including rural 
reconstruction theories and military skills were provided to this people's militia. Villagers who 
were middle peasants {zhongnong) or above were recmited^^. The trained militia became the core 
defense group. In addition, basic defense training was later provided to other villagers. In 1936, 
nearly 17,000 villagers, about one-tenth of the total population, were trained. Zhouping became 
an well-armed county^^. 
iv) Public Health Promotion 
Like other Chinese villages, Zhouping lacked formal health-care services. The infant 
mortality rate was extremely high^^. In 1933, a small hospital was set up under the Shandong 
Rural Reconstruction Research Institute to provide basic medical services at a nominal charge. A 
medical worker's training program was also organized. Mother and infant health-care clubs were 
14 ibid, p.l05-106. 
15. It was to grantee that they were economically well being and would not be bribed by the local bullies. 
16. ibid, p.90-101. 
17. ibid. p.m. 
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also set up. With the combination of medical treatment and public health education, the spread of 
• 18 
infectious disease came under control and the infant mortality rate dropped . 
The Rural Reconstruction Movement in Zhouping came to an end in 1937 when the 
Japanese occupied Shandong province. Some of the rural reconstruction workers thenjoined the 
local guerrilla forces and others escaped. General Han Fuqu ordered the mobilized local defense 
teams and people's militia to retreat. Villagers witnessed the armed force organized by their sons 
and husbands being deprived of a defense force ahead of the Japanese invasion and felt betrayed 
by the Rural Reconstmctionists. The angry villagers killed some local cadres and the school 
directors and bumed the village schools. The peasant schools were tragically destroyed by the 
peasants themselves^^. 
4.2 Chinese Communist Party Revolutionary Movement 
Following orthodox Marxist beliefs, the Chinese Communist Party believed that the 
proletariat or working class was the most important revolutionary force. At the first stage ofthe 
CCP Revolution, CCP members participated in various labor union movements in big cities such 
as Shanghai, Nanchang, Changsha, Wuhan and Guangzhou. As a result, within the party 
constituency, 60% were working class origin and 22% were urban intellectuals in April 1927. 
20 
Peasants, the largest population group in China, accounted for only 5% of party membership , a 
clear indication of CCP's emphasis on the role of workers. 
Before the August 7th Meeting in 1927, CCP's revolutionary focus concentrated on the 
organization of worker's movements. Although the recorded membership of CCP-led peasant 
18. ibid, p.130-144. 
19. Alitto. The Last Confucian, p.269. 
20. Harrison, John, The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1972, New 
York: Praeger, 19，p.70. 
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organizations reached 9,153,093 and peasant organizations 21,458^^ in 1927^^, the peasant 
movement was still weak. However, many spontaneous peasant rebellions took place around the 
country. In northern China, the Red Spears (hongqiang hui) movement dominated. It was 
organized by religious cult members. Some of the leaders were landlords, some were led by 
religious heads and some were the peasants themselves. They were usually directed against the 
• • • 23 
government and the warlords, and aimed for tax reduction and resisted forced military services • 
Li addition, there were larger peasant rebellions without formal organization all over the country. 
The CCP fell behind other peasant movements. In the Fourth National Congress of CCP held in 
1921, passed motions to stop the CCP from leading peasant rebellions. Peasant organizations 
were advised not to initiate rent reduction claims against landlords, as the congress feared that the 
conflicts between landlords and peasants would divert the focus of the revolution and affect its 
outcome24. j^ ^he Fifth National Congress held in 1927, although the main theme of land 
redistribution was agreed by the party, no concrete plan was drafted. The CCP Central Committee 
9S 
despised Land problems . 
In July 1927, the alliance between CCP and KMT came to an end. CCP members resigned 
from the KMT government positions. CCP-led labor unions were suppressed in the cities. To 
safeguard the party's survival, CCP Central Committee conducted several large-scale armed 
revolts to capture the large cities. It was hoped that the large cities would be revolution centers for 
future movements. On August 1，revolts broke out at Nanchang {Nanchang qiyi), led by army 
21. The 21,458 peasant organizations recorded in 1927, probably included some controlled by landlords. 
22. Zhang Youyi, Zhongguo jingdai nongyeshi ziliao (Materials of Contemporary Chinese Agrarian History), 
Vol.2, Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1957, p.685. 
23. Peasant rebellions against public authority was commonly found in modem Chinese history. See also Lucien 
Bianco, Teasant Movements', in John K Fairbank (ed), The Cambridge History of China Vol.l3, p.294, 
24. Hu Hua, Zhongguo geming shijiangyi, p. 106. 
25. Hu, ibid, p.l90. 
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officers who later became the generals of the Red Army. After occupying the city, the revolt army 
turned to Guangdong to capture Guangzhou 一 the city in which the Republican Revolution 
started. However, they were defeated by the KMT troops and only a small part of the army 
survived. 
In the same period, the CCP-led Autumn Harvest Revolts {qiushou qiyi) broke out in 
Hunan and Hubei. The peasants had been organized to form peasant armies. They attacked the 
cities and tried to capture the KMT government there. However, most of the inexperienced troops 
were defeated. Mao Zedong brought the remaining armed forces to Jinggangshan, the first CCP 
revolutionary base area. Here they met the defeated army ofNanchang Revolt and formed the first 
Red Army. 
The final effort of armed revolt was conducted in Guangzhou in December 1927. Led by 
CCP generals, the army soon controlled the city and set up the Guangzhou Commune(Guangzhou 
gongshe). However, they were not supported by the citizens and were soon defeated by KMT 
troops26. The failure of the Guangzhou Revolt marked the end of the CCP's effort to capture the 
city area during the first stage of the revolutionary movement. The armed revolts were found to be 
purely military in nature, which failed to arouse support from the general public. The alliance 
among soldiers, workers and peasants was not strong enough. The militarism ofthe revolt troops 
27 
avoided fLuther social and political effort to mobilize the masses . 
CCP party members were forced to withdraw from the cities. Some of them moved to the 
"mountain tops" but some became "bandits". Some went back to their native home districts and 
tried to organize peasants there. Mao Zedong and Chu De's troops in Jinggangshan at the border 
26. Hu, ibid, p.214-218. 
27. �Guangzhou baodong zhi yiyi yu jiaoxun' (The Lesson Learned and the Real Meaning of the Guangzhou 
Revolt), in Zhongyang tongzhan bu and Zhongyang dangan guang (eds), Zhonggong zhongyang tudi 
geming qianqi tongyi zhamian wenjian xuanbian (Selected CCP Central Committee Documents on the 
KMT-CCP Alliance at the Former Period ofthe Land Revolution), p.103-142. 
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of Jiangxi and Hunan Provinces and He Long's troop in Westem Hunan were among the first 
group. The latter type was represented by Deng Zihui and Chang Dingcheng in Westem Fujian 
and Fang Zhimin in Northeastern Jiangxi. 
After Mao and Chu's occupation inJinggangshan, land was redistributed and the peasants 
mobilized. The first formal CCP land policy, the Jinggangshan Land Law {Jinggangshan tudifa) 
was passed. However, the Red Army could hardly merge into the local community. They had 
involved themselves in the native versus non-native villager's conflicts. Some soldiers who came 
from northern part of Hunan were not willing to stay and fled away. The Mao-Chu occupation 
lasted for six months and was then defeated by the KMT troops^^ He Long's effort in Westem 
Hunan also failed. They were defeated before any land could be redistributed^^. 
On the other hand, Deng Zihui and Chang Dingcheng's effort in Westem Fujian and Fang 
Zhiming's work in Northeastern Jiangxi were quite successful. Being native members of local 
community, Deng, Chang and Fang successfully mobilized the local villagers. They organized 
peasant organizations and conducted various violent and non-violent demonstrations and 
rebellions. Rent was reduced, land was distributed and the peasants were mobilized. A strong 
revolutionary base was built. Their victory was valuable experience for later CCP development^^. 
In addition, there were peasant uprisings and the setting up ofbase areas in Hubei, Anhui, 
Guangxi and Qiongya (Hainandao). All contributed to the CCP revolutionary force and prepared 
for the next stage of development. As Deng Zihui and Chang Dingcheng's efforts in Westem 
28. Mao Zedong,�Jmggangshan de douzheng' (The Struggle in Jinggangshan), in Mao Zedong Xuanji 
(Selected Works ofMao Zedong), p.57-84. 
29. Guo Dehong,�Dierci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi dang de tudi zhengce deyanbian ’ (The Transformation 
of CCP's Land Policy During the Second National Revolutionary War), in Chu Chengjia (ed), Zhonggong 
dangshiyanjiu lunwen xuan (Selected Research Papers on the Study of Chinese Communist Party Histoty), 
p.315. 
30. Guo,ibid, p.314-315. 
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Fujian were the most successful during this critical period, this study now tums to that case for 
further examination. 
4.2.1 Western Fujian Revolutionary Base 
Westem Fujian area included eleven counties: Longyan, Shanghang, Yongding, 
Changting, Liancheng, Wuping, Ninghua, Zhangping and Ningyang. Of the total population of 
1,124,000, Shanghang had the largest population of 180,000 and Mingxi was the smallest at 
38,000. Owner peasants made up only 15% of the total population. Most of peasants were tenants 
and semi-tenant peasants. Most of them were employed under the flexible tenancy system, under 
which the contract was renewed annually. There was no guarantee for renewal and the peasants 
and the landlords had little security in this relationship. As a result, other social relationships 
developed to secure the relationship between tenants and landlords, such as lineage organizations. 
Tenancy relationships were built into these kinship ties. However, due to the limited supply of 
land in this hilly area, each peasant worked only a small plot ofland, with an average of2.2 mu per 
head. After deducting the rent from annual production proceeds, little remained to support the 
peasants. Borrowing was common. They also had to seek other sources of income for survival. 
Peasants made handicrafts ran various small businesses. Li this mountainous area, timber and its 
related products such as paper and charcoal making were the major local industries that generated 
extra income for the peasants. 
Westem Fujian was not a peaceful area. Many warlords struggled for control of the area. 
hi addition, there were many bandits. Local armed militias were set up under the lineage 
organizations. Strong solidarity was formed within each organization. However, this did not 
mean that peasants were not ready to receive new ideas. As early as the beginning of the 1920s, 
communism had spread to this area. Young intellectuals grouped together to study revolutionary 
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theories and published magazines to discuss local social problems. Deng Zihui, bom to a 
declining landlord's family in Longyan, became the founder and chief editor of Yansheng — a 
magazine started in 1923 to spread revolutionary ideas and to criticize inequalities in Longyan 
County. After that, other young intellectuals in Shanghang and Changting also published 
magazines for their native counties, with objectives similar to Yansheng'^^. 
The first CCP organization was set up in 1926 at Yongding. Li 1927, branch organizations 
spread to Shanghang, Longyan. Party members were recruited mainly from the native young 
intellectuals. They organized the masses to support the Northem Expeditionary Army, which was 
fighting the local warlords. In October 1926, the local warlords were defeated and the KMT led 
county government was established. During this period, the CCP and KMT formed their first 
alliance (diyici guogong hezuo). CCP members joined the KMT government to become officers. 
They also formed peasant organizations and directed a series of reform projects, including rent 
reduction schemes in this area. They also organized institutes {nongmin yundong jiangxisuo) to 
32 
train peasants to become movement activists . 
However, the CCP-led reform projects did not last and suffered great a great loss when the 
KMT-CCP alliance broke up. In April 1927, the Fujian KMT provincial government was ordered 
to remove CCP members from the administration. Li Shanghang and Longyan, some CCP 
members were arrested and killed by KMT troops. Peasant organizations were closed down and 
CCP party organizations were forced to move from the town areas to the villages^^. 
Li September 1927, the revolutionary army from Nanchang Revolt came to westem 
Fujian. They defeated the local KMT troops and arrested some local bullies. The local CCP 
31. Jiang Baiyin, Minxigeminggengjudishi (The History ofWestem Fujian Revolutionary Base Area). Fuzhou: 
Fujian renmin chubanshe. 1987. p.8-12. 
32. Jiang, ibid, p.14-17. 
36. Jiang, ibid, p.49-111. 
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organizations cooperated with Nanchang Revolt army and organized demonstrations and public 
meetings to support the army. Later, when the army marched to Guangdong, they left some 
weapons to local CCP members and encouraged them to develop armed struggle against the 
landlords. The strategy of armed struggle corresponded to the resolutions of the CCP Central 
Committee meeting held on August 7th (August 7th Meeting or Baqi huiyi). After that, waves of 
armed peasant uprisings occurred all over the area. Peasants became Red Guards {chiweijun) and 
attacked the local bullies and big landlords. They confiscated property and bumt all land deeds. 
However these uprisings were not enough to defeat the KMT; they were defeated, so they turned 
into guerrilla forces and wandered to other villages^^. 
After large-scale uprisings failed in Longyan, Pinghe and Shanghang, a quite successful 
another in Yongding County in June 1928 succeeded. Yongding County was an area in which 
CCP had mobilized the peasants well. There were more than 30 xiang peasant organizations with 
more than 2,500 member families. The CCP had nine branch organizations and more than 700 
party members in the county. Led by Chang Dingcheng, the peasant uprising broke out on June 
29th. More than 1,000 armed peasants soon defeated the local army and occupied the county. 
Peasants in Longyan, Shanghang and Pinghe responded and supported to the Yongding uprising. 
With Deng Zihui's advice, the peasants were incorporated into a battalion of the Red Army, which 
later developed into the 12th Red Army. The CCP Westem Fujian Special Committee 
(zhonggong mimi tewei) was formed in Yongding. With its leadership, peasants were organized 
across Westem Fujian district. Every village occupied by the CCP set up its own Soviet Power 
{suweiai zhengquan) and land redistribution was the major project of each Soviet Power. The first 
soviet government {stcweiai zhengfu) was set up in Xinan District ofYongding County. Within a 
short period, land was distributed to more than 20,000 people in Xinan. However, these newly set 
36. Jiang, ibid, p.49-111. 
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up soviet governments were usually weak and easily defeated by KMT troops sent by the 
provincial govemment^^. 
In March 1929, the 4th Red Army, led by Mao Zedong and Chu De, marched from 
Jinggangshan to Westem Fujian to escape KMT troop encirclement and suppression {weijiao). 
They defeated local KMT troops in Westem Fujian, and the soviet governments were re-
established in the district. The 4th Red Army split into smaller teams andjoined the local peasant 
armies to conduct large-scale land reform projects and mass mobilization campaigns in the area. 
The entire Westem Fujian was under CCP's control. The Westem Fujian Revolutionary Base 
Area (miwci gemin genjudi) was formed. CCP party membership expanded to over 3,000 in the 
area. More than 100,000 peasants joined peasant organizations and about 800,000 peasants 
gained redistributed land. A Red Army with more than 10,000 locally recruited members was 
formed. The First Westem Fujian CCP General Meeting (zhonggong miwci diyici daibiao dahui) 
was conducted in July 1929. Li the "Resolution on Land Problems" {tudi wentijueyian), a land 
policy was formulated and concrete procedures on land redistribution had been drafted. These 
policies strengthened CCP's control over the district. 
Later, Jiang Jieshi disposed of troops from Guangdong, Jiangxi and Fujian to attack 
Westem Fujian soviet power. Because of the effective defense strategies and the internal conflicts 
among the KMT troops, the KMT attack was defeated. The Westem Fujian Soviet District had 
developed into a strong revolutionary base^^. 
La 1930, the first elected Westem Fujian Soviet Government (miwci simeiai zhengfu) was 
set up and Deng Zihui elected chairman of the soviet government. CCP membership increased to 
nearly 10,000. The number of soldiers recruited in the armed forces, including the local Red Army 
35. Jiang, ibid, p.37-44. 
36. Jiang, ibid, p.49-111. 
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and the Red Guards increased to 30,000. Some of the efforts of the soviet government during this 
period were to promote economic development. Various cooperatives were formed for collective 
production and consumption. Merchants were protected and trade activities encouraged. A Grain 
Price Adjustment Office was set up and led by Deng Zihui to regulate the grain market price 
maintaining a steady level ofincome to the peasants. It encouraged grain production and protected 
the interest of peasants. A Workers' and Peasants' Bank {gongnongyinhang) was formed to issue 
bank notes and provide saving and lending services. It regulated the credit market and lower 
^n 
interest loans than the local merchants . 
Optimism spread throughout the soviet and gave rise to a leftist orientation {zuoqing 
sixiang) that encouraged the success of the CCP revolution through occupying large cities. When 
Li Lisan became the chairman of the CCP Central Political Bureau, the prominent Lisan line 
{Lisan luxian) emphasized the importance and priority of occupying urban centers as the necessary 
path to revolutionary success. The local Red Army ofWestem Fujian was ordered to attack cities 
outside the region. The troops attacked cities in Guangdong and were defeated. In returning to 
Fujian, some soldiers deserted. The military force was weakenecP. 
Apart from losses in the battlefield, the "Leftists" also conducted anti-rich peasant 
campaign (fan funong yundong). Rich peasants (including those who became rich after gaining 
land from land redistribution) were criticized as hidden landlords. Merchants and traders were 
also criticized as exploiters of the working class. Under these campaigns, "rich" peasants' wealth 
were taken away. A minimum wage was set to protect worker's interests. As a result, the 
37. Jiang, ibid, p.116-124. 
36. Jiang, ibid, p.49-111. 
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(8) Letter of 28.1.99 from BOOZ.ALLEN & HAMILTON 
(9) Letter of 1.2.99 from Jack C K So of MTR Corporation 
(10) Letter of 1.2.99 from Alan LUNG Ka-lun chairman of Hong Kong Democratic foundation i 
Proposal for an Asian Bank for reconstruction and development 
(11) Letter of 1.2.99 from Eden Y Woon Director of The Hong Kong General Chamber 
Commerce 
(12) Fax of 1.2.99 from Michelle Lau of The American Chamber of Commerce in Hong kong 
Government relations Committee Luncheon 
(13) Letter of4.2.99 from Julina chan Ag Administrative Assistant to FS 
(14) Letter of2.2.99 fromThe Stock Exchange ofHong Kong 
(15) 
incomeof "rich peasants" and profit of the merchants dropped. These policies destroyed people's 
economic motivations. The economy of the soviet area depressecP. 
Later, the CCP Central Committee, under the leadership ofWang Min (Chen Shaoyu), 
turned even more "leftist". Land was redistributed among the peasants. The former landlords 
were not allowed to own any land {dizu bu fentian). The rich peasants were only allowed to share 
impoverished land (funong fen huaitian). In the later "Land Investigation Movement" (chatian 
yundong), class lines among peasants were redrawn. Newly identified landlords and rich peasants 
were caught and some even killed. Some middle peasants were classified as rich peasants. Fear 
spread all over the soviet area. Productive motivation was completely suppressed. 
In addition, some CCP officials and party members were accused by the left of making the 
serious mistakes of "flightism" (taopao zhuyi), "opportunism" (jihui zhuyi), and "localism" 
{difang zhuyi). They were accused of conducting wrong rural reform policies in the villages. 
Deng Zihui and Chang Dingcheng were dismissed from leadership positions. Those CCP leaders 
who disobeyed the new policies and denied the prosecution of the mistakes revolted^\ 
Despite the leftist policies, in December 1930, the soviet areas in Guangdong, Jiangxi and 
Fujianjoined together and in 1931 became the Central Soviet Area (Zhongyang Suqu), the largest 
CCP-controlled area. This open occupation aroused Jiang Jieshi's KMT troop attack. Five 
consecutive encirclement and suppression movements were directed against the soviet area from 
1930 to 1935. The Red Army beat the soviet in the first four attacks, but lost the fifth. Red Army 
and the CCP central power were forced to withdraw from the soviet area and conducted the 
39. Jiang, ibid, p.l42. 
恥. One of the 28 Bolsheviks who studied in Russia and occupied leadership positions in CCP. 
41 Fu Baicui, one of the founders of the Westem Fujian Base area who had stong local clan relationship, had 
resisted the order to dismiss his position and directed an armed revolt. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONTACT AND INTERACTION 
As members of the greater society, peasants were in continuous interaction with other 
social groups living in the urban centers. They shared values with the great civilization that were 
transformed by the outsiders and which in return altered the thought of the outsiders. It seemed 
that the urban centers were a place for innovation and a contact point for foreign new ideas, and 
usually played a leading role in the cultural transformation process of the whole society. On the 
other hand, rural villages changed very slowly and slowed the overall transformation process of 
the society. The rural sector acted as a buffer, and discouraged the collapse of the fundamentals of 
society when turbulence arose from drastic social changes. In this sense, urban and rural societies 
were complementary sectors preserving a stabilized cultural system. However, under extreme 
cases of sudden social change, the gradual cultural transformation process and the complementary 
roles of urban centers and rural villages might break down. With a radically transformed great 
tradition, changes in the peasants' little tradition would not be in pace to catch up with the great 
tradition and they might become disconnected, leading to an unstable relationship between them. 
The urban center softened its role of leading transformation of the whole society and the rural 
sector would lost its buffer function to social shocks. The gradual interactive process could no 
longer stabilize their relationship and, in this case, some organized transformation would take 
place. The initiation for such transformation usually came from the urban centers and from those 
outside the existing power structure. 
During the early 1920s, the dislocation between urban and rural sectors had evolved in a 
tremendously changing Chinese society. After more than 100 years of contact with West, the 
urban centers became "modernized" in a way that made them very different from the villages 
which still had few contacts with outsiders. There was polarized development of rural and urban 
economies. Large modem industries set up around the cities producing luxury goods, mainly for 
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the urban population. In the rural area, on the other hand, peasants lived sparely on low-profit 
agricultural production. The unbalanced growth of the economy led to an unequal distribution of 
wealth between the urban and rural sectors. In line with economic growth, cultural development 
also split. The Westem lifestyle, as well as Westem thought, spread among the urban inhabitants. 
But peasants in the villages still had traditional Chinese values. There was no cultural interaction 
between the two sectors. What was left was the materialistic relationship to which in net terms the 
rural area supplied food, wealth and labor to urban districts. Under this situation, the Rural 
Reconstmctionists and the Chinese Communist Party initiated a new kind of rural-urban link. 
Both hoped to redirect the linkage between the rural and urban and find a path for Chinese 
development (See chapters 3 and 4 for details). 
The Rural Reconstmctionists and the Chinese Communist Party served two functions in 
redirecting the connection between rural and urban. One was to introduce urban, modem thought 
to the villages and to transform peasants' view oflife, which lagged behind the development pace 
of the greater society. The other function was to bring out the underlying peasants' desires and 
made possible peasants' collectives. The peasants, however, were not passive idlers who could do 
nothing but react to outsider mobilization. The existing local social structure, values and beliefs 
would restrict the possibilities of the movement organizers. Li the local context, there was an 
interactive process between the peasants and movement organizers. This chapter will review the 
first and second stages of this process. 
The first stage was the period before any interaction between the movement organizers and 
the peasants had taken place�Peasants lived in a closed society with the "image oflimited good" 
predominating. It was characterized by the peasants' self-oriented life in the margin of 
1. It is not true to say that there was no interaction between the movement workers and the peasants. However, 
it means that there was no planned or organized interaction between them. 
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subsistence. They competed with each other for every gain, whether material or non-material. 
The peasants perceived of no possibility of improving their standard of living; all they could do 
was to ask for God's help. That was the environment in which the movement organizers began 
their work. When they came to the second stage, they found the peasants very passive to their 
suggestions, and in some cases, the organizers were even considered enemies of the local society. 
Under this circumstance, the first task for the movement organizers was not to transform the 
peasants' view but to become accepted by them. So instead of replacing widely accepted peasant 
values, they enforced them. The existing power structure was also respected. By acting as 
members of the community, movement organizers were gradually accepted. However, merely 
confirming the existed ways did not further the movement organizers' cause. Li order to establish 
peasants' loyalty to the movements, along with the conforming process, the movement organizers 
tried to develop their own arena. That included setting up new peasant organizations and adopting 
new sets of rules for admission to them. These new organizations and rules did not stray far from 
the old ones. The difference was the source of their authority, which changed from the landlords 
and gentry to the movement organizers. This caused little change to the peasants' view of life, 
which was not directly tackled until stage three of the transformation process. Li Zhouping and 
westem Fujian, organizers addressed the peasants' "image oflimited good" in the first stage of the 
transformation process and the enforcement of existing values and institutions in stage two. 
5.1 Predominance of the Peasants' "Image of Limited Good" 
In his Rural Reconstruction theory, Liang Shuming argued that the individualistic values 
of Chinese people was the result of the break-down of traditional Chinese culture, which in tum 
was caused by the spread of Westem individualistic thoughts^. However, in the remote villages, 
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which had few contacts to Westem thoughts, Westem influence was not a factor. This was not the 
kind of individualistic profit maximization thought described as the Westem capitalist one, but 
another deduced from the peasants' "image of the limited good" that resulted from the peasants' 
prolonged poverty. In the conditions of extreme shortage of resources, peasants had to fight for 
any gain for their survival. 
In Zhouping, poverty affected nearly all the villagers and all facets of their lives. Li 
research conducted in Zhouping, more than half of respondents who "felt some difficulties in life" 
felt "poor" and felt that they had "too much work to do". More than 27% of the respondents who 
had not sent their children to school answered that they could not afford it. Among 448 
respondents, more than 75% did not have any savings (money or goods)^. They ate and dressed 
poorly and worked very hard for an extra yuan. 
The heavy economic pressure was also reflected in many social phenomena, among them 
the habit of early marriage. There were many marriages in which the wife was 18 years old and the 
husband only 15. Usually, the wife's family was too poor to support her and wanted her to leave 
the family as early as possible. When she got married, her family was released from the burden of 
supporting her and could eam a considerable dowry. For the husband's family, it was cheaper to 
get the son married at a younger age, as the dowries were lower and a simpler ceremony could be 
held. As the young couple were not mature enough to live on their own, they lived with the 
husband's family, and inter-generation conflicts were commonplace. The relationship between the 
husband and wife was also difficult starting at such a young age. This in tum usually created 
unsuitable parents and the cycle was repeated. Problems went on and widely spread among the 
2. Liang Shuming, Xiangcun jianshe lilun (Rural Reconstruction Theory) in Liang shuming quanji (Collected 
Works ofLiang shuming) Vol. 2. p.l90-191. 
3. See Zhang Yushan, 'Zhouping nongjia funu fangwen de changshi' (The visits to Housewives of Zhouping 
Peasant Families) inXCJS, Vol. 6 no.7 and no.8, Nov 16 and Dec 1 1936. 
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villagers there in Zhouping^. It seemed that economic pressure on life had overridden the 
peasants' social habits. 
The common practice of binding girls' and women's feet continued in the villages even 
though most parents thought that it was a bad practice and was bad for their daughters. In a survey 
of 448 peasants, 420 admitted foot binding was a bad habit. However, more than 70% of the 420 
respondents asked their daughters to bind their feet^. They did so because there were more 
females than males in the district and girls with bound feet were considered more likely to attract a 
husband. An unmarried daughter was not simply a misfortune for the girl but also a burden to the 
family. Finding husbands for daughters was a common concem for all parents^. Once again, the 
poverty determined the fortunes of the people. 
Drug abuse and gambling were common "bad" habits in the villages that were also blamed 
for the peasants' poverty. Since the peasants were found no opportunity to increase their wealth in 
real life, they could enjoy momentary escape through drugs or try their luck at gambling. It 
seemed that these bad habits were the villagers' only spiritual sustenance^. 
Apart from the habits and practice in the villages, many disputes within the family and 
among the villagers were directly or indirectly caused by poverty. A mother scolded a child who 
asked for a pencil; close partners quarreled about methods of payment (immediate or future 
payment); a food stall owner sued a customer who could not pay enough cash for steamed bread 
4. Li Jianyu, 'Zhouping zaohun wenti zhi fenxi yanjiu' (The Analysis ofEarly Marriage Problems in Zhouping) 
in XCJS Vol. 4,no.30,Jun21, 1935. 
5. See Chang Yushan, 'Zhouping nongjia funu fangwen de changshi', ibid. 
6. Chang, ibid. 
7. Li Xuexun, 'Xiangcun zhong de yanzhong wenti, (The Serious Problems in the Villages) in XCJS. Vol.6. 
no.5. Oct 16，1936. 
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{mantou). Conflicts over small amount could result in bloody fights^. An appointed village 
school teacher, Chen Kangpu, was surprised to find extreme individualism — in some cases even 
fathers and sons did not help each other^. In addition，there were many lawsuits between the 
villagers, most ofthem over money. Villagers spent a lot to pursue these lawsuits, but they seldom 
se t t l ed^�The village was completely disorganized. Without secure prosperity, peasants were 
miserable and eager for every immediate gain. Disputes and individualistic orientations 
frequently arose because of lack of enough resources for common good. As all the village 
colleagues were competitors for pieces of the same pie, cooperation among them was impossible. 
The problem of poverty overruled all aspects of peasant life. Over a long period oflife under poor 
environment, constant consideration of the basis of limited wealth and resources became part of 
the peasants' mind. It was not simply a thought but an overwhelmingly decisive criterion for 
consideration on all everyday behavior and actions. It had become a view of life — "peasants' 
image oflimited good". 
When the RRM organizers began their work in Zhouping in 1933，they found the villagers 
very different from what they had expected. Villagers did not hold traditional Confucian values 
but selfish individualistic orientations. The villagers viewed the RRM workers as outsiders. They 
were suspicious of RRM's mobilization programs. The RRM workers soon noted poverty as the 
source of the peasants' "bad" values and habits. Peasants had to be saved from the poor living 
environment before the start of any mobilization and transformation work. A Rural 
Reconstmctionist, Chen Kangpu believed that the reason for peasants' mistrust of outsiders was 
8. Han Zhao, Women changjian dejige xiangcun wenti (Few Common Rural Problems) in XCJS vol.6. no. 1, 
Aug 16, 1936. 
9. See Chen, Kangpu, 'Weijiazhuang gongzuo zhi zibai' (My Work in Wei Village), in XCJS, Vol.4, No.29, 11 
Jun 1935. 
10. Yan, Ruoyu, 'Zhouping diliu xiangxue gongzuo gaikuang'(The Brief Summary of the Work in the Sixth 
Xiang School in Zhouping), in XCJS, Vol.4, no.30,21 Jun 1935. 
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their "image oflimited good". The peasants feared the outsiders would take some of their limited 
resources. This image had been confirmed in the villagers' minds by previous "movements" 
conducted by the KMT government, aimed at taking away their wealth and manpower. They had 
lost confidence in outsiders claiming to be movement organizers, especially those with connection 
with the govemmentii. When there were youth training programs conducted in the villages, 
peasants feared that it was a kind of military service and tried to escape recruitment^^. When RRM 
organizers recruited peasants to join the school centers, villagers were frightened that the 
recruitment was for the warlords' troops. Both recruitment exercises aroused peasants' fears and in 
some cases they were ready to fight with their lives (j)inmin) to keep their sons or husbands from 
being recmited^^. 
Similar to the peasants' attitude towards the RRM organizers, they were also very 
conservative and reluctant to receive new ideas. No matter whether it was new habits, new 
technology or new agricultural products, peasants all refused to try them. They feared that the new 
things would ruin their lives and bring "bad luck". When the RRM experimental farm tried to 
promote a new kind of seeds, a peasant at first agreed to plant them, but later threw them away. Li 
another case, a peasant took some new seeds and two experimental chicken species (a hybrid of 
Leghom and a local species) from the experimental farm of the Listitute ofRural Reconstruction. 
However, it was found that the seeds were thrown on uncultivated land and the chicken had been 
butchered. Questioned, the peasant said that he would not raise chickens with foreign elements 
11. When RRM started their work in Zhouping, it began with the administrative reform and the Shangdong 
Institute ofRural Reconstruction had replaced the local county government to rule the area. RRM workers 
were also county officials. 
12. See Chen, ibid and Li Nai, 'Zhouping emian lai de xiangcun qingnian xunlian zhi wojian' (My Opinion on the 
Two years Youth Training Programmes in Zhouping) in XCJS, Vol.5, no.lO, 30 Dec 1937. 
13. Nan Shiyin, 'Heze qingnian xunlian zhi gaikuang' (The Brief Summary ofYouth Training in Heze County), 
in XCJS, Vol.6, no.ll, 1 Mar 1937. 
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that could not be used to worship God^ .^ The peasants' reluctance also part of the "image of 
limited good". It was too risky for them to test new ideas, as they had little they could afford to 
lose. 
The peasants' image oflimited good was sustained and strengthened by the social structure 
ofZhouping. In Zhouping, most inhabitants were small owner-peasants^^ who relied on their own 
family's production for subsistence needs. There were few alliances between the peasant families. 
Kinship organizations were the major social networks but they played a very limited role^^. There 
were few relationships among kinship organizations in the area. The whole community was 
loosely integrated. As a result, there were very few social activities. Peasants tumed to their small 
families for all aspects of subsistence. In addition, property ownership was about the same for 
most of the peasants. Peasants' average land ownership was small and varied within a limited 
rangei7. Except a few large landlords, there was little difference between the wealth of the rich 
and poor peasants. Most peasants relied on their own piece ofland, working all year to support the 
needs of their small families. Under this social structure, peasants tended to be very individualistic 
and the "image of limited good" prevailed in other peasant values. However, as there were no 
strong peasant organizations, the limit of moral community was restricted probably only within 
individual peasant families. Apart from family members, peasants would assume that all other 
neighbors and fellow villagers were competitors or enemies. The concepts of nation, country and 
14. See He Fu, 'Zengyang shi nongmin neng jieshou women de yiqiejianyi' (How to Make the Peasants Accept 
All ofour Suggestions), in XCJS, Vol.6, no.lO, 1 Jan 1937. 
15. 86.36% of the peasant population in Zhouping were owner peasants and occupied 86.28% of cultivated land 
in the County. See Appendix. 
16. The major functions of these kinship organizations were to offer sacrifices to peasants' ancestors. Common 
property of the organization was very few. It was hard for them to perform education and welfare functions, 
which were normal functions of similar organization in China. See 'Zhouping jiazu zhidu zhi diaocha' 
(Research on the Kinship System in Zhouping) 'mXCJS, Vol.5, no.l, 16th August, 1935. 
17 See Appendix. 
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social organization were not found among the villagers. Even their concept of the village was 
vague and they could not tell the number of families in their villages, even a rough figure^^ 
The predominance of "peasants' image oflimited good" had prevented the peasants from 
receiving new ideas orjoining new organizations. In stage one of the transformation process of 
peasants' view of life, RRM organizers found it very difficult to get into the local peasant circle. 
"How to get their trust?", and "How to make friends with the peasants?" were common questions 
asked by the RRM organizers. 
Peasant life in westem Fujian was also very poor. Continuous fighting between the 
warlords in the area had hindered economic development. The heavy tax burden and the very high 
land rent charged by the warlords and landlords severely curtailed peasants' annual yields. After 
tax and rent were paid, only about 25% of the agricultural products were left for peasants' own use 
and their family's needs. Peasants living under such conditions were pessimistic about their future 
prospects. They believed that their destiny was pre-set by God. They were not very eager to do 
extra work to improve their living standard (as there was only a small possibility for success); yet 
they were ready to fight against outsiders to protect what they already had. However, within their 
families and their kinship groups, benefits were shared. With a difference to village society in 
Zhouping and westem Fujian, kinship organizations were strong. Various economic, social 
relationships were embedded in kinship ties. Each village was dominated by a particular clan and 
clan village was the dominant form of villages here. 
Li westem Fujian, most of the peasants were tenant peasants and semi-tenant peasants^^ 
and the tenancy relationships coincided with kinship ties. The head of the lineage was usually the 
18. Gao Xunin,�Shandong sherxiao shifan nusheng xiaxiang gongzuo baogao jilu'(Selected Reports on the Rural 
Fieldwork of the Girl Students form the Twelfth Shandong Teachers Training College), in XCJS, Vol.6, no.2, 
1 Sept 1936. 
19 Combining the two kinds of peasants, there were more than 85% of the total population involved in some 
kinds of tenancy relationship. 
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largest landlord in the kinship; the poor members were on the other hand the tenants. Strong 
kinship ties and the intra-kinship tenancy system organized individual peasant families together. 
Peasants, whether landlord or tenant, showed strong orientations towards their own clans. Clan 
cleavage cut across class lines and was the major principle of social differentiation in westem 
Fujian20. 
There were many strong clan organizations. They were symbolically represented by an 
ancestral temple {citang) in which disputes were settled and ancestors worshipped. The temple 
was also the assembly place for clan members. With established temple assets, including land and 
capital, it shared some welfare functions, such as helping the poor to get married and to feed the 
hungry in poor harvest years. The clan head who had great power over all clan affairs in charged 
the temple. The head was not necessarily the wealthiest landlord; status or reputation in the village 
was more important, as the head had to be supported by most of the clan members. Hence, 
although the clan head had great control over the temple affairs as well as other clan business, he 
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had to be careful when opposing to the opinions of the majority clan members . 
With strong clan solidarity and limited resources in the area, there were many fights 
among the clans. They competed for material interest as well as social status and political 
power22. When LRM organizers began to develop peasant organizations in the area, they had to 
20. In Zhangping county, for example, there were nearly 20 clans with clan member exceeded 1,000. The Chen 
clan was the largest clan with more than 12,000 members. The Chen clan was also the wealthiest clan in the 
county. The ancestral temple {citang) of Chen clan was the best building in the county. The head of clan was 
in charge of all clan affairs including holding memorial ceremonies, settlement of disputes, decision on 
property succession and to deal with local officials in representing the whole clan. The local officials had to 
pay respect to the clan heads. See Liu Zhongning, 'Zhangping jianxian yilai hukou gengdi biandong 
qingkuang gaisu', (The Brief Description of the Changes of Numbers of Families and Land Since the 
Establishment ofthe Zhangping County), in ZPWSZL, Vol.4, Oct 1983, p.34. 
21. Cheng Chaolin,'Tiaolin zaiyi', ibid, and Chen Siduan, 'Yungfu laoqu renmin geming douzheng mogan 
qingkuang jiansu' (Brief Description of People's Revolutionary Struggles at Yungfu Old Districts), in 
ZPWSZL Vol.5, May 1984, p.l-3. 
22 xhe disputes between the wealthy Chen clan and the higher status, more educated Liu clan had lasted from 
the Taiping Rebellion years until the Republican time. The clans would choose to support different political 
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choose whether clan A or clan B was the target of mobilization, whether village A or village B was 
to be organized. The participation of one village meant the exclusion of the other. In Guangtian, 
some clan villages sought support from the CCP Red Army and attacked the wealthy families in an 
opposing clan village. They took away their cattle, pigs and other properties. The Red Army 
^ ^ 
became involved in clan fights . As one clan sought support from the Red Army (hongj'un), the 
other went to seek support from the KMT Army (baijun or White Army)^^. In some cases, the clan 
groups might develop their own military force. Some of these local military forces became Red 
Army troops, while othersjoined the local warlords and KMT troops. Hence the fight between the 
Red Army and White Army was sometimes the continuation of clan cleavage^^. 
Although there were conflicts between different clan villages, they could stand on the 
same side when facing outsiders. Settlers from other provinces had long been discriminated 
against and were in constant competition and conflict with the local Fujianese. As the native 
people mainly depended on agricultural production for their livelihoods, outsiders were not 
allowed to purchase or rent land in the area. As a cross-clan agreement, it was strictly followed in 
each village and the outside settlers could only be merchants or workers. The outside settlers 
treated their lives in westem Fujian as only transitional and they sent their income back to 
birthplace and believed they would return there eventually. Only rarely would they reinvest their 
parties not because of the party objectives and programmes but because of the other clan supported the other 
one or not. See Cheng Chaolin,�Tiaolin zaiyi' (Youth Memories) in ZPWSZL Vol.6, Dec 1984, p.67-82. 
23 See Chen Zurong,�Guangdong "qishi baiming" canan zuiji' (The Memory of "Seven Bodies Eight Lives" 
Tragedy in Guangdong), in ZPWSZL Vol.7, Jul 1985，p.18-20. 
24. Chen, ibid. 
25. Jin Ran, 'Yuanyuan xiangbao huxiang cansha' (Continuous Fights, Continuous Kills), in ZPWSZL Vol.5, 
Mayl984, p.64-71. 
109 
income in the area. The income left local community. The native peasants worried about the 
outflow ofresources and competed even harder with the outsiders^^. 
Compared to the social structure in Shandong, peasants in westem Fujian were linked by 
various kinship ties. Although a similar "image of limited good" prevailed in the area, the 
peasants' sense ofmoral community was set along the kinship organizations instead of individual 
peasant families, as was the case in Zhouping. With a greater dimension of the moral community, 
cooperative arrangements were possible. However, that did not mean that the work of LRM 
organizers was easier than it was RRM organizers. As kinship solidarity was so strong, LRM 
organizers found it difficult even to contact individual peasant families. Differences in the 
dimension of the moral community 一 individual family or kinship organization 一 did not did not 
necessarily ease the mobilization of peasants. 
When LRM organizers began their work in westem Fujian in 1921, they tried to spread 
communist ideas of class struggle and the concept of exploitation through direct speeches and 
publications to the peasants. Although the promotion was quite successful in the city, the majority 
of the peasants who lived in the villages were unable to receive those messages. When the Red 
Army first came to the villages, the peasants had great suspicion of them. They were afraid to 
attend LRM propaganda meetings and that the Red Army might take away their property and force 
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them tojoin. They escaped to the mountains and hid in the grasses . LRM organizers could only 
find small children, women and the elderly left in the villages. 
The peasants' fear was partly based on the rumors spread by the KMT government and 
partly based on the crude action of the Red Army. When LRM organizers came to westem Fujian 
where traditional religions were common, they conducted actions to fight against the mysterious 
26. Cheng Zhaoling,�Tiaoling zaiji', ibid. 
27 Cai,ibid, p.l7, p.33. 
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mentality. They cut down the noses of the God statue and destroyed some temples. This behavior 
annoyed the peasants and the LRM organizers received strong objections. The peasants even 
^ n 
arrested the LRM leader and sent him to the temple to apologize for his offence to God . One 
LRM leader, Deng Zihui, believed that peasants living under extremely poor conditions found no 
way to improve their living except for the hope of supernatural power to bring them good luck, so 
breaking down the statues and the temples meant destroying their only hope. The LRM 
organizers' action would only lead to peasants' rejection and their relationship with the LRM 
organizers wouldjust drift apart^^. The image of the LRM organizers was of a group of outside 
saboteurs who had broken their existing social order. 
Peasants in both Zhouping and westem Fujian shared the peasants' "image of limited 
good". Because of the limited resources in the two areas, peasants had to compete in every aspect 
to avoid falling below the subsistence level ofliving. As peasants had no hope for future prospect, 
they competed with each other for everything. Hence, they were skeptical towards one another 
and especially towards outsiders. Their negative responses to the RRM and LRM organizers were 
therefore unsurprising. 
The "image of limited good" was sustained in different social structure in Zhouping and 
westem Fujian. Although structural factors were not the determining factors affecting peasants' 
"image of limited good", they affected the transformation process by constraining the movement 
organizers' choice of strategies. RRM and LRM organizers had to apply different strategies to 
mobilize peasants there. Zhouping was a loosely organized community where the "image of 
limited good" was bound within individual peasant families. Although it seemed that RRM 
28. Lai Chuankun, Yu Wenbi, Luo Renzhou, Wu Yuansheng and Yu Wucai, 'Hongjunjinjun ningyang mujiji' 
(The Witness Report ofRed Army's March to Ningyang), in ZPWSZL Vol.5, May 1984, p.4 and Jiang 
Boying, Deng Zihui Zhuan (The Biography ofDeng Zihui), Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1986， 
p.53.) 
36. Jiang, ibid, p.49-111. 
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organizers could more easily make direct contact with the peasants, mobilization through existing 
community leaders who had no real influence over the peasant community would be doomed to 
failure. Moreover, as peasants in Zhouping lacked the experience of collective cooperation, it 
would be hard to organize them. 
On the other hand, in westem Fujian, peasants were already organized. If clan leaders 
could be recruited to the LRM, it would surely facilitate LRM's mobilization effort. The difficult 
task of LRM organizers was to break into these strong kinship organizations. When they had 
broken in, it would be easier for the peasants to be organized as they were familiar with organized 
activities. The detailed mobilization process ofRRM and LRM will be analyzed in the following 
section. 
5.2 Breaking into the Village Community 
The Rural Reconstruction Movement or the CCP Land Reform Movement both had to 
overcome the barriers of relatively closed village communities. Village closeness was the main 
barrier encountered by the movement organizers when they first marched into the villages. 
Closeness could be indicated by both physical and social conditions of the villages. For the 
movement organizers, social closure was especially difficult to break through. Induced by the 
"image of limited good", peasants would not follow people who came from outside their defined 
moral communities. External things were perceived as evil and dangerous, and outsiders were 
regarded as enemies. How to break into this closed community and how to set up mutual trust 
between RRMyT^RM organizers and the peasants were the first issues to be tackled. 
]n the second stage of the transformation process of peasants' view oflife, the disconnected 
great tradition and small tradition had chance to confront each other through the contact of their 
bearers. The outside movement organizers began their contact with the villagers. As the 
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movement organizers were considered outsiders and potential threats to the local community, the 
response from the peasants were negative. They soon realized that if their own considerations 
towards the peasants were based on the great tradition, they had no chance to understand the 
peasants and the movements were doomed to fail. Hence, the movement organizers had to 
become members of the local community first. That meant a temporary abandonment of the great 
tradition, the adoption of peasants' small tradition, their views oflife, their logic and their ways of 
life. The contact between the movement organizers and the peasants was through some mediating 
networks. These networks were usually the existing peasant organizations in the villages such as 
kinship organization or religious groups. These organizations connected individual peasants 
together and were the core institution sustaining small traditions in the village. It was hoped that if 
these organizations could be tumed into movement agencies, the contact and mobilization of the 
peasants would be facilitated. However, things often don't go as expected. These organizations 
did not necessarily exist in the villages, such as was the case in Zhouping; and sometimes the 
organizations could be very strong in sustaining small tradition in the village and resisting change, 
as was the case in westem Fujian. Without the help of existing village organizations, the RRM 
organizers in Zhouping set up their own organizations to recruit peasants directly and encountered 
many difficulties. The LRM organizers, however, joined the existing peasant organizations 
through clan networks. By reinforcing those organizations and supporting the original clan 
leaders, LRM soon tumed into a local movement and got deeply rooted in the local community. 
5.3 Utilizing Existing Peasant Community Networks 
As argued in the above section, village community organizations had connected individual 
peasants together and had been the core institution sustaining the village small tradition. Culture 
did not exist in isolation. It was embedded in a sea of social networks, which could be simply 
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called institutions. Without proper institutional settings, culture could not be sustained. On the 
other hand, an institution could not be well identified without particular reference to its cultural 
characters. Hence, when talking about peasant culture, peasant community (institutions) had to be 
an essential element of analysis. To transform peasant culture was also to transform peasant 
community. Culture was invisible to observers but community networks could be found. In short, 
peasant communities included horizontally arranged organizations, from formal to informal 
peasant organizations in the villages, and vertical social hierarchies from the rich and 
knowledgeable peasants and the poor and ignorant peasants. In the present study of RRM and 
LRM of how the existing peasant institutions enhanced and restrained the development of the 
movements, the village leaders will be the focus of this part of this study. 
It seemed that if the RRM and LRM movement organizers could mobilize the existing 
peasant organizations in the villages, it would be easier for them to fuse into the peasant 
community and gain trust from the villagers. However, this was only an ignorant wish unless the 
difficulties of mobilizing the existing peasant organizations and the existed peasant leaders were 
overcome. Although small villages were imagined as communities with strong links to their 
members, it was not a taken-for-granted situation. The village communities in Zhouping and 
westem Fujian demonstrated different community arrangements that affected the mobilization 
processes ofRRM and LRM differently. 
The RRM organizers under Liang's leadership tried to contact the village leaders when 
they first came to Zhouping. Although in Liang's Rural Reconstruction Theory the village was 
treated as an integrated community, in the implementation process of the reconstruction projects, 
villagers were divided into village leaders and ordinary villagers. The village leaders were those 
knowledgeable, experienced peasants who enjoyed high status in the village community. They 
seemed to be the core group to sustain the cultural values of the village community and would play 
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a vital role in the Rural Reconstruction programs��. The ordinary villagers, on the other hand were 
presumed as lacking in knowledge and stubborn to receive new i d e a s � � T h e y would have to be 
led. Liang believed that as the village leaders were more knowledgeable, they would also hold a 
higher moral standard and be more willing to accept the ideas of rural reconstruction and prepared 
to lead the village for development. As in the villages, only rich people could afford education, so 
learning was the monopolized right of the rich. Using knowledge as a yardstick to differentiate the 
villagers would be the same as using the amount of wealth to separate them. Although the leaders 
and the villagers were defined under the principle ofknowledge, they were actually separated by 
the principle of wealth. Hence, the village "integrity" in Rural Reconstruction theory was in reality 
broken into two parts — rich peasant and poor peasant. The village was hence not a closed but 
inter-connected solid community. Village integrity was also not a presumed phenomenon (as in 
Liang Shuming's Rural Reconstruction Theory) but an ideal situation for RRM to achieve. As 
integrity was no longer presumed, it was for the Rural Reconstmctionist to push the village leaders 
(if they were the legitimate ones) tojoin with other villagers^^. Until this condition was achieved, 
the emphasis on "integrity" lost its efficacy to serve as both theoretical and practical base for 
RRM. The belief in integrity without consulting the real village situation would merely be an 
ideological construct. 
However, at the beginning ofRRM mobilization in the villages, the RRM organizers did 
not realize the gap between reality and theory. They believed that the village leaders were the 
"natural" opinion leaders in the villages. They were the core members of the solid village 
community. If they could be successfully mobilized and transformed, they would spontaneously 
30. Liang Shuming, 'Xiangnong xuexiao de banfajiqi yiyi'(The Meaning and Method to Run a Peasant School), 
in Works of Liang Shuming, VoLx, p.347. 
31. Liang, ibid, p.355. 
32. Liang, ibid, p.348. 
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lead their fellow villagers to participate in the RRM. When all village leaders had been grouped 
together, the whole county would be organized. Li addition, village leaders happened to be the 
rich peasants in the villages. With their help, it would be easier to promote the Rural 
Q 0 
Reconstruction projects . 
In some exceptional perfect cases, there were knowledgeable, rich village leaders with 
high moral standards who were respected in the villages and willing to help the Rural 
Reconstmctionist. These people did in fact help to set up the programs successfully. In the case of 
Hejiacun (He Village), a rich old man named Li Zhiting was a figure ofhigh respect in the village. 
He handled all disputes between the villagers. His rule was the final word and was strictly 
followed. Since Li had been appointed chairman of the village school, he helped the RRM 
organizers to establish schools. Other members of the Li family had also shared the duties to act as 
school directors and teachers^^. The RRM worker'sjob was easier with Li's help. However, this 
was an exceptional case. In most of the other villages, the aim of mobilizing peasants through the 
village leaders failed. 
Chen Kangpu was charged with establishing a village school in Wei Village that he though 
could only be a dream. The village leaders gave him no help. At best, they only neglected to block 
his programs^^ In other cases, village leaders were former officers of the local government and 
they had already adopted the habits ofbureaucrats. When they were appointed as village school 
heads, they still operated as administrators of the government and were not welcomed by the 
villagers. When they tried to promote RRM, they used no educational means but only gave 
33. Chen Kangpu,�Weij iacun cunxue gongzuo zhi zibai', ibid. 
34. See Bai Feishi, 'Hejiacun cunxue gongzuo huigutan' (The Review on the Works Carried out in He Village 
School), in XCJS, Vol.4, 1 Jun 1935. 
35 Chen Kangpu, 'Weijiazhuang cunxue gongzuo zhi zibai', ibid. 
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instructions. They could never be moral leaders of the village^^. Another RRM worker, Zhifei, 
thought that the negative reactions of the village leaders at least bore no negative effect to the 
RRM. The worst cases were the ambitious self-interested village bullies who made use of the 
reconstruction projects to expand their own power and wealth. In those cases, RRM degenerated 
nn 
to become the instruments of the bullies . 
Apart from the difficulties of choosing the right village leaders to join RRM, there were 
also problems of cooperation among the leaders. Besides separation between rich and poor 
peasants, there was also conflicts among the rich peasants. If they were given the right to be in 
charge of the school centers, personal conflicts would tum into disputes among different village 
schools. In these cases, as no cooperation was possible, the support gained from one leader would 
mean loss of support from another leader. Lm the worst cases, those villages, which had had no 
prior contact, would generate disputes if conflicts broke out between village school leaders. The 
villages would become opposing villages^^. Even if the village leaders agreed to cooperate with 
one another, they might fail to arrive at consensus in making decisions. Discussions easily led to 
quarrels and ultimately affected the result ofRRMprojects. Even when the leaders came to some 
agreement, that agreement might be different to what the RRM workers expected (which were 
also not for the majority of the peasants). Li some other cases, village leaders treated the official 
meetings as mere occasional social gatherings. Whenever there was a meeting, they habitually 
asked for refreshments. ”Xianchiyizui” (Let us eat before starting the meeting) was a common pet 
phrase at the beginning of their meetings. The meals and goods consumed were charged ofcourse 
36. Chen Kangpu, 'Weijiazhuang cunxue gongzuo zhi zibai', ibid. 
37. Zhi Fei,�Shenshen dangdi zhengzhi lingxiu jiaru xiangjian yundong' (Be Aware of the Local Political 
Leaders' Participation in RRM), 'mXCJS, Vol.6, no.lO, 1 Jan 1937. 
38. Meng Huifeng, 'Tandao xiangcun qu' (Discussion on the Way to Work in the Village), 'mXCJS, Vol.6, no. 1, 
16 Aug 1936，and Han Zhao,�Xiangcun yundong she yin xian zhuyi dejige wenti' (The Few Problems which 
Should be Considered by RRM Workers^ inXCJS, Vol.6, no.3, 16 Sept 1936. 
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in terms of public funds. As a result, there were many disputes between the leaders and RRM 
organizers over the use of public funds and the accounts were never balanced^^. 
RRM organizers' aim of mobilizing the village leaders as a means to mobilize the whole 
village had finally come to an end. They discovered that even the village leaders might welcomed 
the Rural Reconstructionists, provided that there were accommodations and money for them. 
However, they would not help RRM workers in the further mobilization of the general villagers， 
The village leaders were not as the ones presumed in Liang Shuming's Rural Reconstruction 
Theory. Being knowledgeable and rich did not mean they were immune from the "peasants' image 
oflimited good". The idea ofRural Reconstruction was beyond their sense of responsibility and 
vision of development. These leaders were actually holding the same "peasants' image oflimited 
good" as their neighboring villagers. As they were the core group sustaining the village's cultural 
values, they might also be the strongest defender of peasants' small tradition and the major 
defender of "peasants' image of limited good". They did not used to think about their village 
community as a whole and they did not believe that there was a possibility for prosperous future 
development. They had to be transformed before they gave support to the RRM. Unfortunately, 
the RRM organizers failed to realize that point quickly and wasted many resources in the 
mobilization of these leaders. 
Moreover, in contrasted to what the RRM organizers expected, the peasant community in 
Zhouping was only loosely integrated, far from the image of a solid community composed of 
strongly linked elements. The basic unit of social life was not based on the village community or 
any kinds of formal or informal peasant organizations. These are the small peasant households 
39. Han Zhao, 'Xiangcun yundong zhe yin xian zhulyi dejige wenti，，ibid. 
40. Li Nai, 'Zhouping emianlai de xiangcun qingnian xunlian zhi wojian' (My Opinion on the Two Years Rural 
Youth Training in Zhouping), mXCJS, Vol.5, no.lO, 30 Dec 1935， 
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that sustained peasants' social life and shared the responsibilities to sustain the "peasants' image of 
limited good". Without linkage among the peasant households, the village was in pieces. Without 
a common network, the village leaders were seldomly the legitimate ones. Hence, even if they 
wished to promote RRM programs, they could do very little. The RRM organizers' hope of 
mobilizing peasants through the existing community networks in Zhouping was a complete 
failure. Only later, when RRM established their own networks in the villages, could RRM 
program be promoted. 
In the mobilization of peasants in westem Fujian, the LRM organizers had tried to make 
use of their kinship relationships to the local community. Organizers with local origin were 
chosen and sent to the villages. When these organizers arrived at their home villages, they tried to 
mobilize those peasants in their own clan. Although the general principles of the CCP's theories of 
class exploitation were announced in public, the actual mobilization moved along clan lines. 
Although in the CCP's orthodox thought poor peasants were believed to be more revolutionary 
than other strata of peasants, the core of the movement were the middle peasants. In fact, LRM 
leaders and organizers did not necessarily come from poor peasant families. On the contrary, they 
were usually from middle and rich peasant or even landlord families. Their families did not have 
to be rich but did enjoy respectable status in the clan organization. Most likely, the status was 
based on the level of education and knowledge acquired. One of the CCP leaders, Deng Zihui, 
who was a member of the Deng clan village, was bom in an impoverished wealthy family. His 
family had enjoyed a high status in the village. Deng's father was a respectable erudite scholar and 
a doctor in the village who frequently helped the villagers. With considerably better education and 
high talent, Deng Zihui became the only student who was chosen by the county government to be 
sent for further study abroad. Deng soon became a well-known figure in the village. When he 
returned to the village in 1927, it was a big event. Dozens of villagers came to visit Deng and 
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discussed their poor lives with him. Deng was easily accepted by the villagers not only as an 
"insider" but also a respected member of the community whom the peasants could trust. He 
became a strong asset for the LRM's mobilization^^ 
Apart from the case ofDeng, a local leader was usually the leader of the clan organization 
and there were also clan leaders who had been persuaded to join by their clan members who were 
CCP members or LRM organizers. These clan leaders agreed to support LRM as they believed it 
was a locally oriented movement that could help the development ofthe local community. 
Through various clan relationships and the status enjoyed by the LRM leaders in the clan 
organizations, LRM became successfully localized in westem Fujian. However, it was not the 
local community that was transformed by the movement, it was the movement itself that was 
transformed and the effect was the enforcement of existing social networks and peasants' views of 
life. Accepting the LRM organizers did not imply that the "image of limited good" had broken 
down. The LRM organizers were accepted because they were considered members of the local 
community. Hence, it was actually the success of the local clan organization in recruiting new 
forces rather than the success of the LRM. However, that did not mean the efforts of the LRM 
organizers in this stage was unproductive. The LRM movement had localized within the clan 
villages. Although land redistribution was not carried out, some mild land reform measures were 
conducted, such as rent reduction, selling grain at a lower prices and the forfeiture ofextra high 
rent collected. The practices did ease the burden on the peasants and brought new hopes to them. 
LRM's reliance on clan relationships enhanced its effectiveness but also limited its 
development. When LRM organizers started the "real" Land Reform Movement (involving 
redistribution of land from landed to land-less peasants) when they had localized in the village 
communities, the harsh measures were directed at the wealthy families of other villages that had 
41. See Jiang, Deng Zihui Zhuan, Chapter 1 -3. 
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older disputes with the LRM-led village or were against the LRM. The "class line" cut across the 
clan villages. Peasants were mobilized by clan cleavage instead of class conflict. Peasants were 
mobilized to fight for clan interest instead of class interest. When CCP Leftists were ordered to 
redistribute all land from the landed to land-less within the clan village, strong opposition was 
received from the clan leaders and some LRM leaders who had clan backgrounds. They refused to 
carry out "land revolution" within the clan village. They thought that it would reduce their control 
over their fellow peasants and hence curtail the development of the revolutionary force. Fu 
Baicui, who was a CCP leader with landlord family background in Jiaoyang County, had reduced 
rent on land owned by his family and sold grain at a lower price to the peasants in years of bad 
harvest. However, he refused to redistribute land ofhis family's ownership. Redistribution ofland 
would surely reduce his family's control over the peasants and income to his family. Despite 
self-interested considerations, Fu claimed that land redistribution would dissolve the established 
clan solidarity and weaken the revolutionary force. He thought that it was the land relationship 
that sustained the strong clan solidarity. If peasants gained their own piece of land, they might 
leave the clan organization and hence reduce the CCP's revolutionary power. As strong objections 
were received, the extent ofland reform was limited^^. 
The objection from Fu was not an exceptional case. On the contrary, it was not the worst 
case for the LRM. In some other cases, LRM leaders who had strong clan links participated in the 
movement only to pursue their clan interest. They supported the Red Army in exchange for 
military assistance and political support. They never really thought of carrying out Communist 
Revolution or liberalizing the poor peasant class. When the LRM was defeated by KMT troops, 
they easily tumed to the "White Army". As considered by LRM organizers, the betrayal was a 
42. See Deng Zihui and Chang Dingcheng, 'Minxi baodong yu hongshierjun' (westem Fujian Rebellion and the 
Twelfth Red Army), in Xinghuo liaoyuan (A Single Spark Can Start A Prairie Fire), Vol.l, Beijing: Renmin 
wenxue chubanshe, 1958, p.383, 388-389. 
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total rejection. It meant loss of military force and weapons essential to the movement^^. However, 
from the viewpoint of the clan leader or the clan organization as a whole, the betrayal action was 
totally understandable. It was consistent with the "peasants' image of limited good" which 
characterized the selfishness of the peasants. As the LRM organizers could not help them, there 
were no grounds for continued support. 
As the clan leaders were usually wavers and their loyalty to the LRM was questionable, it 
was a difficult task for LRM organizers to depend on the clan leaders to promote the movement. 
On one hand, certain autonomy had to be granted for the clan leaders to expand their control over 
the villages.M3n the other hand, they should be closely monitored to ensure that they would follow 
the Central Committee's polices. It was an "artistic" job for CCP to employ and control clan 
power. 
Moreover, in mobilizing peasants through the clan organizations, clan conflict would 
cover up the class conflict within the clan. CCP had to forego the policy of mobilizing peasants 
through class lines. That meant the abandonment of the great tradition in favor of the small 
tradition. The shift of movement's focus was considered by the LRM organizers a temporary 
measure and necessary step towards the final objective. However, it was not in agreement with the 
LRM organizers. Mobilizing peasants along class line or clan cleavage was a hard choice. CCP's 
policy actually swung between the two ends. Using CCP's own words, it was "the struggle 
between the two lines" (liangtiao luxian de douzheng). Front-line movement organizers were 
ready to adopt the more practical clan line at this initial stage of the movement. For Party Central 
43. See Guo Xuefeng, 'Longche baodong gaikuang' (Brief Description of Rebellion in Longche), in ZPWSZL 
Vol.3, May 1983 and Cheng Sidua,�YongfU laoqu renmin geming douzheng ruogan qingkuangjiansu' (Brief 
Summary of People's Revolutionary struggle in Yongfu District), in ZPWSZL, Vol.5, May 1984 and Guo 
Xuefeng, 'Yongfu zongbaodong he qita gedi jianli suweiai zhengquan jiankuang' (Brief Description on 
Yongfu Rebellion and the Establishment of soviet Power in other Districts), in ZPWSZL, Vol.4, Oct 1983. 
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Committee members, however, class lines were necessary from the orthodox Communist point of 
view. 
Both RRM and LRM tried to break into peasant community through the existing village 
network in this stage of the transformation process of peasants' view of life. However, both 
attempts failed. Even for the LRM, although organizers successfully broke into the peasant 
community, it in fact reinforced clan power instead of strengthening the LRM's influence. The 
result of the transformation movement was contrary to what was expected. The small tradition 
had been fortified instead of transformed. It seemed that the process of cultural transformation 
was never a linear, unidirectional course. There was also no guarantee for a predetermined 
destination to be reached. Both RRM and LRM found their initial attempts moved in the opposite 
direction of their pre-set movement objective. Adopting a local community situation was a 
practical way in a realistic movement. No matter whether it was the Confucian-inspired RRM or 
the Marxist-led LRM, they both had to follow the rules of the local community. It was the small 
tradition that dominated the rules of the game in the villages. If the movement organizers wanted 
to achieve the final success, they had first to bend to the local rules and regulations, i.e., adopt the 
small tradition. However, that was understood as a transitional step, both movements would 
develop their own network and then began the promotion of the great tradition. 
5.4 Mobilization through the Establishment of New Forms of Peasant Organization 
As the efforts to mobilize peasants through existing peasant community networks failed, 
organizers of RRM and LRM began to build up their own institutions. This signified the 
beginning of Stage II of the transformation process. New forms of moral community would be set 
up and new peasants' views of life would be sustained. Li the initial stage, only part of the 
community's peasant population would be selected to join the new community. As the peasants' 
123 
small tradition was still dominating, their participation was either on the condition of material 
rewards or coercive force, which also followed to the small tradition. RRM chose a group of 
young peasants to be the initial target of recruitment and LRM adopted the flexible "mass line" 
approach to recruit the "majority". As described in Chapter 2, peasants' participation did not mean 
they have any change in their views oflife. The image oflimited good still prevailed. Changing 
peasants' view was the work in the next stage. In this stage, peasants' actions came before the 
transformation of their views oflife. It was hoped that the changed mode of action would induce 
the change of views. It was for the next stage to assure the final transformation of peasants' views 
oflife. 
It is learned from the above section that the village communities in Zhouping were loosely 
integrated and peasants' sense of moral community restricted to their individual families. It was 
impossible for the limited number of village leaders or RRM organizers to visit every individual 
peasant family. When RRM workers found that they could not depend on village leaders to 
mobilize the peasants, they turned their mobilization effort toward the young peasants of both 
sexes. When the number of young peasants participating in RRM had increased, in-depth contact 
with the peasant families was possible. It was believed that the young people were open-minded 
and eager to leam new ideas. In fact the young peasants were the group which was least 
contaminated by peasants' small tradition, i.e., less inclined to hold the "image of limited good”. 
Although they did not possess the ideas of the great tradition, resistance from them to receive new 
ideas would also be less. They would be more receptive to the movement than the old village 
leaders. As a large number of young peasants became involved in RRM, the scope ofmobilization 
could be expanded. 
At the beginning of the youth mobilization programs, the more knowledgeable youth who 
came from rich and middle peasants families had been absorbed into the village school's board of 
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directors or had been encouraged to join the youth department of the schools. The criteria in 
choosing the peasants (being rich) was to ensure that they were spare labor for their families and 
could support themselves during training and participation in movement activities. At the first 
stage, young people had to be nominated by school directors before they were allowed to join the 
village schools. As admission was very limited, the nomination procedure was abandoned. 
However, the young peasants were still expected to join the village school voluntarily. 
Unfortunately, the number of admission did not increase^^. On the other hand, since most women 
got married when they were still very young and married women would seldom join the school 
centers, enrolment of peasant women was confined to only a few. The exceptional few recruited 
girls were also too young and could hardly help the promotion of RRM^^. As the result, the 
voluntaristic recruitment of peasant youth was not successful, and compulsory programs were 
arranged. 
In order to expand the scope of youth training, a centralized youth training programs were 
conducted in the county towns. As the RRM took control over the government, administrative 
orders were issued to request that young men aged between 18 to 25 take part in the programs. 
They were selected from each lu (neighborhood — each lu included 25 families). The selection 
soon caused the spread of rumors. Villagers believed that it was recruitment for KMT military 
service. Peasants were dubious towards that program, even after tremendous propaganda effort 
from RRM organizers. Some peasants escaped the village; some fought and quarreled with the 
recruiters; some rich families employed other peasants as substitutes; some lied that they were sick 
or in a period of bad fortune; some said that they could not shift their work to other family 
44. Chen, ibid. 
45. Bai Feishi, 'Hejiacun cunxue gongzuo huigutan', ibid. 
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members and had to work for subsistence living^^. Other groups in the village also objected to the 
program, especially those in leading village positions. The village leaders felt nervous that they 
would be replaced by these well-trained energetic youth. They refused to give support to the 
program and sometimes even tried to destroy it^ .^ In addition to the centralized compulsory 
programs there were also dispersed training programs in various xiang and village schools. They 
were also conducted by administrative instructions and faced peasants' boycotts. 
The RRM workers had to solve the dilemma of whether to use the more coercive force of 
the state to order the youth to join the programs orjust let them participate voluntarily. Although 
Liang Shuming had emphasized the importance of voluntary participation in RRM, in practice, if 
the RRM depended on peasants' initiatives it was destined to fail. The application of force seemed 
to be a must especially at the beginning of the mobilization process. Although Liang believed that 
forced participation would only destroy peasants' underlying sense of"reason", it was also true that 
if the peasants never participated in the movement, the underlying "reason" would never prevail. 
In the end, RRM organizers employed an approach that lay between the complete adoption 
of administrative power and the mere dependence on voluntary peasant participation. Although 
the peasant youth were forced to participate in the programs, educational strategies were applied in 
the programs. Young peasants learned both Liang Shuming's Rural Reconstruction theories and 
agricultural production technologies. It was intended to improve both spiritual and technical 
standards of the youth. The spiritual education emphasized the cultivation of ethics such as 
altruism, the awareness of collective interest and to care about the nation and the country. Under 
the consideration ofRRM, these elements were the core of the great tradition. If the youths would 
adopt the ethics, the "peasants' image of limited good" would automatically be broken. Through 
46. Li Nai, 'Zhouping emianlai de xiangcun qingnian xunlian wojian', ibid. 
47 Li, ibid. 
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the course of training, the young peasants gradually found the programs as useful and interesting. 
At the same time, the bad rumors on RRM were proved incorrect. As the training programs 
continued, voluntary participation of peasant youth increased. After the training programs, many 
young trainees became very good RRM organizers. They were sent back to the villages to 
organize other peasants. Connections had been set up among these youth and soon they became a 
strong force for the RRM. The youth formulated a new village network and this network was the 
institution sustaining the newly developed spouts of the great tradition. However, as the peasants 
were from the rich peasant families, they were only the minorities in the village. The dominant 
peasants' view was still the "peasants' image of limited good". The majority poor peasants were 
excluded and their view oflife had very little change. 
For LRM in westem Fujian, the LRM organizers found that without the cooperation of 
clan organizations, there was little hope for the success of peasant mobilization. Nevertheless, 
peasant mobilization through the clan power was not secure. One way out ofthe dilemma was to 
set up LRM's own village networks. Class lines should be implemented and the poor peasants 
who came from poor family backgrounds and had no strong clan links should be trained to become 
the organizers of the movement. However, as many poor peasants were totally illiterate, they had 
to undergo a long period of training before they could share the duties of the LRM organizers. 
Many courses were then organized to teach the illiterate peasants. The courses served the double 
function of increasing their educational level and transmitting CCP thought (the great tradition). 
However, the peasants were poor and could not afford to spend their valuable production time to 
attend these courses. The attendance and effectiveness rates of these training courses were 
questionable. The undereducated clan leaders were also required to attend the courses. As they 
could allow more time for study, they were the most successful group of the training programs. 
Although their literacy level improved, they were still strongly inclined to their clan 
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organization^^. Hence, the LRM organizers had to tolerate the existence of middle to rich peasants 
with higher literacy levels but lower loyalty to be the core members of the movement. 
LRM organizers could not depend for a prolonged period on the precarious clan power for 
the mobilization of peasants. They had to develop more secure peasant support. In order to ensure 
general support from the peasants and to formulate a mechanism to check against the clan leaders, 
the LRM leaders adopted a flexible and practical approach, the "mass line”，i.e., majority rule. The 
objective of this approach was to secure the support from the maximum number of peasants to the 
revolution and to legitimize the leadership of LRM organizers as based on the acceptance of the 
majority. 
In adopting the "mass line”，the small tradition was fully respected. However, the 
peasants' will was not usually accorded the respect of the LRM organizers. In the redistribution of 
wealth in the village, which also meant re-defining who would be included in the peasant 
community, it was peasants' wish to define the boundary of their community flexibly rather than 
according to the LRM's class line. Although peasants were eager to gain more benefits, they 
would not deprive the rich all of their wealth, i.e., expel the rich completely out of the community. 
The peasants feared that if the CCP organizers and the Red Army left the area, they would be 
unable to defend counterattacks from the rich. Hence, no matter how severe the previous 
exploitation, they preferred to let the rich to keep a piece of land and remain in the community. 
They were willing to receive less land and even in some cases, refused to take the redistributed 
land. Hence it was against peasants' will to redistribute all rich peasants' land and drive the rich to 
death. Acknowledging this peasants' choice, LRM leaders had followed the "majority's will" and 
kept a small plot for the landlords. 
48 'Zhengfu gongzuo renyuan yao jiajin xuexi' (Civil Servants should Improve Their Learning Attitude) in 
HSZH, Vol.l2, March 2 1932，p.6. 
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After a successful rebellion in Xinan of Yongding County, Deng Zihui, a LRM leader 
suggested the immediate redistribution ofland in the district. He thought that it was necessary to 
provide immediate incentive to the peasants who had joined the rebellion. On the other hand, 
other leaders were more cautious. The redistribution of land would also mean re-defining the 
boundary of the peasant community and only those who had been included in the community 
would share a piece of land. They feared that the redistribution would disintegrate the existing 
community without building up a new one. They tried to figure out a middle way, which was to 
maintain the continuity of the community and also provide sufficient benefits to those who had 
participated in the rebellion. Finally, land was redistributed. The method of redistribution, 
however, was not made according to strict class labels. It was judged by the majority peasants in 
the district. The interests of the middle peasants were protected and their production incentive 
maintained. The rich landlords were allowed to keep a piece ofland for their own living as well. 
In conducting such a mild redistribution, further opposition was avoided^^. However, the 
inclusion ofthe rich peasants did not lessen the success of the LRM's redistribution. It was even 
more successful in gaining peasants' support than insisting on class line and expelling all the rich 
out of the new community. 
When LRM organizers tried to set up a new community with a re-defined boundary, it was 
a negotiation process with the majority of the peasants. When most of the villagers accepted the 
former village leaders, they were included in the new community and protected against full 
deprivation of wealth. Sometimes, they even became leaders of the LRM peasant organizations. 
If they were found to be the common enemy of the villagers, they would be expelled from the 
community and deprived of all wealth. This coped with the "mass line" and with the majority 
peasants' wishes. 
49. See Jiang, Deng Zihui zhuan, ibid, p.73. 
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However, this did not mean that the LRM organizers protected all rich peasants' and 
wealthy people's interest, otherwise they would be no different from the KMT's policy. As poor 
peasants' demand for land and property had to be fulfilled, at least some of the rich people's wealth 
had to be redistributed. LRM's strategy towards the rich was a selective one. Those rich people 
whose wealth was accumulated through the exploitative means and in strong conflict with the 
mass peasants would be the target of class struggle. The other rich people were protected. 
Nevertheless, it was not a permanent policy. When land was insufficient for redistribution, the 
number of rich peasants who had become the "class enemy" would increase. It was after all a 
flexible arrangement. When the Red Army came to Zhangping, they conducted a series of 
investigations to check whether the wealth of the rich families were accumulated through the 
running of "healthy" business or through exploitation. They chose the one who had strong 
connection with the local warlords and whose behavior aroused general criticism to be the target 
of class struggle. Mass approval was gained from general consultation in mass meetings 
{qunzhong daihui). Properties of the chosen rich families were redistributed. Active participants 
would usually receive a larger share of the redistributed property. Through these approaches, mass 
support was aroused^^. 
Sometimes, the rich or the landlords were not the target of criticism. The middleman or 
the brokers were the major targets of attack. As these people have made frequent direct contacts 
with the mass for collection of tax and rent, they were usually the public enemy. When LRM 
organizers came to the village, these people were caught, put on trial and killed. In Houtian, which 
is in vicinity ofDeng Zihui's home village, there was a development of peasant organization led by 
CCP members. In response, the landlords also formed their organization headed by a local riffraff 
50. See Cheng Baituan,�Canyu hongsijun zai zhangping de geming huodong de huiyi' (The Memory on 
Participation in Fourth Red Army Revolutionary Activities in Zhangping County), in ZPWSZL, Vol.6, Dec 
1984,p.8. 
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Chen Beimi. Chen had lead a gang of armed militia and was very harsh towards the peasants, 
especially the members of the CCP peasant organization. When rebellion broke up in Houtian, 
Chen was killed in public to release peasants' hatred^^ In eliminating common enemies who had 
been excluded from peasants' sense of moral community, selective punishments were imposed 
and it satisfied the peasants' wishes to expel them out of the community. By doing so, LRM 
organizers were considered "friends" of the community. 
Follow the mass line did not mean that the LRM was always passive. When it found that 
village leaders had disobeyed the party's orders, it would selectively try to tum them into the public 
enemy. Criminal offenses by the leaders were publicly announced. The leaders were described as 
being against the interest of all the villagers, against the community and against the LRM. With an 
active accusation of those untrustworthy village leaders, the "political line" (loyal to CCP) 
overcame the "mass line" to be the dominant criterion for recruiting peasants into the village 
community. The dilemma now facing LRM was no longer the balance between "class line" and 
"clan line" but between "mass line" and "political line". Those who were politically incorrect 
(against LRM) were rejected by the majority peasants. Support from the masses was not 
abandoned but manipulated. Through open criticism in public meetings, the LRM organizers 
sought the masses' approval to expel the disobedient leaders out of the community. Mass approval 
was arrived after the party's ajudication. It was still very important to accord the "political line" 
with the "mass line". The large Scale Land Investigation Movement conducted in 1933 illustrated 
the application of the "political line". 
In June 1933, CCP organized the Land Investigation Movement {chaitianyundong). The 
aim ofthe movement was to evaluate the result of former land distributions. In places where too 
much land was retained by landlords and rich peasants, redistribution was carried out. Its aim was 
51. See Jiang, Deng Zihui Zhuan, ibid, p.64-65. 
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to fight the landlord class and to avoid possible counterattacks^^. The movement was carried out 
all over the soviet area. It lasted more than a year. Just between June and September 1933, 6,988 
landlords and 6,638 rich peasants were "found’. Their land was expropriated and redistributed^^. 
These newly discovered landlords and rich peasants were caught, fined, jailed and exiled. Some 
of them were killed. Many middle peasants who were afraid that they would become "rich 
peasants" escaped. Poor peasants who had actively participated in CCP organized activities were 
appointed as peasant representatives^^. The Land Investigation Movement actually aimed to 
replace rich peasants who had occupied leading positions in peasant organizations and Red Army 
with the representatives of poor peasants. It was a continuation of the CCP's strategy ofsolidifying 
its control over the village communities. Those newly discovered "landlords" and "rich peasants" 
were actually not the large land owners but disobedient village heads. When the Land 
Investigation Movement were pushed toward an extreme end, even loyal village leaders and those 
middle peasants were caught and killed. "Red Terror" spread over the soviet area. When KMT 
began the encirclement war on the soviet area, the Land Investigation Movement came to an end in 
October 1934. 
The Land Investigation Movement seemed to be a necessary policy for LRM organizers to 
strengthen its control. It could be considered a drastic process to set up a new community by the 
power of terror. New values were emphasized, including loyalty to CCP, Marxist communist 
thoughts and concem for public issues. Political correctness had outweighed the consideration of 
52. ^Zhongyangju guanyu chaitian yundong de jueyi' (Resolution of the Central Bureau on Land Investigation 
Movement), 2 June 1933, in Jinlin Hong, Zhongguo xiandaishi zilian xuanqi (Selected Materials in 
Contemporary Chinese History), Vol.4, Beijing : Zhongguo renmin daixue chubanshe (The Chinese People's 
University Press, 1989, p.302-306.) 
53. Mao Zedong, 'Zhonghua suweiai gongheguo zhangyang zhixing weiyuanhui yu renmin weiyuanhui dui 
dierci quanguo suweiai daibiao daihui de baogao' (Report from the Chinese soviet Republic Central 
Executive Committee and People's Committee to the Second National soviet Assembly) in Dierci quansu 
daihui tekan (Special Issue of the Second National soviet Assembly), in HSZH, 26 Jan 1934. 
54. 'Zhongyang zhenggu tonggao' (Central government Announcements, in HSZH, Vol.85, 14 Jun 1933, p.3. 
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mass support. This "political line" was applied as LRM wanted to strengthen its control over the 
newly set-up community. A large number of peasants were forced to participate in the new 
community through participation in the Land Investigation Movement. Loyalty to the party had to 
be shown no matter whether it was real or not. It forced the peasants to adopt the CCP-dominated 
style of community life. The demonstrated peasant behavior was forced to change but the change 
did not come deeply from their hearts. It did not involve the change of peasants' view oflife. To 
transform peasants' view, further efforts had to be made. 
In the appointment of new leaders of the community along the "political line", those who 
were loyal to CCP and welcomed by the mass peasants were selected. The power of the new 
leader would no longer base on traditional clan status but CCP's support. In this way, LRM 
organizers confirmed their control over the village and gained a legitimate place in the village 
community. 
In addition, to strengthen the new moral community, LRM organizers was also very harsh 
towards the traitors who had tumed to the KMT side. The traitors were considered expelled out of 
the peasant community and were sent to public trial. Their properties were all redistributed and 
some of them were sentenced to death. When the Red Army came to Zhangping in 1929, the 
traitor Chen Zukang escaped. In his absence, his anti-revolutionary offences were put under 
public criticism in a mass meeting. His property, including livestock, grain and furniture, were all 
distributed to other peasants. Chen's house was bumed down^^. 
The LRM's strategy at this stage of transformation of peasants' view was to secure 
peasants' support. The objectives at this stage was after all to fight against a minute number of rich 
landlords and local bullies who were either the common enemies of the majority peasants or 
against the Land Reform Movement. Other rich peasants were protected. While applying this 
55. See Cheng Baituan,�Canyu hongsijun zai zhangping de geming huodong de huiyi', ibid, p.8. 
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strategy, most of the peasants' loyalty had been secured and their productive incentives were 
maintained. The village small tradition was retained with a changed loyalty of the peasants from 
merely inclined to clan power and clan leaders to the loyalty to LRM organizers. The village 
community was retained with its boundary but the criteria for inclusion had changed. 
Both RRM and LRM tried to break into the village community through mobilization of the 
existed village community network at the initial stage of the transformation process ofpeasants. 
As clan organizations were stronger in westem Fujian and the LRM organizers had enjoyed 
considerably higher status in the clan organizations, LRM was more successful than RRM's efforts 
at making use of the existing community network. As the RRM organizers were not native 
settlers, and RRM appeared in Zhouping as KMT government organized activities, the peasants 
usually distrusted RRM organizers. The situation was even worsened by some RRM organizers 
who came from the city area and could not give away all their habits of the city. As they played 
double roles as both RRM organizers and government administrators, theyjust felt it inappropriate 
to act like an ordinary peasant. They never could be the ideal RRM organizers. They never could 
be accepted by the local community. On the other hand, although LRM was successful in 
mobilizing the clan power and later through the application of the "mass line", loyalty of clan 
power was always in question. Hence both RRM and LRM turned from the dependence on 
existing village power to new forms of organization in the mobilization of peasants. This 
represented the tum from Stage I into Stage II of the transformation process, ki the newly set- up 
moral communities, loyalty to the movement was emphasized. The emphasis on public awareness 
and altruistic values were included and they were usually contrary to peasants' "image of limited 
good". The new organization was actually a new moral community in confronting with the old 
one. Those who were recruited into the new organization had to follow new norms. Peasants 
might be involved in the new moral community involuntarily. They j oined the new community by 
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RRM's coercive force (administrative instructions) and by LRM's force of terror (Red Terror). 
However, once theyjoined the community, they had to follow new rules of the game. No matter 
whether their views of life changed or not, their behavior had to change. The transformation 
process was facilitated by other movement techniques, which is Stage III of the transformation 
process. 
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CHAPTER 6. INTERACTION AND TRANSFORMATION 
At this last stage of the transformation process, we found that the outsiders tried to gain 
trust from the local community. During the course of their action, they tried to mobilize the 
existing peasant networks. The existing networks were not simply organizational settings to link 
the peasants but also an embodiment of peasants' culture and views. While the RRM and LRM 
acknowledge the true need to make use of these existing networks to break into the local 
community, they also realized the importance of respect to peasants' small tradition. With respect 
to peasants' small tradition, the promotion of the movements was greatly facilitated. As the 
movements were accepted as local movements, participation could be augmented. It showed that 
the transformation process of peasant culture was not necessarily a unilateral process. Changing 
peasants' views began with a counter action to reinforce instead of weakening the small tradition. 
Hence, when the RRM and LRM were localized in the villages, it did not mean they had changed 
the peasants' view oflife. The movement organizers had to find some other ways to facilitate the 
further transformation of peasants' view of life. It was the movement organizers who needed to 
search for the right way of transformation. As depicted in Stage III of our theoretical framework of 
the transformation process of peasant view oflife, peasants would become actively involved in the 
movements due to the change of view oflife. However, it was not a spontaneous change. Further 
action had to be conducted by the movement organizers to induce that kind ofchange. In inducing 
changes to peasants' views oflife, it was not easy to find a suitable way. It varied from educational 
and persuasive means to materialistic attraction or coercive force. 
In Zhouping, Liang Shuming claimed that RRM's nature was an educational movement 
and the emphasis was on the application of educational approaches to change peasant view oflife. 
The RRM organizers believed that educational methods and persuasive means were the best ways 
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to cultivate peasants' self-motivation. Through the setting-up of village school centers and the 
application of various educational programs, peasants would acknowledge the importance of 
"reason" {lixin) and voluntarily conform to the social contract agreed by all members within the 
community. 
However, in the real villages of Zhouping, the peasants were not those idealized traditional 
Chinese gentlemen. They did not possess "reason" as assumed in Liang's Rural Reconstruction 
Theory. It was RRM's responsibility to implement reasons, to teach and to regulate the peasants to 
adapt to the "social contract". In the implementation process, educational means were found to be 
ineffective. The RRM organizers had to supplement it with the application of material attraction 
(through cooperatives) and coercive force (compulsory youth training programs). As RRM was in 
connection with the administrative reform in Zhouping, RRM workers became the state 
administrators, too. They found that the administrative power was more effective than educational 
means to recruit peasants to participate in the movement. Gradually, they preferred to use the state 
apparatus instead of educational means. Li Kangmin pointed out that once RRM has tolerated 
linkages to the state, it would not become a voluntaristic peasant movement. The increasing 
application ofadministrative means in the promotion of the movement would corrupt the nature of 
the movement, leading it in the opposite direction�However, it did not necessarily mean that 
peasant view of life remained the same. Although RRM was carried out in the opposite direction 
against Liang Shuming's ideal and the peasants were mobilized by material interest and coercive 
force, peasant view oflife changed. Those young peasants who had actively participated in RRM 
acquired knowledge that never knew before the movement and adopted enlightened views 
towards their future. They then became core members of RRM and conducted various 
1. Li Kangmin, 'Xiangcun yundong yu zhengfu nongzheng shi fengji wenti' (Rural Reconstruction Movement 
and the Division ofPower between State and Society) in XCJS, Vol.6, no.7. 
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developmental programs in Zhouping. However, before their efforts could achieve any substantial 
results, RRM came to an end as the Japanese invaded and occupied the whole Shandong Province. 
RRM was forced to become an unfinished project. 
In contrast to the Rural Reconstructionist, LRM organizers were not hesitant to apply 
various material incentives to attract peasants to join LRM and use coercive force to induce 
peasants' continuous participation. However, peasants' obedience was based on an exchange basis 
and did not come from the heart. Once material incentives were exhausted and coercive force was 
held back, their support was suspended. As the CCP continued to strengthen its control over the 
soviet bases and continued to carry out LRM, merely depending on material incentives and the 
"political line" would not be a long-term approach. After LRM had secured a legitimate standing 
in the villages, it had to consolidate its supporting mass base and to cultivate "true" loyalty among 
the peasants. Through various organizational efforts and the political mobilization campaigns, 
peasants' view of life changed. When KMT launched encirclement and suppression war on the 
soviet base, peasants who had already transformed their views of life participated actively to 
defend their homeland villages. 
6.1 Induction by Material and Social Incentives 
As delineated by the theoretical framework, in Stage III of the transformation process of 
peasant view of life, peasants were attracted to join collective actions merely for the benefits 
expected. In the course ofboth the RRM and LRM, material and social benefits were provided to 
induce peasants' participation. For RRM, material incentives were granted through the various 
cooperative activities. For LRM, it was the selective redistribution of land and properties to the 
loyal peasants that induced their active participation. 
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In Liang's Rural Reconstruction Theory, cooperatives played a very important role. 
Peasant cooperatives were essential to the movement, not because they could increase peasants' 
production efficiency and wealth but because they were the institutions where the poor peasants' 
individualistic thoughts could be transformed to collectivism^. For Liang, peasant cooperatives 
should serve to solve four difficulties in peasants' life, (i) shortage of food; (ii) shortage of 
financial resources; (iii) difficulties in purchasing and selling products; and (iv) difficulties in 
agricultural production. The storage function of the cooperatives could prevent food shortages in 
famine years. The credit unions (financial cooperatives) could facilitate peasants' collective 
borrowing and lending. The marketing cooperatives could help peasants to obtain a better price in 
negotiating with suppliers and buyers. Finally, within the production cooperatives, coordinated 
collective production could be implemented to increase the level of output and increase 
production efficiency through the shared use of more advanced technology. The production 
cooperatives were especially important, as they were the necessary paths towards collective 
ownership ofland which would finally eliminate exploitation and individualism^ Adding up all 
the cooperatives, they performed the function of attracting peasants' participation in RRM through 
the provision of material rewards. 
In Zhouping, cooperatives began to set up as the Rural Reconstruction program started in 
1931 • The number ofcooperative members increased tremendously. The number ofcooperatives 
in Zhouping from 1932 to 1935 increased more than sixteen times and the number ofcooperative 
members increased from 458 to 14,939 (See table 6.1). 




Table 6.1 Number of Cooperatives and Cooperative Members from 1932-1935^ 
Year No. of Cooperatives No. of Cooperative members 
1932 20 ^ 
1933 25 ^ 
1934 133 4,446 
1935 336 14,939 
The cooperatives were set up along with the village schools and xiang schools. At the 
county level, there was a Zhouping Federation of Cooperatives responsible for coordination 
among the cooperatives and arranging contracts with outside businesses on behalfofall the village 
and xiang cooperatives. Li the operation of the cooperatives, peasants were organized for 
marketing, production and financing activities. The RRM organizers hoped that continuous 
cooperation would finally generate a collective orientation in the peasants' minds. In the 
operational arrangements, part of the profit was retained as public ftinds after all ofthe costs were 
deducted, and the residue was shared among the members according to their effort contributed and 
number of shares held. The public fund was re-invested in the cooperatives to improve either the 
productive efficiency or product quality. Apart from the above mentioned public fund generated 
from retained profit, the essential production tools, such as farm cattle, ploughs, weavers for 
making cloth were all shared among the cooperative members. The agricultural and handicraft 
products were also sold through the cooperatives. The cooperatives usually obtained higher profit 
margin than individual producers did. The cooperative also introduced new plantation spices and 
new methods of production which largely increased the amount of output. The search for 
technical improvement to the quality of agricultural products could also reinforce the formation of 
4. 'Zhouping shiyanxian hezuo shiye baogao zhuanhao' (Special Issue on Cooperatives in Zhouping County), in 
XCJS Vol.5, no. 11 & 12, 16 Feb 1936，Introduction. 
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a stronger collective orientation among the peasants. In the promotion of "localistic pure breeds" 
{difang chunzhongzhuyi) which required all peasants in Zhouping to plant the same spices ofhigh 
quality plantations, the RRM organizers were aimed at controlling the quality of Zhouping 
produced agricultural products and to eam a higher selling price. American Toris cotton spices 
was introduced to the members of the Cotton Marketing Co-operative. Soon Toris cotton had 
planted all over the county. The quality of Zhouping producing cotton was assured and the selling 
price was maintained at above market average. On the other hand, the cooperative members who 
were Toris cotton producers were differentiated with the non-members. Solidarity among the 
cooperative members improved. This "pure breeds" on one hand improved product quality and 
reinforced the "we" against "they" sense among the peasants. It differentiated Zhouping's products 
with other county's products, differentiated cooperative members (who produce the superior 
quality cotton products) with non-members. The search for quality improvement of agricultural 
products was in tum to reinforce the formation of a collective community^. 
With various direct and indirect efforts to mobilize the peasants, there was an increase in 
the cooperative membership. The cooperatives proved to be effective in attracting peasants' 
participation. However, the aim to cultivate collective orientation among the peasants was 
unsuccessful. Peasants who joined the cooperatives did not have much commitment towards the 
cooperatives. They were merely attracted by the higher rate of the return earned. As they were 
motivated by material interest. Once the material benefits from the cooperatives reduced, they 
left, hi the Cotton Marketing Cooperative, the most successful cooperative in Zhouping, it 
provided better cottonseeds to the cooperative members. The seeds produced high-quality cotton 
in a large volume that could be sold at a high price. With a higher quality and an organized 
5. See�Ymian lai mianye yunxiao hezuoshe zhidao gongzuo' (The Direction of Business of the Cotton 
Marketing Cooperative in This Year), mXCJS, ibid. 
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cooperative to maintain supply, some large cotton mills signed long-term contracts with the 
cooperative. They offered not only higher prices but agreed to bear the cost of transportation. 
These terms of trade were impossible for individual peasants，no matter how high the quality 
cotton produced. Apart from the profit earned from cotton trade, members could borrow funds 
from the Bank ofChina through the cooperative at a very low interest rate. That was exceptionally 
important, as the cost ofborrowing in rural China was usually high. In addition, as the cooperative 
was run on a non-profit making basis, profit to the middleman was kept to a minimal. The 
cooperative was closely monitored by the RRM organizers to avoid the cooperative staff to 
defraud the peasants on the quality and weight of cotton products. As the cooperative soon got a 
reputation in supplying products of good quality, its bargaining power over the selling price 
increased. However, peasants' continue involvement in the cooperative depended on the high 
retum and the low interest loan offered. They agreed to sell their cotton products through the 
cooperative only for the benefits offered. The amount of product they agreed to pass to the 
cooperative was in proportion to the low interest loan obtained. As a result, most ofthe profits had 
to cover the loan interest and repayment of the principle and the use of funds was also restricted by 
the banks6. ^^ addition, it was difficult to maintain the level of "collectiveness" across all 
members of the cooperative. In the production cooperatives, selfish peasants cheated the 
cooperatives by mixing low-quality products with the high-quality ones. One major task ofthe 
cooperative staffwas to keep close supervision over product quality. There were many disputes 
between cooperative staff and members over thejudgement on product quality. Species ofcotton 
with a poorer quality were found mixed with the Toris cotton and sent to the Cotton Marketing 
Cooperative. Sometimes, even wet cotton was added to increase the weight. It was the task of 
6. See 'Yinian lai mianye yunxiao hezuoshe zhidao gongzuo' (The Direction of Business of the Cotton 
Marketing Cooperative in This Year), inXCJS, Vol.5, no. 11 and 12, 12 Feb 1936. 
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cooperative staff to check the quality of cotton received. There were also many disputes over the 
assessment ofthe quality. The Experiment Farm of the Research Institute had to prepare samples 
of cotton with various quality standards to be displayed on the transaction desk to let the peasants 
measure themselves to reduce disputes?. 
Besides the problems of monitoring product quality, the cooperatives were still hindered 
by several difficulties. Firstly, as the number of cooperatives expanded, monitoring tasks ofthe 
RRM organizers were hard to carry out. ki addition, the village school and xiang school were 
expected to work side by side with the cooperatives and perform mobilization and organization 
functions. However, due to low participation rate to the school organized programs, they failed to 
do so. The cooperatives had to share the organizing work. Its functions became overloaded and 
the final result was greatly affected. In addition, as the peasants participation in the cooperatives 
were highly related to the amount of products that they sold through the cooperatives and the 
production volume of the products dropped, their participation decreased as well. The amount of 
agricultural products however largely depended on the appropriate weather condition and the 
market situation. In 1936, Zhouping had a dry spring. The lack of rainfall and water supply 
delayed the sowing ofseeds and hence affected the cooperative's business. As the peasants got no 
products to send to the cooperatives, the number of cooperative membership dropped. When the 
RRM organizers planned to build an irrigation system in the villages, there were very few 
supports. As it was not directly related to their individual benefit, the peasants found less interest 
to participate in those programs^. 
7 See�Yinian lai mianye yunxiao hezuoshe zhidao gongzuo' (The Direction of Business of the Cotton 
Marketing Cooperative in This Year), 'mXCJS, ibid. 
8. �Yinian lai mianye yunxiao hezuoshe zhidao gongzuo, (The Direction of Business of the Cotton Marketing 
Cooperative in This Year), 'mXCJS, ibid. 
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The aim of the cooperatives was to improve peasants' wealth and cultivate a collective 
sense among them. However, it could not be a long-term policy. Income generated from 
production and trading was not enough to release subsistence pressure from all peasants. The ones 
who received the greatest benefit were the rich and middle peasants who could afford larger loans 
to increase their volume of production. The majority peasants who were really poor hardly 
benefited. The differentiated benefit to different groups of peasants did not help to build up a 
collective sense among the peasants. As the relationship between peasants and the cooperatives 
was built on peasants' self-oriented motives, it was difficult to tum it into a collective mind. 
Providing material incentives could only attract the peasants to participate but not to transform 
their attitudes. 
The LRM in westem Fujian also involved the application of material incentives. When 
the Red Army defeated the KMT troops and occupied a city or a town, material incentives were 
given to the people there on a selective basis. Those who had actively participated in LRM 
activities and those had helped the Red Army were awarded. Li Zhangping, when the Red Army 
occupied the county town, Chen Baituan who helped the Red Army to identify the big bullies in 
the town were rendered properties confiscated from the bullies^. 
When the Red Army occupied a new place, a mass assembly would be convened. Li the 
meeting, the policies ofLRM would be announced. For the peasants, however, the attraction was 
not the talks or shows in the meeting but the distribution of properties confiscated after the 
assembly. When the Forth Red Army occupied Zhangping, such assembly had attracted many 
local residents. Those who had participated had the right to take a share from the confiscated 
9. See Chen Baiyuan, 'Canyu hongsijun zai Zhangping de geming huodong de huiyi, (Memories on Participating in the 
Revolutionary Activities ofthe Forth Red Army in Zhangping), in ZPWSZL, Vol.6, Dec 1984, p.8. 
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properties of the rich. Not every participant got the same amount of the property. Those who gave 
the greatest support and assistance to the Red Army gained the largest piece^^. 
Besides the material interest selectively distributed to the peasants, LRM organizers also 
assigned political resources to those loyal peasant organizations of formal or informal nature. The 
LRM organizers would distribute weapons to the village Red Guards (chiweidui), which helped 
the Red Army to defeat the local warlords. As the possession of weapons represented the 
possession of political power, the allocation of weapons represented the allocation of political 
power, hi Red Earth village Qiongdicun), a village in Ting River in Changting County, the village 
Red Guards helped the Red Army to break into a local bully's castle. The captain of the Red 
Guards got injured during a battle against the bully. He successfully destroyed a machine gun and 
removed a great threat to the Red Army. After the bullies were defeated, the captain was 
personally awarded. Although there was a shortage of weapons and bullets, each Red Army 
soldier was ordered to donate one bullet to the Red Guard. The Red Guard's military as well as 
political power was greatly strengthened with these additional bullets. A team ofwell-armed Red 
Guard would become the most powerful organized peasant team in the area^^ 
In addition, political power was assigned through the set-up of soviet councils. Organizers 
hoped to establish an institutionalized link between the mass peasant and the soviet government. 
The council was responsible for policy decisions and monitoring the administrative execution of 
their duties. Since the people's representatives and elected officers could enjoy many privileges 
and had a real influence over government policies, the competition was keen. Subject to approval 
10. See Guo Xuefeng, Qiu Shuicai and Huang Han, 'Hongsijun jinjun zhangping chuji minzhong' (The Red 
Army Marched to Zhangping and Attacked Central Fujian), in ZPWSZL, Vol.3, Dec 1982, p.2. 
11. See Xiao Xiao, 'Zidan de gushi' (The Story ofBullets), in Longyan dequ wenhuaju and Longyan junfenqu 
zhengzhi bu, eds, Tingjiang Chiweidui (The Ting River Red Guards), Fujian: Renmin chubanshe, 1978, 
p.l-14. 
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by the CCP Central Government on the qualification, council members were elected by the 
peasants. The landlords and rich peasants were not allowed to participate in the soviet council 
elections although they were very keen to influence the result of the election. Only those poor 
peasants who actively participated in LRM activities qualified for election. The majority of 
peasants, they were ignorant of the election. They were not familiar with the candidates and the 
rules of election. They were reluctant to attend the election meetings and told the election 
organizers that they would follow the LRM leader's instructions and vote for the chosen candidate. 
12 
If there was no clear indication, they did not know how to vote . 
Loyalty to LRM was not solely constructed through selective distribution ofmaterial and 
political interests. Sentimental force was also important in maintaining loyalty of peasants. 
Personal care offered by the LRM leaders was directed to those loyal peasants. It was a great 
honor for the peasants to receive greetings from some important figureheads. Chen Baoyin's 
family was a Red Army contact family (jietouhu) in a village at the border ofLongyan, Nanjing, 
and Zhangping in westem Fujian. As a contact family, Chen was responsible for sheltering the 
CCP revolutionaries and protecting them from the arrest ofKMT troops. Chen had hid Red Army 
leaders including Deng Zihui and Wei Jingshui several times against White Army search. Chen 
was also responsible for sending messages and information to the Red Army. Although the KMT 
government had declared that it would kill all family members if any member served the Red 
Army, Chen never stopped carrying out his duties. Li return, Deng Zihui personally wrote to Chen 
and sent him clothes as admitting the close relationship they had. When Chen's cousin died saving 
12. �Minxi xuanju yundong zhong de chengji' (The Result of the Election Movement in westem Fujian), in 
HSZH, Mar23 1932, p.7. 
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Red Army troops from the attack of White Army, Deng Zihui felt very sad and expressed his 
. 12 
deepest sympathy to Chen's family . 
LRM leaders' attitude towards those loyal peasant followers was widely promoted all over 
the revolutionary area. As a result of demonstration effects, peasants were willing to give support 
to the Red Army. However, in giving this kind of support, peasants expected a return of either 
material or social benefits. Peasants felt that they were doing business with the LRM organizers 
while their support was exchanged for benefits. To keep up this kind of support, LRM organizers 
had to generate financial resources continuously to "buy" peasants support. There was a period in 
which economic development of the soviet base was emphasized. 
The westem Fujian Revolutionary Base was basically an agricultural economy. Economic 
development also meant high level of agricultural production. To promote economic growth, land 
redistribution was LRM's core policy to improve the amount of agricultural production as well as 
to increase the wealth of the peasants. How land was distributed would affect the economic 
performance ofthe soviet base and peasants' income. However, economic considerations were 
not the sole consideration on the way of distribution ofland. Peasant's wishes had to be taken into 
account as well. Although the ideal Communist way of production was the collective way which 
was believed to be the best way to increase the level of production, it was abandoned as it was 
against peasants' wishes and disturbed their established production habits. With the land 
redistribution experience in Xinan, Deng Zihui decided to redistribute the land on the basis of 
causing minimum disturbance to the peasants. This was also in line with the peasants' wishes, i.e. 
in accordance to peasants' small tradition. As a result, only few large landlords' land was 
redistributed to the land-less peasants. If the peasants were formerly tenants, they were allowed to 
13. See Chen Baoyin, 'Jianku de licheng, nanwang de suiyue' (Hard Experience and Unforgettable Times), in 
ZPWSZL, Vol.l, Sept 1982, p.9-15. 
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keep the piece of land they currently farmed. Those owner peasants were allowed to continue 
work on their own land. The landlords were also allowed to keep a plot of land to support their 
own living. Hence, most land was owned by peasants who worked on it continuously. This 
minimized peasants' resistance, which could otherwise tum to be a serious adverse effect to 
agricultural production. After the redistribution, most peasants owned a piece ofland. Peasants' 
production goals were raised. As the amount of agricultural products increased, the peasants' 
income increased. Increased material gain to the peasants further aroused their support to LRM^ .^ 
In addition, many production and consumption cooperatives were set up. The production 
cooperatives were to facilitate the collective use of basic factors of production including farm 
cattle and ploughs. Labor teams were also formed to help those in need, bi addition, the 
consumption cooperatives were to facilitate the buying and selling of peasants' domestic products. 
As a collective buyer and seller, the cooperatives reduced the middleman's fee and gained extra 
benefits for the peasants. Grain Adjustment Bureau was also set up in various counties to balance 
the seasonal and regional fluctuations of grain price. The bureaus operated by buying grain during 
harvest seasons at a relatively higher-than-average market price and selling grain back to the 
peasants in starving months at original price or lower-than-average market price. It greatly helped 
the peasants to resist famine. The LRM organizers also led peasants to open up wasteland. Extra 
farmland gained was distributed to those in need^^ All these newly set-up peasant alliances were 
aimed to substitute the existing peasant organizations and to promote maximum cooperation 
among the peasants. It was hoped that the peasants could cultivate a collective mind when 
14. Jiang Boyin, Minxi geming gengjudi shi (The History of westem Fuj ian Revolutionary Base), Fuzhou: Fuj ian 
Renmin chubanshe, 1987, p.69. 
15. Jiang, ibid, p.117-124 and p.237-246. 
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participating in these alliances and through the process in which their views of life could be 
changed. 
Although the Central Soviet Government's policies were all targeted at the maximum 
cooperation among the peasants and among different areas, the cooperatives and the Grain 
Adjustment Bureaus were not free to exercise their power. In some villages, the peasants and the 
LRM leaders with a local background had held the "image oflimited good" and refused to transfer 
grain and other essential factors of production out of their village. Although there might be a 
surplus supply of farm cattle, they could not be borrowed from or bought by other villages. 
Similarly, grain could not be sold below the market price to the outsiders. The practice blocked 
the circulation of economic resources in the soviet area and hindered the total amount of 
agricultural production^^. 
LRM leaders gradually realized that merely depending on material benefits to mobilize the 
peasants could only attract the peasants to participate in LRM but not to transform their view of 
life. The transformation of peasants' views depended on non-material input. As Mao Zedong 
once acknowledged, the successful expansion of the Red Army had to depend on both material 
incentives and political mobilization^^. Material incentives could induce peasants to support the 
LRM but the support was based on the attitude to exchange something in return and did not come 
from the heart. There were some cases in which Red Army soldiers were recruited through solely 
material incentives, such as providing money or grain. In return, they often deserted or even 
tumed to the White Army^ .^ Merely using material incentive did start peasants participating in the 
16. See�Duiyu chungeng zhong zhi gengnu liangshi wenti dejueyi' (Decision to Solve the Shortage Problems of 
Farm Cattle and Food), in HSZH, Vol.l4, Mar 16 1932, p.6. 
口. Mao, 'Caixi xiang diaochai', ibid. 
18. Jinquan,�Qiaomiao de kuangda hongjun fangfa' (Ridiculous Ways to Expand the Red Army), in HSZH, 
Vol.l4,6Marl932, p.8. 
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movement but did not change their view of life. To transform peasants' views, their views were 
confronted by various political propaganda campaigns. 
6.2 Institutional Transformation of Peasant View of Life 
When the movement organizers discovered that the exchange of material and social 
benefits for peasants' support was inadequate to transform peasant view of life, it was 
supplemented by longer-term institutional efforts. 
In Zhouping, it was carried out in school centers, youth training programs and selfdefense 
programs. At the beginning of the programs, young peasants involuntarily participated and later 
became deeply involved. They formed various groups and became the major force ofRRM. With 
their continuous efforts to transform the villages, the peasant community in Zhouping changed. 
The LRM in westem Fujian organized peasants into different peasant groups including the Red 
Guards, the Youth Pioneer Groups, the Children's Team and the Women Groups. Through 
participation in these groups, peasants changed their view oflife. 
The core organizational effort to cultivate collectivism among the peasants in Zhouping 
was the setting-up ofvarious school centers. Fourteen xiang school centers and 366 village school 
centers were set up. The centers were not simply educational institutions. They substituted for 
various government administrative levels and shared administrative functions ofthe county. The 
District Offices and Village Offices {qugongsuo and cungongsuo) of the former local government 
were abolished and substituted by the school centers. The xiang heads and village heads were 
replaced school heads, school directors and teachers. The school heads and directors were 
selected on the basis ofreputation in the villages and their moral standards. It was to ensure their 
support and avoid unnecessary resistance. The teachers, who were recruited locally, graduates 
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from the Rural Reconstruction Institute. They were assumed to be most familiar with the theories 
ofRural Reconstruction and possessed the essential skills. Aside from the school directors and 
teachers, all the students ofthe school centers came from the mWdigQS>lxiangs. Theoretically, all 
members ofthe villages/x/flrwg5 were students of the school centers. Zhouping was then a large 
village school ki this school, administrative reforms were carried out and the aim was to 
substitute the bureaucratic structure with more flexible, humanized and organized school centers. 
Persuasion, rather than administrative order, was used to manage the people there. People no 
longer had to follow the instructions and regulations but were encouraged to participate in 
collective affairs voluntarily. In each school center, there were Education Division, 
Administration Division, and Planning and Development Division. The Administration Division 
was responsible for the daily operational tasks of the village including the flow of population, 
self-defense, production and cooperation. The Planning and Development Division was 
responsible for the design and planning of large-scale programs. The Education Division was 
divided into the Adults Department, Women's Department and Children's Department. All age 
groups were in theory members of a department. These Departments provided both formal and 
informal education to the peasants and tried to organize them to form concrete collective bodies to 
carry out large collective projects^^. However, when the Rural Reconstructionist began to set up 
school centers in Zhouping, the villagers were very unresponsive to the programs. They did not 
have any obligation to join the center-organized activities. As voluntary participation ofpeasants 
was emphasized by the RRM organizers at the initial stage, without any incentives or threats, the 
peasants did not care about whether they were "students" of the school center. 
19. Shandong xiangcunjianshe yanjiuyuan chubangu (The Shandong Rural Reconstruction Institute, Publication 
Unit), Shandong Xiangcun Jianshe Yanjiuyuan ji Zhouping Shiyanqu Gaikuang (Shandong Rural 
Reconstruction Institute and the Zhouping Experimental District), Shandong: 1936, p.79. 
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When Chen Kangpu tried to set up village school center in Wei Village, he found the 
peasants quite unresponsive to joining the school center. Out of the population of 627 male and 
529 female peasants, only 56 joined the courses. Their level of education varied from totally 
illiterate to those who had more than five years of learning experience. In the courses, current 
news, "spiritual training" (jinshen taolian), basic reading skills and simple calculation with an 
abacus were taught. However, the peasants were not interested in the course content. Those who 
had many years of learning experience would find the course too simple; those who were 
completely illiterate found it too difficult to leam. In addition, they lacked discipline. They were 
present and absent in a random manner. Some came late and some left before the lesson ended. 
The RRM organizers had found it difficult to teach a class of "floating students". The relationship 
between the teachers and the students was bad. Both of them had no sense ofbelonging to the 
school, not to mention the cultivation of solidarity and collectivism. Another RRM organizer, Bai 
Feishi started a village school center in He Village. Out of the population of965 villagers, 120 
males joined the Adults Department and 20 females the Women's Department. Bai found that 
very few villagers attended the lessons regularly. Only an old man aged 80 attended every lesson. 
He found that as most villagers were small owner peasants, they had to work in the fields nearly 
every day in order to meet their subsistence needs. It was just too hard for them to spare any time 
to attend the courses or other activities organized by the school center regularly^^. 
Under those circumstances, the RRM workers tried to form mobile teaching units which 
traveled around the villages to seek every opportunity to deliver lessons to the villagers when they 
took a break. Unfortunately, this kind of delivery education service was also ineffective. As the 
20. See Chen Kangpu, ^Weijiazhuang cunxue gongzuo zhi zibai' (The Account of Works carried out in the 
Village School Centre ofWei Village), in XCJS, Vol.4, no.29,21 Jun 1935 and Bai Feishi,�Hejiacun cunxue 
gongzuo huigutan' (Review ofWorks Carried out in the Village Centre ofHe Village), 'mXCJS, Vol.4, no.28, 
1 Jun 1935. 
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peasants did not feel they were attending a class when listening to a mobile lesson, they did not 
recognize any collective body they belonged to. The RRM workers had also been given not 
enough time to speak to them and make a closer relationship^^ 
It seemed that on a completely voluntary basis, the peasants would not participate in any 
RRM programs. They had real difficulties getting released from heavy fieldwork to attend the 
school center and found the courses useless. They did not find it necessary to leam many words or 
to know about the county or nation or the theories ofRRM. What they needed to know was how to 
produce grain and plow land. They were not willing to study seemingly irrelevant materials to 
their life experience. In front ofthese peasants bearing with no intention to leam, RRM workers 
could do nothing. 
Soon, the Rural Reconstmctionist changed the voluntaristic principle and forced young 
peasants to join the courses. Although the RRM workers still believed that peasants' voluntary 
participation in the organizations was the best result ofRRM, they found it ineffective to let the 
peasants make decisions themselves. Some kinds of compulsory arrangements had to be 
implemented to force the peasants to become organized. Referring to past experience, the old 
village leaders were reluctant to change. RRM workers tumed to mobilize the youth group who 
was the most active group in the villages. Li 1933, a pilot training program was conducted. Every 
one ofthe 14 xiangs was required to send four young peasants to the program. Two was finally 
chosen. After four months ofcomprehensive training, they were sent back to their villages to start 
training programs there and made themselves to become trainers ofother villagers. 
21. h\ Wei Village, Chen found peasants would stop to listen to what he said. If they were not interested, they 
soon left. As peasants' interests were diversified, it was impossible to attract every one ofthem. There was no 
guarantee on the number ofattendance. Chen found itjust difficult to communicate with the floating student 
population. There was no chance to taUc to the villagers directly and it was impossible to cultivate any 
concrete relationship with them. See Chen, ^Weijiazhuang cunxue gongzuo zhi zibai', ibid. 
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In winter ofthe same year, a large-scale centralized training program was organized. Two 
young peasants in every lu (each consisted of 25 families) were sent to join the program. A total 
number of 1,200 young peasants were joined together to undergo a four-month training program. 
It was a quasi-military program. They were assigned into various teams. No two youths from the 
same village would be on the same team. It was aimed to break up their localistic and familial 
values. They had to follow very strict discipline. The course content was very comprehensive 
which included spiritual training, rural reconstruction theory, problems of the village, the ways run 
cooperatives, laws and regulations, military knowledge and ability to read. After the training 
program, the young peasants went back to their villages to organize similar programs there^^. 
In 1934, the youth training program expanded to cover all of Zhouping country. With only 
a few exceptions, youths between the age of 16 to 25 were required to participate in the training 
programs. A total of 8,589 young peasants were recruited. They underwent a comprehensive 
program including the training of agricultural techniques, management of cooperatives, basic 
calculation and reading skills, military knowledge, health care information and current news. At 
the beginning, the youth found it alienated to be recruited under the training programs. They left 
their families, which was a rare experience for most of the young peasants. However, they soon 
became involved in collective style ofliving and also became addicted to the training programs. 
They were afraid of shooting at the beginning but when they became familiar with the raffles, they 
found shooting very exciting. They were once very afraid of the bandits that attacked the villages 
occasionally. After shooting practice, they felt empowered and even hoped the bandits would 
come to give them the opportunity to test their shooting skills^l The young peasants also 
22. Li Nai, ^Zhouping emian lai de xiangcun qinnian xunlian zhi wojian' (My Opinion on the Two Years Village 
Youth Training Programmes), mXCJS, Vol.5, no.lO, 30 Dec 1935. 
23. See Li Nai, 'Zhouping emian lai de xiangcun qinnian xunlian zhi wojian' (My Opinion on the Two Years 
Village Youth Training Programmes), in XCJS, ibid. 
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developed close relations with the trainers and each other. After the training period, their relations 
were maintained. When they came back to their home villages, the connections became an 
effective network that allowed the Rural Reconstruction Programs to be carried out^ .^ 
As a new event in the village, the programs were not welcomed by the conservative 
villagers. The rich peasants were not willing to send their sons to attend the strict training 
programs. The employers did not want to release their employees to be trained. The handicraft 
masters did not want their students' normal learning and working schedule to be changed. Native 
villagers did not want the settlers who came from other provinces to be trained. They were afraid 
that the trained outsiders would become more competitive for scarce resources. The older 
generation did not want the youth to be trained. They were afraid that their authority might be 
threatened25. j^^ f^ars were actually fear of change in general. As the programs changed the 
views ofthe young peasants, they became a challenge to the peasants' small tradition. Those who 
felt responsible sustaining the small tradition would surely oppose the changes. 
After the training programs, the young peasants not only changed their villages, but also 
changed themselves. They felt very proud of themselves. They began to be dissatisfied with their 
lives in the poor villages. They hoped to improve their living standard as well as to broaden their 
social networks. They were dissatisfied with the village power structure which the elderly 
occupied the top positions. Some ofthem even fought with the older generation. Conflict broke 
up in the "peaceful" villages. Although most of the peasants still held the "peasants' view of 
limited good", the post-training young generation represented the hope of the village on future 
prosperity. They tightened their future prospect with the future development ofthe village. They 
24. Li, ibid. 
25. Li, ibid. 
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felt that it was their responsibility to protect the village and eager to help its development. The 
collective mind substituted the "image oflimited good". 
RRM organizers were realistic in trying to transform not the whole village but a group of 
the most potential peasants 一 the youth. Although the young peasants were forced to join the 
training programs at the beginning, they became an organized group after the training. Their 
views oflife had changed and they became the core supporters ofRRM and became RRM's agents 
in the villages. As they were the village inhabitants, they were at the best position to lead the 
transformation movement. They became organizers of the local training programs and the heads 
ofthe self-defense teams. Through their tremendous efforts to implement further transformations 
of peasants' view, some fundamental values of the peasants had changed. 
A second youth training program started in 1936. 8,353 young peasants from the age of 16 
to 30 were recruited. Compared to the first training program, the second one was well prepared. 
The target and standards of every training program were clearly stated. The length of each 
program was pre-scheduled and the regulations were issued to enforce trainee's discipline. As 
tales the enjoyable experience of the first training program spread in the villages, most ofthe new 
traineesjoined the programs voluntarily. They also took the initiative to increase the standards of 
training. After ten weeks of training, most of the students became more disciplined and aware of 
the responsibilities as a member of the community and started to care about the country and nation, 
i.e., a collective mind developed^^. 
Self-defense programs were organized in the local village communities in conjunction 
with the youth training programs. Those who had undergone the compulsory training programs 
went back to their home villages to form self-defense teams. All trained young peasants became 
26. Shi Linian, 'Zhouping shiyanxian ershiwu nian chun chengnian jiaoyu de shishi' (The Implementation of 
Adult's Education at Zhouping Experiment County in Spring of 1936), in XCJS, Vol.6, no. 1，16 Aug 1936. 
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members of the teams. The teams were set up under the school centers but they enjoyed great 
autonomy. When these teams joined together, they formed the Join Village Association 
{Lianzhuanghui), which was a county level self-defense organization. When bandits were 
discovered in the area, the Join Village Association called the self-defense teams to form a strong 
armed force to fight against the bandits which were their common enemy. In peaceful times, the 
teams also had to undergo a re-training program once in each month to keep up both their physical 
fitness and military knowledge. In addition, being even more important was to maintain high 
morale among them. During the retraining programs, they would listen to the speeches conducted 
by senior Rural Reconstructionists. Sometimes, Liang Shuming would deliver the speech himself. 
The speeches served as a reminder for the trainees on the qualities of an ideal "peasant". 
Sometimes, competitions would be organized to improve their knowledge and abilities. Hi 
addition, during re-training, the young peasants took the opportunity to communicate with one 
another. Hence, along with the retraining programs, their relations were steadily improved and 
their sense ofbelonging also enhanced^^. After continuous training programs, the young peasants 
strengthened both their personality and military skills. They became very good RRM organizers. 
Their close relationships also assured the continuity of a solid peasant network. This strong team 
was capable of protecting the county from outsider attack. 
Apart from its self-defense duties, the teams also organized various programs in their own 
villages. When there was a fire, they became fire fighters; when there was flooding, they became 
lifeguards; when there were crimes, they also acted as local policeman. They were also teachers of 
the village school centers where they shared their knowledge and experience with other student 
peasants. They also conducted campaigns to fight against bad habits in the villages such as opium 
27. �Zhouping xiangcun ziwei shiyan baogao' (Report of the Self-defence Programme), in XCJS, Vol.6, no. 4’ 1 
Oct 1936. 
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smoking, gambling and drinking. The team actually became the core force in maintaining the 
village's social order and seeking the development of the villages^^ When they were released 
from the role in the self-defense teams, they were also the core members of the cooperatives and 
the self-discipline groups. After all, these organized young peasants became strong assets of 
RRM. They were the group possessing the most relevant knowledge ofRural Reconstruction and 
were the only group in the villages that developed the collective mind. With the set-up ofthese 
teams, RRM had really broken into the village community and changed the members' view oflife. 
However, most of the team members came from rich families. They were only the 
minority in the village. The majority poor peasants did not share their values. Poor peasants might 
change their behavior but it was only involuntary actions following the self-defense teams' 
instructions. The poor peasants had not changed their view of life. For the poor, the image of 
limited good still prevailed. The new moral community was set up through RRM was unreliable. 
Along with the self-defense programs, there were also self-discipline groups set up under 
the village school centers named Village Improvement Society {xiangcun gaijinhui) or Loyalty 
Club {zhongyishe). The groups were organized to curtail criminal behaviors and bad habits in the 
villages. Villagers joined the groups voluntarily. Members of the group collectively agreed on 
some rules. They kept an eye on others' behavior. Those who breached the commonly agreed 
rules would be criticized and encouraged by other members to rectify their misbehavior. Groups 
against gambling, smoking and drinking were the most common ones. Besides these correctional 
groups, there were also groups to promote good behavior and attitudes such as fulfillment offilial 
28 Wang, ibid. 
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piety, a hard working attitude and a thrifty life and the concept of mutual assistance. There were 
• 29 
also some mutual help groups such as fire fighting groups and famine relief groups . 
Apart from their specific functions, the groups helped to cultivate a collective mind among 
the peasants through group dynamics. Actually these were xiang yue (village covenant) like 
arrangements. These were the ideal institutional settings that Liang Shuming delineated in his 
Rural Reconstruction Theory. However, as participation was on a voluntary basis, the number of 
these groups was very limited. Peasants that participated in these groups were only the minority. 
For the transformation of peasants' view of life by long institutional process, the LRM in 
westem Fujian had set up peasant groups that included all peasants as members. The major one 
was of course the Red Army. The Red Army was a military troop but also the LRM organizer. 
Besides fighting with KMT troops in defending the soviet base, Red Army had marched into 
various villages to organize peasants and conducted land reforms there. As the recruitment ofRed 
Army soldiers had continued for the whole period of the CCP's occupation in westem Fujian, it 
involved the largest number of peasants' participation. Besides participating in the Red Army, 
adults alsojoined Red Guards (chiweidui); young peasants became members of the Youth Pioneer 
Group (shaoxiandui% children participated in the Children's Team {ertongtuan), women took part 
in many domestic working teams {gongzuodui) such as washing team, weaving team and farm 
team. The Red Army together with these groups performed the institutional function sustained the 
cultivation of a new peasant view of life and the formation of new peasant communities. A 
peasant's life became an organized one. Full-fledged care was provided not by clan organizations 
or other family members but by these new peasant groups. 
29. Kong Xuexiang, Zhongguo jinre zhi nongcun yundong (The Rural Movements in China Today), Shanghai: 
Zhongshan wenhuajiaoyu guan (Zhongshan Cultural Education Agent), 1934, p.25-26. 
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As all peasant groups were involved in the defense war against the attacks ofKMT troops, 
the defense wars became large-scale peasant mobilizations that involved every member in the 
villages. Red Army soldiers fought in the battlefield against the White Army. Red Guards 
defended the village against attacks from local warlords and bandits. Youth Pioneer Group and 
Children's Teams helped set up watch-guard posts and acted as messengers. Women became the 
major work force in the household and in the fields. They were also major participants in LRM 
programs and campaigns conducted in the villages. 
The recruitment of peasants to participate in Red Army and the other peasant 
organizations was not ajob without hitch. The recruitment of Red Army was the most difficult 
task as the peasants did not want to be sent away to the battlefield. The worst case was when the 
soldiers were required to march out ofFujian to attack cities in other provinces. There were many 
cases that Red Army soldiers had deserted collectively. Li a case, more than 2,700 Youth Pioneer 
Group members were recruited to join the Red Army and sent to attack cities in Guangdong 
Province. Before they arrived at the front line, more than 2,000 deserted. Desertion was not 
conducted individually but in an organized way. Even the leader of the army deserted together 
with the soldiers30. j^^ CCP front line leaders, including Mao Zedong and Deng Zihui had 
strongly objected to the Leftist's offensive strategy to send the Red Army to attack cities outside 
the soviet area. Mao and Deng had considered realistically that although the number ofpeasants 
recruited in various peasant organizations was great, their loyalty to LRM and their participation in 
the defense wars against KMT troops was partly based on their view to protect their homeland. If 
they were sent to other provinces and lost the linkage with their homeland, desertion would be 
30. See�Daipi chishao duiyuan kaixiaochai' (Many Youth Pioneer Group Members Deserted) in HSZH, Vol.66,, 
2Aprl933,p.2 
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expected. It was more practical to strengthen the soviet bases and to expand the CCP occupation 
gradually through mobilization of the general peasant mass. 
In addition, LRM leaders believed that if the Red Army men were recruited merely on a 
compulsory basis or attracted by material incentives, they would easily desert. However, 
depending on peasants' voluntary participation could not assure the number of recruitment. It was 
a dilemma for LRM organizers to recruit a large number ofRed Army soldiers on one hand and to 
avoid from depending merely on the use of material interest or coercive force. Recruitment ofRed 
Army soldiers was then usually also considered a transformation process. Only ifpeasants' views 
had changed, they could be loyal Red Army soldiers. Propaganda campaigns and persuasion 
techniques were mainly used to mobilize peasants to join the Red Army^^ Apart from these on 
going campaigns, Ml-fledged care was provided to the Red Armymen's families, not simply to 
provide material incentives to the families but because it was hoped that the family members 
would be moved by all the care provided by the LRM organizers. It was found that a more 
effective way to recruit peasants to join the Red Army should be conducted through mobilization 
oftheir whole family instead of the target individual peasant only. 
In the first Chinese soviet Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' National General Assembly, 
the police were passed to offer a series of preferential benefits to the Red Army soldiers and their 
families {hongjun jiashu). It was believed that as the core force of the CCP Revolution, the Red 
Army had contributed tremendous efforts. They were entitled to be compensated. They should be 
relieved from any worry about their family's life. The Central Soviet Government released orders 
to assure the above policy to be carried out thoroughly. It was announced that any disobedience to 
the order would be considered anti-revolutionary — the most serious offence in the soviet area. 
31. �Yiyue lai zhengli chishaodui tuji yundong kaikuang' (Brief Summary on One Months Work of the 
Mobilization Campaign ofthe Youth Pioneer Group) in HSZH, Vol.l72, 7 Apr 1934, p.l. 
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The local government was responsible to investigate the number of Red Armymen's families in 
the area. Ifthe families had any difficulties, the local Government had to release their hardship by 
providing extra land or extra helping labor force�� . When land distribution program was carried 
out, Red Armymen's families would have the right to choose a more fertile piece. In the 
production cooperatives, a labor team was set up to help the Red Armymen's families work in the 
fields free of charge. Non-Red Armymen's families might be requested to offer help to Red 
Armymen's families without charging any price. On the contrary, when members of the Red 
Armymen's families was hired by other peasants, they received above-normal returns. In the 
consumption cooperatives, the Red Armymen's families also enjoyed many advantages. They 
could buy products on credit terms. When there was a shortage of goods, they had the right to 
purchase before the others. Li famine years, the Grain Adjustment Bureau would also sold grain to 
these privileged families first. If they were really short of cash, grain could be lent to them at no 
interest. To further alleviate burdens of the Red Armymen's families, special service teams would 
be organized to help the families perform domestic duties. As a result, Red Armymen's families 
would be in a better position to develop their family wealth than other peasants would. As these 
comprehensive benefits were provided continuously, peasant families became more willing to 
send their sons or husbands to join the Red Army. In Caixi of Shanghang County, more than 
77.5% of male peasants aged between 16 and 55 joined the Red Army. Most of them were 
supported by their families. Some mothers and wives even took the initiative to send their sons or 
husbands to join the Red Army^^ 
32. �Zhixin hongjun youdai tiaoli de gezhong banfa' (Methods to Execute the Regulations to Provide Preferential 
Benefits to the Red Armymen), in HSZH, Vol.8, 3 Feb 1932, p.8. 
33. See Mao Zedong,�Caixi ang diaochaf (Research on Caixi Xiang), in Mao Zedong, Nongcun Diaochai 
Wenji, Beijing: Renming chubanshe, 1982, p.333-354. 
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As most male members of the familiesjoined the Red Army, the female members became 
the major force in agricultural production and promotion ofLRM programs in the local villages. 
They became the major target group ofLRM mobilization. They were trained to use farming tools 
and few technologies. The number of women who knew how to farm cattle increased ten times. 
As the major labor force in the rear area, womenjoined together to form labor teams, organized to 
produce clothes and shoes for the Red Army and formed a transportation team. They also 
participated in the local administrative structure and were elected as people's representatives. 
With their active participation, women's influence on LRM's policies increasecP. LRM's 
women's policy was also tailored to release them form the traditional marriage arrangements. In 
the soviet marriage law, women were entitled to free marriage and the right to get divorced. The 
monogamy system was upheld by Law. Marriage was forbidden before the age of 18^^ As 
• • • 36 
women's status was raised, they gained more freedom and courage to join the LRM activities . 
They soon became a major group of active peasant participants. As women's status in the families 
increased, their view oflife also gradually changed. They no longer focused only on their roles in 
the household, but on their roles in the peasant community. They became less loyal to their 
families and alleviated from the "image oflimited good". Along with changes to themselves, they 
also effected their family members' views and behaviors. As they encouraged their husbands and 
sons to join the Red Army, the recruitment figure increased tremendously. 
34. Mao, ibid. 
35. See 'Zhonghua suweiai gongheguo hunyin tiaoli' (The Marriage Law of the Chinese soviet Republic), in 
HSZH, no.2, 18 Dec 1931, p.4. 
36. 7iji fadong funu canzhan' (Mobilization ofWomen to Join the War), in HSZH, Vol.20, 25 May 1932，p.8. 
163 
As the peasants continued to participate in various peasant organizations orjoined the Red 
Army, their view of life underwent the transformation process. The transformation was not only 
based on material interests but on various political mobilization processes. 
6.3 Ideological Confrontation 
In the stages of transformation process of peasants' view of life discussed earlier, we 
learned about how the village community changed due to efforts of the LRM and RRM. So far 
during the transformation processes, "peasants' view of limited good" had not yet been directly 
confronted. In the early stages, the view was even reinforced. However, as new institutional 
networks had formed, new opportunities arose and the total village environment started to change, 
peasants found the possibilities to improve their life. The lack of future prospect was the 
underlying criteria of "peasants' image of limited good. When this underlying criterion had 
vanished, the image would then lose its efficacy. When the peasants' "image oflimited good" was 
directly confronted on the ideological battlefield, it could no longer stand strongly to defend the 
peasants' small tradition. 
Among all the training programs in Zhouping, spiritual training was consistently 
emphasized. Liang Shuming was personally responsible for the teaching of this part. The aim of 
it was to inspire the sense of care that originated from every peasant's heart {shengxin daiyuan or 
deep heartily wishes)^^. Liang thought that everyone had the sense of care. Through spiritual 
training, it would be developed. Liang's belief was the basic Confucian faith, which states that the 
nature of human being is kind and gentle. Spiritual training programs of RRM was actually a 
process of personality training aimed at developing the goodness ofaperson. Liang thought that 
37. Liang Shuming, 7insheng taolian yaozhi' (The Principles of Spiritual Training) in Liang Shuming Quanji, 
Vol.5, p.492-493. 
164 
the major part of care was to care the nation or being nationalistic {minzujinsheng). It was 
exceptionally important when Chinese nationality was in a deep crisis^l The training programs 
were led by Liang personally. He delivered speeches by himself. He talked about the future of 
China, the future of RRM and the good behavior of an ideal peasant. As a kind of personality 
training, it merged into the patterns of everyday life during the whole training period. Trainees had 
to wake up early in moming, then work and study according to a very tight schedule. In the small 
study groups, members would discuss together, criticize each other's misbehavior. There were 
also sessions requiring them to sit aside to think quietly to look into their self-mind and to develop 
the ability ofreflexivity. The life of the trainees was a kind of ascetic practice. It was hoped that 
such a difficult experience for the trainees could improve their "lixin" (reason) and moral 
standards. After the training, it was hoped that every trainee would be model peasants who was 
kind to his family, hard working, being thrifty, responsible, disciplined punctual, nationalistic, 
knowledgeable and "smart'^ ^. 
For RRM's counterparts in westem Fujian, many political propaganda activities were 
taken to promote LRM's popularity in the villages through political mobilization. Mao Zedong 
acknowledged from the very beginning of the CCP's struggle with KMT the importance ofthe Red 
Army as both a fighting troop and the propaganda team ofLRM^^. 
When the Red Army came to a new place, whether it was a newly occupied city or a 
village, mass meetings would be held. In the meetings, LRM leaders would try to explain to the 
crowds the aim ofLRM, the aim of the CCP revolution and the advantages the CCP would bring 
38. Liang, ibid, p.507-508. 
39. Wang, Xiangcen,�Ziwei xunlian yinyou de mubiao' (The Objectives of Self-defence Training), in XCJS, 
Vol.6, no.l9, 16Jun 1937. 
40. Mao Zedong,�Guanyu jiuzheng dangnei de cuowu sixiang' (On How to Correct Wrong Thoughts in the 
Party), in Mao ZedongXuanji (Selected Works ofMao Zedong), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1991, p.86. 
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to them. When the Red Army led by Chu De marched towards Zhangping and passed over 
Ningyang, a mass meeting was held. Later, when the Red Army occupied Zhangping, another 
mass meeting was held. To increase the participation of the local peasants in these meetings, 
soldiers from a special propaganda group were sent to visit the peasant households. They 
encouraged the peasants to participate in the mass meetings. During the mass meetings, Chu De 
gave speeches on the CCP revolution, class struggle and the importance of land revolution. In 
addition, the art troupe {wengongtuan) played dramas, sung songs and danced to attract the 
peasants and to foster the atmosphere. They also led the crowd to shout anti-KMT and pro-CCP 
and Land Reform slogans. The high point of the meeting was the public trial of local bullies. 
Since the selected bullies were those whom the peasants had great hatred on，the trial usually could 
arouse the crowds' enthusiasm. Although the peasants did not become loyal to the CCP 
immediately after the meetings, in terms of a first contact between the Red Army and the mass, the 
meetings were quite successful in building a clear image on LRM among the peasants^^ 
Along with the mass meetings, LRM propaganda groups were also sent to various villages. 
The group visited every peasant household and opened small forums in the peasant families 
{zuotanhui). Cai Xiaoqian who was an urban intellectual with rural background, was sent to his 
home village to promote LRM ideas. The group visited every household and tried to explain what 
Red Army could help the peasants and how LRM was successful. They organized forums to 
arouse discussions among the peasants. Cai found that the experience shared during the forums 
was quite effective in cultivating a sense of recognition among the peasants^^. The recognition 
41. See Cai Xiaoqian, Jinagxi suqu, Hongjun xicuan huiyi (Memories on Jinagxi soviet Area and Red Army's 
March to the West), Taipei: The Institute of the Study of Chinese Communist Problems, 1970, p.20. 
42. See Cai Xiaoqian, Jinagxi suqu, Hongjun xicuan huiyi, ibid, p. 17. 
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was not based on clan origin, but common life situations. The new "we" feeling was further 
related to the LRM as it was said to improve the life situation of the peasants. 
hi the soviet area, the political propaganda campaigns were unrelenting. Large-scale 
political campaigns and daily conducted education programs were numerous. The large-scale 
political campaigns usually served the double objective of promoting LRM thoughts and 
mobilizing the peasants. In addition, there were also occasional meetings when those 
revolutionaries from the white area came to the soviet base. Orientation parties would be held. In 
those parties, the revolutionaries from White Army area would introduce how bad the life in 
KMT-controlled area was and contrast the good life in the soviet area. In a welcoming party 
organized for Cai Xianqian, Cai had a strong feeling that the aim of the party was actually to 
contrast peasants' lives in the White area with life in the soviet base. They were encouraged to tell 
stories and experience on how the imperialist and KMT had exploited people in White area. They 
usually expressed their delight over the advance development in the soviet base^^. Cai and the 
other guests actually served propaganda functions to degenerate peasants' image on life under 
KMT's rule and at the same time to increase loyalty to the soviet rule. 
It was always LRM's objective to arouse class consciousness and nationalistic feeling 
among the peasants. However, for the peasants, the idea of class conflict and nationalism were 
strange and detached. They could understand only who were friends and who were enemies. To 
demonstrate the abstract concepts, the Red Army propaganda group prepared a series of dramas 
which symbolized imperialist and landlords. The imperialists and landlords were described as in 
alliance to exploit the peasants. These dramas were supplemented with many slogans and songs to 
express the impeded meanings. Carried with the dramas, songs and slogans, the propaganda 
43. See Cai Xiaoqian, Jinagxi suqu, Hongjun xicuan huiyi, ibid, p.20. 
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group traveled around the soviet area to promote the revolutionary message^^. Although peasants 
were seldom in contact with the imperialists and hardly knew the concept of exploitation, by 
getting the message from the dramas, they would link their poor lives as a result ofthe alliance 
between the landlords and imperialists. Even they did not get the point, they might believe that in 
order to improve their lives, there had to be something to do with the landlords and imperialists. 
For those slogans, although the peasants might not understand the abstract message 
contained, the LRM organizers tried to make sure that they at least remember the words. There 
were inspection spots set up by the Children's Team to check the people passed through. Their 
responsibility was to ensure that people could read the slogans. Those who could not read the 
words were ordered to leam at once^^ It was hoped by the LRM organizers that by getting the 
wordings in their mind, the peasants would one day realize their meanings. 
The Red Army's position to fight against the Japanese invasion was promoted as a strong 
nationalistic stand. Although there was no real threat of Japanese invasion in westem Fujian, 
LRM organizers tried to cultivate the anti-Japanese atmosphere as a means to advance 
nationalistic thoughts among the people there. In addition, as KMT retreated in front ofJapanese 
invasion, Red Army's struggle against KMT wasjustified as struggle with the traitor ofthe nation. 
In the announcement made by the CCP Central Government to declare war on Japanese, KMT 
was portrayed as capitulators to the Japanese and other foreign imperialists. The KMT 
encirclements ofthe soviet area were told to be instructed by the imperialists. Fighting against 
KMT was to defend national interest and to fight against the Japanese and imperialists invasion. 
LRM and the soviet government were described as the only anti-imperialist force. Under the 
nationalistic tone, every Red Army's battle against the KMT troops was fought for the people of 
44. Cai, ibid, p.86-87. 
45 cai, ibid, p.37. 
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China. The war against KMT was a "Nationalistic Revolutionary War" (minzu geming 
zhanzheng). Under this nationalistic banner, every Red Armyman and every CCP member carried 
a "sacred duty". What they did was for the achievement ofjustice. In 1932, the soviet government 
issued war bonds (zhanzheng gongzai) targeted to raise 600,000 yuen. Various villages, 
organizations and institutions were assigned to subscribe to certain amounts ofthe bonds by the 
Central Government. All subscriptions had to be made on a voluntary basis. Political campaigns 
were organized to promote the subscription. The subscriptions were promoted as a proud 
behavior, a concrete action to help the Red Army and an admirable action to fight against the 
imperialists and the Japanese invaders. Competitions were held among villages, organizations 
and the institutions. Those who subscribed the largest number ofbonds would be a great honor. 
The name ofthe village or people who got the highest amount of subscription would be published 
on newspaper and posted on the notice boards. Through these competitions, it was hoped to 
mobilize more peasants tojoin the subscription movement. These competitions were to substitute 
forced subscription, which might lead to great hatred. However, voluntary subscriptions did not 
apply to rich businessmen and rich peasants. They were required to subscribe. They then became 
the major group to share the financial burden^^. As the majority of the peasants did not actually 
share the burden of the subscription, the subscription then became a process to strengthen 
peasants' involvement and to promote their support to LRM and Red Army only. 
Although the LRM had organized a great deal of campaigns to promote collectiveness 
among the peasants, some peasants still withheld a self-oriented and localistic mind. In the worst 
46. See�Lmshi zhongyang zhengfu bugao' (Announcement from the Temporary Central Government) and 
'Zhonghua suweiai gongheguo linshi zhongyang zhengfii zhixin weiyuanhui xunlin' (Order ofthe Executive 
Committee, Chinese soviet Republic Temporary Central Government), in HSZH, Vol.24, 23 Jun 1932, p.5-
7 and also Zhonghua suweiai gongheguo linshi zhongyang zhengfu (Chinese soviet Republic Temporary 
Central Government),�Guanyu dongyuan duiri xuanzhan de xunling' (Announcement to Declare War to the 
Japanese) in HSZH, Vol.l8, 21 April 1932, p.5-6.. 
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cases, some peasants were found stealing public properties. As they did not have the sense of 
public, they did not feel ashamed to take away the properties. To avoid the problem, those public 
properties had to be assigned to some LRM leaders. It was hoped that the peasants would pay 
respect to or afraid of those leaders and not to take away the properties. Once, the Red Guards 
were assigned to transport some books to Reijin, the soviet Capital. Outside the boxes, it had to 
print "To Mao Zedong" to avoid Red Guard members from taking them away instead of sent them 
to Reijing47. Not only the peasants, even some soviet government officers had the same problems. 
hi some areas in Fujian, the local LRM leaders still held the localistic values. They were not 
enthusiastic about promoting the "Join the Red Army" campaign. On the contrary, they believed 
that to expand local armed force was more important than expansion of the Red Army. They even 
wrote letters to the Red Army soldiers asking them to leave the Red Army troops and return to 
their home village. They preparedjob opportunities for those retumed soldiers. Although, they 
48 
were criticized by the central government, they were still reluctant to change their attitudes . 
To avoid the spread of these localistic self-oriented peasants' view, especially to avoid its 
effect on the expansion of Red Army, the soviet government promoted correctional measures. 
Peasants were mobilized to join the Anti-Desertion Campaign (fan kaixiaochai yundong). The 
Red Armymen's mothers and wives were mobilized in the campaign to persuade their sons and 
husbands to stay in the Army. People were encouraged to criticize deserted Red Army soldiers 
who retumed home. Deserted soldiers found that they had no right in the village and were not 
welcomed by all the villagers, even their own family. The great pressure forced them to re-join the 
47. See Cai Xiaoqian, Jiangxi suqu, Hongjun xicuan huiyi, ibid, ibid, p.37-38. 
48. 'Zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui guanyu kuangdai hongjun wenti xunling' (Central Executive Committee's 
Order on Expansion ofRed Army) in HSZH, Vol.34, 20 Sept 1932，p.l-3. 
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Army49. These kinds of campaigns helped to strengthen the peasants' loyalty towards the CCP. 
The growth oflocalistic view was avoided. 
6.4 Final Episode of the Transformation Process 
In the final phase, Stage IV of transformation process of peasants' view, peasants' "image 
oflimited good" shattered. Peasants became "enlightened" They were ready to protect their own 
community, as well as to fight for the interests of the peasant class and the nation. In Zhouping, as 
Japanese troops invaded Shandong and occupied the entire province, the transformation process 
ended before its final episode. RRM came to an end in 1937. In westem Fujian, when the soviet 
base was attacked by the KMT troops, most peasants joined the Red Army or were organized into 
various teams to fight against the KMT troops. We will see how RRM ended before reaching its 
final stage of transformation first in the following part. 
There were always hidden anxieties over the RRM programs in Zhouping. Li Nai, an 
RRM organizer thought that whether it was the government or the Rural Reconstmctionist that 
held the final responsibility for training was very important. As the government assisted the 
programs, Li was afraid that the trained young peasants (the Self-defense Teams) had to follow the 
government's orders. They might be ordered by the government to fight in wars or carry out state 
policies in the area. If it was the case, the Self-defense Teams would not be an autonomous 
collective body. On the other hand, ifRRM workers held the training programs, they would lack 
political power and the necessary financial resources. It would be impossible for them to organize 
49. ^Zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui guanyu kuangdai hingjun wenti xunling' (Central Executive Committee's 
Order on the Expansion ofRed ArmyX in HSZH Vol.34, 20 Sept 1932, p.1-3 and�Youshi yige mofan de 
guidui yundong' (Another Model Case ofRetum to Red Army Movement), in HSZH, Vol. 147，9 Feb 1934’ 
p . l . . 
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any programs without the government's assistance. Li hoped that the government could support 
the RRM workers without any other kinds of intervention and restrictions^^. 
Unfortunately, the KMT government never released its control over the Self-defense 
Teams. What was worried by Li Nai happened when the Japanese invaded Shandong. Han Fuqu, 
the KMT Chairman of Shandong Province ordered the quasi-military Self-defense Teams to 
retreat in ahead ofthe Japanese invasion ofl937. The villagers thought that the youth team should 
protect the villages and their sons should not be taken away. When the self-defense teams were 
forced to leave the villages, the villagers became very angry. They accused the RRM organizers of 
cheating the peasants. The angry peasants burnt the school centers and killed the school directors. 
The image of RRM was completely mined and came ended in the villages of Shandong^^ 
Unfortunately RRM did not end because of the Japanese invasion but because of the KMT policy. 
RRM organizers were dismissed. Some joined KMT and some joined the guerrilla force led by 
the CCP. Although Liang wanted to put the RRM force together again to restart RRM projects, he 
found it impossible, as there were fights and battles everywhere in China. Without the protection 
of any armed force, it was even difficult to travel. 
The RRM tried to adopt in Zhouping an "everyday form of transformation". Through the 
school centers peasants were expected to leam some ”daoli” (reason) every day. Through the 
cooperative, peasants would leam how to cooperate with other members in production. Under the 
monitoring of the Self-defense Team, good habits were to be cultivated. In the self-discipline 
groups, with mutual assistance, a spirit of care was to be built. Through the continued interaction 
and encouragement, peasants were hoped to change day by day. After the long process, 
50. Li, 'Zhouping emian lai de xiangcun qinnian xunlian zhi wojian', ibid. 
51. It seems that ifRRM organizers have control over the Self-defence Teams, they would be able to defend the 
villages against Japanese invasion. Even if they were defeated, they would not lose the hearts ofthe peasants. 
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collectivism was to be built and peasants' view of "image oflimited good" gradually eliminated. If 
RRM in Zhouping had not ended in 1937, all these things might have happened. However, in 
1920s and 1930s China, there was no peaceful environment for long-term development projects 
such as RRM to thrive. The failure ofRRM was not due to incorrect approaches or programs, but 
because of the social condition that did not facilitate RRM to succeed. 
In westem Fujian, after continuous mobilization (by using both material and non-material 
incentives) and organization processes, the soviet base was mobilized. All peasants became 
members of various peasant organizations. The peasants were members of the quasi-military 
groups and hard-working peasants. They acted as stand guards, messengers and inspection team 
members for the Red Army. As they were the local inhabitants, they were also familiar with the 
terrain and the people. They helped the Red Army to set up guard posts on the hilltops to provide 
surveillance over the KMT troops. In working closely with the Red Army, they defended the 
52 * c*i 
soviet base in four KMT directed encirclement and suppression movements . In the Fifth 
Encirclement Movement in 1934, Jiang Jieshi organized more than 500,000 KMT troops to attack 
the soviet base. The Red Army was defeated by the KMT troops. The Red Army as well as the 
soviet government had to flee the area. The local soviet government turned underground and 
formed guerrilla forces to continue the struggle against KMT and to protect the peasants' 
interests53. 
The Red Army soldiers who were local peasants had to depart their home villages with the 
Red Army. Unlike the peasants in Zhouping, there were no strong objections from the local 
peasants for their sons and husbands to leave. On the contrary, the locals fully supported the Red 
Army's defense against KMT troops. The villagers also supported the guerrilla forces 
52. Cai Xiaoqian, Jinagxi suqu, Hongjun xicuan huiyi, ibid, p.33-34. 
53 Jiang Boyin, Mirvci gemin gnegjudi shi (History of the westem Fuj ian Revolutionary Base), ibid. 
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continuously. They also assisted the guerrilla force to continue the struggle against the local 
landlords and warlords. The peasants adopted the "White skin and red heart" strategy {hongpi 
haixin) which pretended to support the KMT government in public and helped the CCP guerrilla 
force s e c r e t l y 5 4 . Peasants' loyalty to the LRM and to their local community was proved. Their 
strong support was the result of previous LRM efforts in westem Fujian. Through the 
transformation process ofLRM, peasants' views oflife in westem Fujian changed from an "image 
of limited good" to an enlightened one. The Stage W of the transformation process of the 
peasants' view was achieved. Peasants affiliated their future prospect with the success of LRM 
and the CCP Revolution in General. Although the Red Army was defeated in 1934, the peasants 
still hoped the Red Army one day would come back to the area. It was not simply because they 
hoped the Red Army could bring them material benefits but the Red Army became members of 
their moral community and peasants were engaged with the Red Army. Red Army's future 
success also meant progress in their lives. 
In the RRM's and LRM's mobilization of peasants, a comprehensive package ofmaterial 
incentives was provided. They were also supplemented by a coercive force. On the other hand, it 
was insufficient to transform peasants' view oflife merely to provide material incentives or threats 
ofpunishment. They had to be supplemented by introduction of new values and beliefs. In RRM's 
work in Zhouping the Confucian beliefs were instilled through the spiritual training programs. In 
westem Fujian, it was the CCP nationalistic revolutionary thoughts promoted in various political 
propaganda campaigns. Both value systems emphasized the importance ofcare ofthe community, 
the nation and the country. Altruistic behavior was encouraged. Loyalty of RRM/LRM was 
praised. These values werejust at the opposite end of peasants' "image oflimited good". From the 
54. Zhang Dincheng, Deng Zihui and Tam Zhenglin,�Minxi sannian youji zhanzheng' (Three Years Guerrilla 
Warfare in westem Fujian) mXinhuo liaoyuan, Vol.4, Beijing: Zhanshi chubanshe, 1980，p.208. 
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result of the transformation process, it was proved that peasants' views could be totally 
transformed from one end to the another. Peasants were conservative but also could be 
revolutionary. These were the conditions of their lives, the people they interacted and the new 
values and beliefs that they adopted as the essential elements for the transformation. 
The LRM's strategy was to involve peasants in every aspect of their daily lives within the 
assistance as well as under the surveillance of the CCP. As time passed, one could not survive 
without some relationships with the LRM. If the RRM had been allowed to expand the duties of 
the self-defense team, they probably would have adopted a similar approach. 
The RRM workers wanted to rebuild social order in the villages and xiangs. However, 
there seemed no such order and organization never existed. The abolishment of the state apparatus 
did not mean the break-up of community (if it really existed) could restore its shape. On the other 
hand, ifthere was no "former, organized peasant community", inviting those old village heads to 
act as leaders in the new community did not help set it up. Hence, it was impossible to rebuild 
either old or new peasant communities. If RRM really wanted to build a new community, new 
elements had to be implemented. Old village leaders should be replaced rather than to confirm 
their positions, hi addition, if there was no peasants' organization ever existed, the peasants would 
just be isolated families. They were not ready to be gathered into a peasant community. Calling 
them students ofthe school center did not mean they would agree and accept the role. Peasants' 
minds would not changejust for their names changing from peasants to "students". Incentives had 
to be provided to induce their participation in the new community. The hope for their voluntary 
participation was only an innocent wish. 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 
7.1 Collective Action through Transformation: Change of Peasant's View 
According to most studies, the peasant view is always a contradictory one. Peasants are 
said to be "potatoes in a sack forming a sack of potatoes" that "cannot represent themselves and 
must be represented. Their representatives must at the same time appear as their masters, as an 
authority over them"i. They were the major actors in "Vietnam battlefields and India's poverty, 
Latin American guerrillas, Africa's stagnation and China's 'Great Leap’"�. Peasants have been 
described as conservative, innocent and stubborn. Yet they have actively participated in 
revolutions and are loyal to their own values. The peasants are not being inconsistent; however we 
sometimes lack the knowledge to understand them. 
In this thesis, contradictory images have been juxtaposed. The concept of "the peasant 
view oflife" has been introduced to bridge the gap. The peasants' view oflife directs their actions. 
If the view changed, their action would change. In a peasant society, life is full of routine. 
Peasants must follow the schedules of nature and look after their crops carefully. Towards the year 
end, he or she will probably eam enough to live. Without any particular stimulus, a peasant's view 
is unlikely to change, causing them to seem very conservative. When exposed to outside stimuli, 
however their views oflife can change. 
In the two cases described in this thesis, peasants were stimulated by outside groups — the 
RRM workers and the LRM organizers. Li both cases, the peasant view oflife changed and so did 
their actions. The "image oflimited good" was found in both Shandong and Fujian. Although the 
1. Marx, Karl,�The Class Struggle in France 1848-1850' and�The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', in 
Karl Marx and Frederick Engles, Selected Works, Vol.l, extracted in Teodor Shanin, ed, Peasants and 
PeasantSocieties, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987，p.332. 
2. Shanin, Teodor, ibid, p. 1. 
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majority of peasants in Shandong were owner peasants, their lives were no better than tenant 
peasants in Fujian. They all had to work hard for subsistence income. 
To work out a practical way to solve peasants' subsistence needs, both RRM and LRM 
mobilized the peasants to join collective movements. The RRM wanted to restore traditional 
Chinese ideals in the villages. Hence, the peasants were mobilized in restorative terms. The LRM 
wanted to create a new social order 一 the socialist, communist order. Therefore, the peasants 
were mobilized towards a revolutionary goal. 
No matter what their mobilization goal, in the initial stage of the transformation process, 
the first task was to be accepted by the peasant community. RRM workers first contacted the rural 
leaders, who were rich peasants of the older generation. When they received little assistance from 
this group, they turned to the younger generation and succeeded. The RRM workers secured 
loyalty from these young peasants by offering a comprehensive training program. The youth 
helped RRM workers to start mobilization in other villages. 
In contrast, the LRM mobilized peasants through an existing clan organization in Fujian. 
Facilitated by the existed family networks of the LRM organizers, they were quickly accepted by 
the local community. They then began to organize peasant organizations and rent reduction 
programs. When the programs had achieved a degree of success, the reputation of the LRM 
spread over the area. However, peasants came to expect material benefits in return for their 
support to the movements. As RRM workers started cooperatives, peasants were attracted by the 
higher return and low interest loans provided. They joined the cooperatives for purely for their 
own aims. If the cooperatives failed, they would just tum away. 
LRM organizers realized from the start in Fujian the importance of offering incentives to 
those who had given the most support to the movement. Although they realized that material 
benefits would not directly promote loyalty, it was a good method of attracting the peasants to j oin 
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the transformation process. Since peasants gained by participating in movement activities, it was 
an opportunity they had never experienced before. The impact was that the "image of limited 
good" loosened. At least, peasants acknowledged the possibility of mutual gain for the whole 
community. However, to the peasants, the future was still uncertain 一 they were afraid to risk 
everything by giving their full support. They usually tried to get the immediate gain but remain 
prepared for a quick retreat. 
As benefits flowed steadily to the peasants especially to those who actively participated, 
confidence ofthe success ofthe movements grew. The "image oflimited good" ofthe most active 
group ofpeasants broke down. In Shandong, young peasants who had underwent comprehensive 
training and enjoyed a high status in the villages, were the ones who laid down their "image of 
limited good". They felt that they had a responsibility to protect the local community. The 
community's development was connected with the status they enjoyed. They were eager to protect 
the community from attack by the outsiders. They also helped to maintain order within the 
community. 
The LRM provided tremendous incentives to these loyal peasants, and they associated the 
success ofLRM with those benefits. They were also exposed to political propaganda. Although 
they might not have understood the meaning of revolution, they felt saw that it was in their interest 
and their responsibility to help the LRM movement. They were willing to share duties assigned to 
them. 
]n the final stage, the whole community was mobilized. Peasants participated in the 
movements. They all hoped for a prosperous future. 
For RRM, its interrupted ending prevented the movement from moving beyond this stage. 
If the RRM had been allowed to carry on, peasants' views of life might have changed. The 
question is how long it would have taken and whether social conditions would have allowed it. If 
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the social conditions remained unchanged and the youth self-defense team was allowed to carry on 
with its work, the village might have developed as expected. Unfortunately, changes in the social 
conditions were not under the Rural Reconstmctionists' control. It wasn't only the war that 
stopped RRM's development; the falling prices of agricultural products led the cooperatives into 
bankruptcy. A natural disaster - floods — also damaged RRM's efforts. RRM seems to have been 
a good project implemented at the wrong time. Its emphasis on the application of education, 
reliance on voluntary participation and long-term goals all demanded a stable environment. 
However, in 1920's China, the messy situation allowed no such conservative, step-by-step 
development projects to succeed. The only chance for this kind of project to be successful was to 
back it up with strong political power to could protect the project from outside attacks. IfRRM's 
strategy erred, it erred in expecting non-political participation in a political society. Liang 
Shuming did not want RRM to be involved in any kind of politics. Although RRM was supported 
by Han Fuqu, a KMT warlord, it was careful to avoid intervention from the government. 
However, no matter how carefully it did that, it was Han Fuqu who removed the core youth self-
defense teams of RRM that had declared the end of the RRM in Shandong. If Han's betrayal 
action had been avoided, even in the face of Japanese invasion, the RRM would not have come to 
an end. 
LRM, on the other hand, successfully mobilized peasants to step into Stage IV of the 
transformation process. Although Red Army troops had left the homeland of the peasant soldiers, 
villagers here were still in support to LRM. They formed the guerrilla force to continue the 
struggle with KMT troops. The villagers responded to LRM's call of "to protect the soviet is to 
protect the ownership of land"l The villagers' fate was tied to that of the LRM. The LRM's 
3. Printed title words in HSZH, Vol.240, 3 Oct 1934, p.2-3. 
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success in transferring the peasants' view of life and securing their loyalty was due to the 
application ofaradical and violent "political line". It quickly extinguished all counter forces and 
created an atmosphere (Red Terror) in which no one would say no to the party. Many people were 
killed and agricultural production was retarded during this period. The loss oflives and material 
goods was the price paid for this radical strategy. However, the effect of the "political line" was 
short-term. LRM supplemented it with a steady flow of material retums and political propaganda 
campaigns. Through these follow-up actions, the peasants' loyalty was built up. 
In contrast to the RRM's strategy, LRM's strategy to change the peasant view oflife was a 
revolutionary one. It seemed that both strategies succeeded in changing peasants' views. One was 
a conservative approach with few costs and the other, revolutionary, one had greater losses. 
Whether the strategies could succeed or not depended on the objective social condition. There 
were no two identical societies, and there would also be no identical transformation processes. In 
1920's China, revolution seemed to suit the times. 
7.2 The Peasant View of Life Reconsidered 
In the analysis ofpeasant's collective actions, mobilization is usually related to peasants' 
reactive behavior^. However, seemingly contradictory peasant actions are common and many 
contradictory explanations have formed. If peasants were always inconsistent, there would be 
something wrong in the method of study. As Ann Swidler tells us, unit acts could not delineate 
what the person wanted. Unit acts do not reflect value. Only chains of acts indicate the values 
behind them. Hence, to see the logic requires not hiding contradictory observation ofpeasants' 
behavior but lining them up to seek the logic behind them. This induces a study ofpeasant culture 
4. Migdal, Joel S, Peasants, Politics andRevolutions, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. 
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or the peasant view of life. We have to understand these views before any understanding of 
peasant's behavior can occur. 
In this thesis, the concept ofthe peasants' "image oflimited good" was introduced. The 
image delineates peasant behavior under its coverage as well as when it has broken. Research on 
Chinese peasant reactions to mobilization can be explained by peasant nationalism^ or by material 
interest^ or folk sense o f j u s t i c e ? . The concepts previously used were static descriptions ofthe 
peasant view. No study has considered the peasant view as a variable subject to change, or seen 
the peasant view as a dynamic concept. 
This thesis shows how the peasant view can be changed through a process of 
transformation. In this dynamic process, interaction between peasants and outsiders, in our case 
the RRM and LRM organizers, has transformed their view. In this light, peasants' inconsistent 
behaviors can be explained as consistent. 
7.3 Rethinking the "Image of Limited Good" 
A consideration of the "image of limited good", does not simply delineate peasants' 
pessimistic attitudes, but can also be used to describe cultural characteristics ofall societies with 
finite resources and a puzzling future. People in those societies would share similar values to the 
peasants in a closed community. The breakdown of such views explained the change ofbehavior 
from a selfish attitude to an altruistic one during a great transformation ofthe society. 
5. Johnson, Chahners, 1962, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
6. Nee, Victor, 1991，Social Exchange and Political Process in Maoist China, New York: Gorlord Publishing. 
\ Thaxton, Ralph, 1983, China Turned Rightside Up, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
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As the study ofculture/value becomes more and more important for understanding human 
society, it becomes apparent that studies on peasant society can make tremendous contributions. 
\n point offact, during a revival ofpeasant studies in the 1970s, one piece of research compared 
peasant society with industrial society. It found that the peasant society was not as traditional as 
imagined and the industrial society was not that modem. The comparison deepened our 
understanding of the human world. FOOTNOTE? 
7.4 Limitations of the Study and Directions of Future Research 
This research is based solely on documents. However, articles in the two core magazine 
series, Xiang Cun Jian She (Rural Reconstruction) and Hong Se Zhong Hua (Red China) are not 
directly comparable. There are many research studies in XCJS but few in HSZH. There are 
detailed descriptive stories in HSZH but few in XCJS. In addition, as the Soviet Central 
Government's official newspaper, HSZHhas few antagonistic cases. Evaluations ofthe policies 
can only be traced from disobedient cases. 
In addition, few qualitative data can be found to describe the peasants' feelings and 
thoughts. The biographies used to supplement the two magazines lack detailed descriptions ofthe 
transformation process ofpeasants' views. Lacking their subjective reflections during both the 
RRM's and LRM's mobilization dilutes the persuasive power of the arguments. 
Above all, this thesis is an exploratory study using the concept of the peasant view oflife 
and "image of limited good" to analyze the mobilization processes of RRM and LRM. It 
emphasizes culture as a necessary aspect in the analysis of peasant's collective action. As peasant 
culture is such an important key in the understanding of peasant's life, the field ofresearch needed 
further exploration. Qualitative methods might be more appropriate to collect necessary data. For 
historical studies, those qualitative data were, however, difficult to locate. 
182 
Bibliography 
Alitto, Guys. 1979. The Last Confucian; T.iang Shuming and the Chinese Dikmma ofModgmitv. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Association ofAsian Studies. 1993. "NewPerspectives on the Chinese Rural Economy, 1885-1935: 
A Symposium," Republican China, vol.l8, no. 1, 1993. 
Aston, T. H. and Philpin, C. H. E, ed. 1985. TheRrennerDebate. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Bailey, F. G. 1966. The Peasant View ofthe Bad Life； Advancement of Science. Vol. 23. No. 114. 
p.399-409. 
Banfield, Edward C. 1958. The Moral Basis of a Backward Societv. Glenioe: The Free Press. 
Bianco, Lucien. 1990. 'Peasant Movements' in Cambridge History of China. Vol. 13. Fairbank & 
Feuerwerker ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bianco, Lucien. 1Q71 Origins ofthe Chinese Revohitinn. 1915-1949. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press. 
Brandt, Loren and Sands, Barbara. 1990. "Beyond Maltus and Ricardo: Economic Growth, Land 
Concentration and Income Distribution in Early Twentieth Century Rural China," Joumal c>f 
KconoTTiic Historv. vol.50, no.4, Dec 1990: p.807-827. 
Brandt, Loren. 1989. rommercializPition and A^cultural Development； Centml and Eastern Chin^ 
1870-1937. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Brandt, Loren. 1987. "Farm Household Behavior, Factor Markets and the Distributive 
Consequences of Commercialization in Early Twentieth-century China," Joumal of 
Kmnomic Historv. vol.47, no.3, Sept 1987: p.711-737. 
Buck, John Lossing. Reprinted 1980. Three Kssays on Chinese Farm Economy. New York: Garland 
Publishing. 
Buck, John Lossing. 1937. T.andTJtilization in China. Shanghai: University ofNanking. 
Burke, Peter. 1992. History and Social Theorv. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Chen, Jerome. 1992. The Highlander5; ofCentral China. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 
Chen, Yung-fa and Benton, Gregar. 1986. Moral Kconomv and the Chinese Revolution： A Critique. 
Anthropological _ Sociological Centre, University of Amsterdam. 
183 
183 
Chen, Yung-fa. 1986. Making Revolution. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Chesneux, Jean. 1973. Peasant Revolts in China 1840-1949. London: Thames and Hudson. 
Colbum, Fomest D. 1989. Kveryday Forms ofPeasant Resistance. New York: M. E. Sharpe. 
Duara, Prasenjit. 1988. Culture. Power, and the State: Rural North China. 1900-1942. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
Dumenberger, E. Paul. 1984. rbayanov. Peasants, and Economic Anthropology. Orlando: 
Academic Press. 
Eastman, Lloyd E. 1990. "State-Building and the Revolutionary Transformation ofRural Society in 
North China," Modem China, vol.l6, no.2, Apr 1990: p.226-234. 
Elvin, Mark. 1973. The Pattem ofthe Chinese Past. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Fairbank, John K. & Feuerwerker, Albert, eds. 1990. The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 13. 
Repihlican China. 1912-1949. Part 2， 
Faure, David. 1989. The Rural EcnnoTny of Pre-1iberation China: Trade Tncrease and Pe^sant 
Livelihood in .Tingsu and Giiangdong. 1870-1937. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. 
Feuerwerker, Albert. 1969. The Chinese Kconomy. ca. 1870-1911. Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese 
Studies, The University ofMichigan. 
Feuerwerker, Albert. 1977. Fconomic Trends in the Republic of China. 1912-1949. Ann Arbor: 
Center for Chinese Studies, The University ofMichigan. 
Foster, George M. 1965. 'Peasant Society and the toage of Limited Good.’ American 
Anthropologist. Vol. 67. No.2. p.293-315. 
Foster, George M. 1960-61. 'Interpersonal Relations in Peasant Society； Hum^n Organization. Vol. 
‘19.p.l74-178. 
Frank, Andre Gunder. 1980. "Development of Underdevelopment or Underdevelopment of 
,Development in China," in The Development of UnderdevelopTnent in China: A 
Symposium. See Huang, ed. 1980. 
Friedman, Harriet. 1978. "World Market, State, and Family: Social Bases ofHousehold Production 




Gamble, Sidney. 1 QS4, Ting Hsien: A North CHrm Rnml Crnnmunitv. Stanford: StanfordUniversity 
Press. 
Gamble, Sidney. 1963. Nnrth China Village. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press. 
Goodman, David and Redclift, Michael. 1981. From Peasant to Proletarian — Capitalist 
Development and Agrarian Transition. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Greertz, Clifford. 1973. The Tnterpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. 
Harriss, John. 1982. Rural Development: Theories of Peasant Economv and Agrarian Change. 
London: Hudchinson. 
Hayford, Charles. 1992. To the People： James Yen and Village China. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Herskovits, Melville J. 1970. Man and His Works. New York: Alfred. A. Knopf. 
Hilton, Rodney. 1976. The Transition From Feudalism to Capitalism. :London: Atlantic Highlands: 
Humanity Press. 
Hinton, William. 1972. Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chingse Vilbge. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
Hobsbawn, EJ. 1978. Primitive Rebels. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Huang, Philip C. C. 1991a. "A Reply to Ramon Myers," Joumal of Asian Studies, Aug 1991: 
p.629-633. 
Huang, Philip C. C. 1991b. "Paradigmatic Crisis in Chinese Studies: Paradoxes in Social and 
Economic History," Modem China. Jul 1991:p.299-341. 
Huang, Philip C. C. 1990. The Peasant Fntnily and Riiral Development in the Yangtze Delta, 
1350-1988. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Huang , Philip C. C. 1985. The Peasant Kcnnoniy and Social Change in North China. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
Huang, Philip C. C, ed. 1980. The Development ofIJnderdevelopment in China: A Symppgium. 
New York: Sage. 




Keyes, Charles F, ed. 1983. 'Peasant Strategies in Asian Societies: Moral and Rational Economic 
Approaches - A Symposium.’ Joumal of Asian Studies. Vol. 17. No. 4. p.753-868. 
Kimmel, Michael S. 1990. Revolution: A Sociological Tnterpretation. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Kwok, Danny Wynn Ye. 1965. Scientism in Chinese Thought. 1900-1950. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Kuhn, Philip A. 1975. "Local Self-Govemment Under the Republic", in Conflict and Control in Late 
Tmperial China. See Wakeman, ed. 1975. 
Landsberger, Henry A. 1974. Rural Protest: Peasant Movements and Social Change. London: 
Macmillan. 
Landsberger, Henry A. 1969. TMin American Peasant Movements. London: Cornell University 
Press. 
Lewis, Oscar. 1960-61. "Some ofMy Best Friends are Peasants； fhiman Organization. Vol. 19. 
p.179-180. 
Lewis, Oscar. 1QS1 T.ife in a Mexican Village. Tepoztlan Re-studied. Urbana: University ofIllinois 
Press. 
Lippit, Victor. 1980. "The Development ofUnderdevelopment in China," in The Development of 
Underdevelopment in China: A Symposium. See Huang, ed. 1980. 
Little, Daniel. 1989. TInderstanding Peasant China: Case Studies in the Philosophy of Soci^l 
Science. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Madsen, Richard. 1984. Morality and Power in a Chinese Village. Berkeley: University ofCalifomia 
Press. 
Marks, Robert. 1984. Riira1 Revolution in South China. Madison: University ofWisconsin Press. 
Mendels, Frank F. 1972. "Proto-industrialization: The First Phase of the Industrial Process," 
Joumal ofKconomic History, vol.32, nos. 1-2, 1972. 
Mercher, Joan P, ed. 1983. Social Anthropology ofPeasantrv. Bombay: Somaiya Publications. 
Migdal, Joel, S. 1974. Peasants. Politics and Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Mintz, Sidney W. 1953. The Folk-Urban Continuum and the Rural Proletarian Community.' 
American Jonma1 nfSociologv. Vol. 59. No. 2. p. 136-143. 
186 
183 
Myers, Ramon H. 1991. "How did the Modem Chinese Economy Develop?——A Review Article," 
. T o _ 1 ofAsian Studies. Aug 1991: p.604-628. 
Myers, Ramon H. 1988. "Review Article: Land and Labour in China," Kponomic Development and 
Cultural Change, vol.36, 1988: p.797-806. 
Myers, Ramon H. 1980. The Chinese Fconomy. Past and Present. Belmont: Wadsworth. 
Myers, Ramon H. 1970. The Chinese Peasant Kconomv - Agricultural Development in Hopgi and 
Shantung. 1890-1949. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Naquin, Susan. 1976. Mi11enanan Rebellion in China. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Perkins Dwight, ed. 1975. China's Modem Economy in Historical Perspective. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
Perkins, Dwight. 1969. Agricultural Development in China. Chicago: Aldine Publishing. 
Pitt-Rivers, Julian 1960-61. "'Interpersonal Relations in Peasant Society" A Comment'. Human 
Organization. Vol. 19. p.180-183. 
Popkin, Samuel L. 1979. The Rational Peasant. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Potter, J.M., M.N. Diaz and G.M. Foster, eds. 1967. Peasant Societv: A Reader. Boston: Little 
Brown. 
Rawski, Thomas G and Li, Lillian M, ed. 1992. Chinese History in KconomiQ Perspective. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Rawski, Thomas G. 1989. Kconomic Growth in Prewar China. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Redfield, Robert. 1989. The T.itt1e Cormniinitv and Peasant Societv and Cultyrg. Midway Reprint 
edition. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Redfield, Robert. 1947. The Folk Society'. American Joiimal of Sociology. Vol. 52. No. 4. p.293-
308. 
Redfield, Robert. 1Q41. The Folk Culture ofYucator. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Redfield, Robert. 1930. Tepoztlan: A Mexican Village. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Riskin, Carl. 1975. "Surplus and Stagnation in Modem China," in China's Modem economy in 
Historical Perspective. See Perkins, ed. 1975. 
187 
183 
Riskin, Carl. 1980. "The Symposium Papers: Discussion and Comments," in The Development of 
Underdevelopment in Cbina: A Symposium. See Huang, ed. 1980. 
Schultz, Theodore W. 1968. Kconomic Growth and Agriculture. Bombay: Tata McGraw Hill. 
Schultz, Theodore W. 1964. Transforming Tr^ditirma1 Agriculture. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
Scott, James C. 1988. Weapons ofthe Weak: Evervdav Forms ofPeasant Regi$tance. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
Scott, James C. 1976. The Moral Fxonnmy ofthe Peasant. New Heaven: Yale University Press. 
Seldon, Mark. 1971. The Yenan W?^ y in Revolutionary China. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University 
Press. 
Shanin, Teodor. 1990. Definrng Peasants. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Shanin, Teodor, ed. 1987. PeRsant and Peasant Societies. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Sheel, KamaL 1989. Peasant Society and Marxist Tntellectuals in Chin^. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Siegel, Bernard J, ed. 1962. Riennial Rev i ew ofAnthropologv. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Siu, Helen. 1989. Agents and Victims in Sonth China: Accomplices in Rural Revolution. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
Skinner, William. 1964-65. "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China," Joum^1 of Agian 
Studies 24(1-3). 
Snow, Edgar. 1968. ^eA Star Over China. London: Gollancz. 
Stavenhagen, Rodolfo. 1970. Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin America. New 
York: Anchor Books. 
Tan, Chester. 1971. rHnese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century. New York: Garden City. 
Tawney, R. H. 1966. T nnd and T.abor in China. Boston: Beacon. 
Thaxton, Ralph. 1983. Hnim Tumed Right Side Up. New Haven: Yale University Press. 




Thomer, Daniel, Kerblay, Basile and Smith, R. E. F., ed. 1966. A. V, Chayanov on tbg Theory of 
Peasant Economy. Madison: University ofWisconsin Press. 
Thomiley, Daniel. 1987. The Kconomic<^ n^H SocioloPv of Rural Communities; East and West 
Perspectives. Hong Kong: Avebury. 
Tilly, Charles. 1981. As Socio1ogv Meets Historv. New York: Academic Press. 
Wakeman, Frederic. 1975. r,nnflict and Control in T.ate Tmnerial China. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Wittfogel, Karl A. 1970. AgHcii1ture: A Key to the Understanding of Chinese SodetV. Pa$t and 
Present. Canberra: AustralianNational University Press. 
Wolf, Eric. 1955. Types of Latin American Peasantry: A Preliminary Discussion', American 
‘Anthropology. VoL 57, p.452-471. 
Wolf, Eric. 1988. Peasant Wars ofthe Twentieth Century. New York: Harper and Rowe. 
Yang, C. K. 1959. A Chinese Vimge in Karlv CoTTimTinist Transition. Cambridge Mass: Harvard 
University Press. 
Yang, Mao Chun. 1945. A Chinese Vi11^ g^e: Taitou. Shantiing Province. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Yip, Hon Ming. 1988. Merchant Capital, Stnal] Peasant Economy and Foreign Capitalism: The Case 















































.v  .  =  
.
.






















,  :  > . 广；
-. 











































































.  , - r ,  
. . .  
-  -  .•  .•
.-
〜 .  .  
.
.










 :  ；
 






















































: - r^ y s^ M f i^ '^^ ^^^ .^ .  ^ 二  f  J 


















 •  .  .  V  4  ^ / ^ % , 
！
：
 -  -
^ 
.








圓國圓11丨111111 S3LJBjqLn >|HnD 
